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The last decade has seen mounting pressure on public sector organizations to become more "businesslike," especially to open themselves up to the play of market forces and the real needs of customers. An important component of the business ethos that is being urged on the public sector is an emphasis on organizational culture and "getting the culture right." This article looks at the relevance of the culture perspective to the problem of ethical conduct in the public sector. The concept of organizational culture is examined critically in the light of some recent examples of attempts to effect a culture change in national and local government in the United Kingdom. The article concludes that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the imposition of a market-driven philosophy and the need for the openness and accountability that are indispensable features of all public service organizations.

ENHANCING PUBLIC SERVICE ETHICS
More Culture, Less Bureaucracy?

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INTRODUCTION

It is increasingly recognized that in the perennial search for efficient and honest public administration, the creation of an appropriate ethical climate is as crucial as the formal specification of appropriate and legitimate conduct. That is to say, it is possible and necessary to exclude through statute or contractual limitations such unequivocally unacceptable behavior as gross neglect of duties, the solicitation of bribes, or the misappropriation of public funds. But there is, in addition, a wide range of equally unacceptable forms of conduct—covert favoritism, blocking access to key individuals and to crucial information, and other manifestations of illegitimate influence—which are much more difficult to specify, punish, and accordingly deter.

Until the 1990s, the notion of administrative professionalism was regarded as the principal bulwark against the more amorphous and intangible forms of inefficiency and abuse. But as the 1980s wore on, old-style

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professionalism came increasingly to be viewed with suspicion, synony-mous with vested interests and the exploitation of credentialism for monopoly purposes and, in some general sense, lying at the heart of the problem of rigid and inflexible bureaucracies unresponsive to the public they were supposed to serve. The fact that professional associations seemed also to be failing to protect the modern state from the creeping contagion of corruption gave additional weight to the view that they were operating primarily to protect the interests of their members rather than those of the public.[1] Administrative professionals could therefore no longer be relied upon to safeguard the public interest.

In the antistate, antibureaucracy atmosphere of the 1980s and the corresponding enthusiasm for the market, it was inevitable that the world of business and the values and management practices that informed it should come to provide the model for public administration. Accordingly, the public sector was enjoined to become more "businesslike." Typically, this has involved more and more areas and departments of national and local government, in the United Kingdom and in many other developed countries, embracing the language and practices of the private sector: formulating mission statements, launching quality initiatives, being more proactive and entrepreneurial, ensuring greater choice, and, above all, embracing an ethic of consumerism. No longer to be treated as passive recipients who should be thankful for whatever is handed down to them, those on the receiving end of public services are now to be regarded as customers who have a right to expect a high quality of service.

But how are public servants long schooled in the ethic of bureaucratic standardization—an ethic that allegedly tends to regard client needs as impediments to rational planning—how are such officials to be converted to an ethic of consumerism? The answer seems to be that such a conversion may be effected by transforming the *cultures* of public sector organiza-tions. That is to say, by purging the latter of traditional administrative values and replacing those values with others that, in stressing flexibility, initiative, and responsiveness to customer needs, are eminently suited to a rapidly changing postmodern world.

Such an argument has a distinct appeal when we consider the negative consequences of some formal attempts to promote acceptable standards of behavior by public servants. In this context, the commonly accepted means of promoting ethical behavior are precisely to strengthen formal organization—the "steel net" (Theobald, 1990, 1993)—which operates to constrain the complex of human behaviors and activities that it encloses.

In practice, this has usually meant subjecting public servants to greater regulation and scrutiny through the elaboration of formal rules and procedures. However, the elaboration of formal rules and procedures in turn requires the further elaboration of formal organization in the form of committees, boards, and panels, as well as investigating officers to oversee the implementation and enforcement of ethical codes. In this respect, the task of keeping public administration as public as possible often runs the risk of producing excessive bureaucratization. It has frequently been observed that the institutionalization of ethical practices can have a profoundly negative effect upon decision making, as well as on the morale of public servants. A number of studies of the U.S. civil service have revealed that rules aimed to eliminate patronage and inefficiency often result in as much inefficiency and irregularity as they aim to prevent. Such systems can become so encumbered with safeguards as virtually to preclude effective management. For example, a review of staffing procedures in city government revealed that it took between 17 and 610 (sic) calendar days to hire a new employee. Disciplinary actions can drag on even longer: One classic example relates to the case of a supervisor attempting to fire an employee whose repeated unauthorized absences from duty had placed an unacceptable burden on coworkers. This supervisor had to spend no less than 21 months preparing documentation and conferring with personnel staff to build a successful case. But at the end of the period, this same supervisor received a poor rating from his superior for neglecting other duties (see Campbell, 1979).

Although the above example possibly represents an extreme case,[2] it alerts us to the dangers of an overreliance on formal procedures in the drive to enhance ethical standards. It raises the crucial question of whether public service performance standards can be strengthened while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of overbureaucratization.

TRANSFORM CULTURE NOT STRUCTURE

In the light of the current enthusiasm for the privatization of public administration, it is interesting that a powerful theme in the business literature currently runs in favor of *debureaucratization*, that is, of dismantling rigid structures and hierarchies, promoting decentralization, and maximizing flexibility even to the point of creating chaos (Peters, 1988;

Stacey, 1992). For such writers, the key to organizational success lies not in the refinement of organizational structures—the ever-more precise definition of roles, rules, procedures, hierarchies, divisions, departments, and channels of communication—but in the strengthening of *organizational culture*, that is, the system of core values, symbols, and rituals around which organizations are believed to cohere.

The management literature of the 1980s displayed a marked shift in enthusiasm away from what may be termed a rational approach to management based upon sophisticated often quantitative techniques, in favor of moral and symbolic forms.[3] Management gurus have increasingly emphasized the importance of strong cultures in the form of clearly articulated sets of informal values and norms that provide unequivocal guidance to all employees as to how they are expected to behave without subjecting them to the constraining and stultifying domination of the bureaucratic net. Strong cultures thus give firm direction without suffocating creativity and initiative.

The strong culture movement has its origins in the search for solutions to the problem of the perceived declining performance of American and European economies. Because, by contrast, the Japanese economy seemed during the 1970s and 1980s to be taking giant steps toward international competitive supremacy, it was inevitable that it was to that country, its culture, and society that the management gurus of the West turned for inspiration (see, especially, Pascale & Athos, 1981). The gurus found that all aspects of Japanese society, not least its renowned corporations, seemed to be pervaded by strong normative systems that made possible extremely effective levels of integration and cooperation while at the same time apparently avoiding the pitfalls of overly rigid and centralized organizational structures.

Accordingly, the 1980s saw an outpouring of management writing strongly advocating the virtues of strong organizational cultures and insisting that the proper management of culture is the passport to corporate success. Culture, understood as shared key values, beliefs, and symbols buttressed by appropriate rituals and ceremonies, allegedly fulfills several key functions: First, it conveys a sense of identity to the organization's members; second, it plays a major role in developing a sense of commitment to an entity larger than the individual; third, culture enhances the stability of the organization as a system of interrelated parts; and fourth, culture embodies a pattern of metaphors and symbols that provide crucial

guidelines for behavior, thereby enabling individuals to situate themselves in relation to the larger whole (see, especially, Smircich, 1983). The point is that where an organization's culture is strong, the high levels of integration and commitment that allegedly ensue enable that organization to get the most from its key resource—people. Such an organization is thus able to adapt with ease and efficiency to the constantly changing environment of the late 20th century.

Large claims are made for strong organizational cultures: According to culture enthusiasts, Deal and Kennedy (1988), employees who know exactly what is expected of them will waste little time in reflecting on how they are supposed to behave in a given situation. In an organization where the culture is weak, by contrast, employees spend a lot of time trying to decide what they are supposed to be doing. The consequences of a strong culture, claim Deal and Kennedy, are truly amazing, with as much as 2 hours of productive work gained in any single day (p. 15).

Similarly, Peters and Waterman (1982), in their celebrated multimillion-dollar bestseller of the 1980s, contend that business excellence is in no small measure closely related to getting the culture right. On the basis of their survey of high-performing companies in the United States, Peters and Waterman highlighted their eight well-known basic attributes of excellence:

1. Bias for action—get on with the job rather than become bogged down in complex analyses.
2. Close to the customer—staying attuned to the customer's needs with the emphasis on quality, service, and reliability.
3. Autonomy and entrepreneurship—create the conditions that foster innovation and independent action. Accordingly, excellent companies usually break down into small units where individual initiative will be encouraged.
4. Productivity through people—genuine commitment to the development of the employee skills that are the foundation of quality and productivity. Such a commitment is achieved by convincing employees of their importance to the organization through high levels of involvement in decision making and other programs and activities.
5. Hands-on, value driven—top management keeps in close personal contact with all areas of activity in the organization.
6. Stick to the knitting—keep to areas of activity that you know best; avoid the temptation to diversify, as has been the case with conglomerates.
7. Simple form-lean staff—keep organizational structure simple; avoid especially the multiplication of managerial levels.
8. Simultaneous loose-tight properties—organizations should be based upon strong core values, but at the same time allow flexibility to subunits and display tolerance of error.[4]

RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS?

But is the concept of organizational culture, developed overwhelmingly in the context of private, profit-seeking corporations, of any relevance to the operation of public organizations? In the light of the current enthusiasm for privatization and deregulation, and for the subjection of the public sector to the logic of the market, the immediate response to this question is likely to be in the affirmative. Furthermore, given the pronounced antibureaucratic strain of the culture movement, of the business ethos generally, it is to be expected that the public sector will be targeted for the thoroughgoing dose of debureaucratization that the strong-culture remedy entails. After all, it has become virtually axiomatic that the public organizations epitomize the pathologies of bureaucracy—remotness, arrogance, undeserved privilege, complacency, rigidity, and inefficiency. It will not therefore be surprising that a number of writers on local and national government, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, have argued strongly for the relevance of the notion of cultural transformation for public service organizations.

According to a much-used British textbook on public administration (Lawton & Rose, 1994), *In Search of Excellence* has become the bible for rising executives, not least those in the public sector.[5] The Benefits Agency (the largest of the English civil service agencies), for example, adopted Bias for Action as one of its core values, elaborating it into a list of relevant features emphasizing innovation, clear sense of direction, and confident and visible leadership. East Sussex Social Services, likewise heavily influenced by Peters and Waterman (1982), developed the theme of responsive management, the core characteristics of which are leadership and clarity of values, an orientation to action, responsiveness to customer and client, encouraging autonomy, risk taking, and enterprise, and involving staff in creating a synergic work environment. In line with developments in the business world, public sector culture transformations have often been bound up with quality initiatives. Too varied to be examined in detail here, such programs have generally entailed first, detailed specifications of what services citizen-consumers are entitled to expect from public authorities; second, the establishment of channels of information and opportunities for complaint; and third, the means by which citizen-consumers may seek redress.[6]

So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, Stewart and Clarke (1987), in a much-quoted article, have urged the development of a public service orientation (PSO) in British local government. This PSO recognizes that:

- A local authority's activities exist to provide service for the public.
- A local authority will be judged by the quality of the service provided within the resources available.
- The service provided is only of real worth if it is of value to those for whom it is provided.
- Those for whom services are provided are customers demanding high-quality service.
- Quality of service demands *closeness to the customer*. (The term *close to the customer* appears repeatedly throughout this article.)

In the light of the above observations about professionalism, it is interesting that Stewart and Clarke (1987) maintain that the PSO challenges senior managers who "judge the quality of service by organizational or *professional* [italics added] standards" rather than by customer standards. They move on to note that "the Audit Commission has rightly advised local authorities to ensure that their management is guided by *vision or shared values* [italics added]" (Stewart & Clarke, 1987, pp. 161-162).

Although few would not support the goal of making public bodies more responsive to those who have a right to their services, the key question seems to be whether cultural change offers the best prospect for achieving this goal. More generally, can we be confident that the strategies and policies that have allegedly achieved success in profit-making organizations are likely to be similarly successful or even appropriate in public service organizations? These are very large questions that obviously cannot be resolved within the scope of a single article. The principal aim here is limited to identifying a number of problems relating both to the concept of organizational culture and to the appropriateness of it and the business ethos generally to the operation of public sector organizations.

First, there is a pronounced tendency in the literature on both private and public organizations to treat culture as nonproblematic. Culture is somehow simply "there"; all that is required is that we take hold of it and mold it to our needs. But culture is a highly complex notion, the analysis of which has preoccupied sociologists and social anthropologists for many decades. On the basis of such analyses, we can be sure that even in extremely simple societies, culture is seldom if ever a monolithic entity. Accordingly, in large complex organizations, culture embodies a kaleidoscope of cross-cutting and often conflicting values and vested interests. Culture both expresses and articulates with the prevailing distribution of power and authority within an organization and therefore comprises crosscurrents and countercultures (see, especially, Anthony, 1994; Meek, 1992; Smircich, 1983). To some extent, the existence and significance of

countercultures is recognized in the business literature—indeed the logic of a cultural transformation or revolution requires a challenge to existing cultures (see Peters & Waterman, 1982; Stacey, 1992).[7] Nonetheless, a certain degree of unease attaches to a concept that can be used to encompass diametrically opposite patterns of behavior—corporate ideology and value configurations and associated behavior that conflict with or possibly challenge this corporate ideology. Unless we can specify in more detail the mode of articulation of values, symbols, and their ritual expression, on one hand, with the disposition of organizational resources, on the other, the term culture loses any explanatory value.

Second, and related to the above, the literature on the private sector is not excessively explicit as to how a radical culture change may be carried through. Too often, the transformation seems to depend upon a strong-willed executive who buttresses the virtual imposition of a set of values with a good deal of informal socializing, backslapping, and ceremonials (see, especially, Deal & Kennedy, 1988). In an era of diminishing resources and declining staff levels in the public sector, calls for thorough-going culture change, especially when they emanate from a newly arrived chief executive, may well be shorthand for the imposition of cutbacks. Furthermore, the proliferation of certain types of quality indicators—elaborate guidelines, proformas, questionnaires on minimum response time to letters, complaints, and so on—may well result in further bureaucratization and simply be a form of Taylorism in disguise.[8] Recognizing this potential pitfall, advocates of culture change emphasize the paramountcy of the genuine involvement of public service staff at all levels in the process of transformation. The process, several writers insist, must be bottom-up rather than top-down: empowerment is the order of the day.[9]

However, in the face of the cutbacks that have devastated the U.K. public sector over the last decade, one wonders about the amount of leverage those who might wish to question the new culture are able to deploy (see, especially, Christoph, 1992). Certainly, the evidence on whistleblowers in the public service does not inspire confidence that recent changes have in fact been bottom-up, manifesting widespread empowerment. (On whistleblowers in British education see below.)

Third, we need to consider carefully whether delivering public services can be equated with the production of Big Macs, tractors, or computer software. The supply of Big Macs, tractors, and computer software is unlimited so long as there are consumers willing to pay. The supply of housing, school places, hospital beds, and nursery facilities is necessarily limited. This means that a pronounced element of dissatisfaction on the

part of an increasing proportion of consumers will be impossible to eliminate. There is also the added complication that public authorities are statutorily required to deliver certain services—child custody is the most obvious example—where there is never likely to be a satisfied consumer at the point of delivery. Such difficulties are in fact recognized by a number of advocates of the PSO, not least Stewart and Clarke (1987):

> The customer of a public service is not the same as a customer of a service in the market. The customer does not necessarily buy the service; the customer may have a right to receive the service; the customer may be compelled to receive the service; customers may be refused a service because their needs may not meet the criteria laid down. . . . Thus the public service orientation is *not merely consumerism.* (p. 170)

Stewart and Clarke (1987) are thus constrained to recognize that public service embodies elements that are entirely absent from the provision of services in the private sector: "Concern for the citizen as well as the customer distinguishes the public service orientation from the concern for the customer that should mark any service organization" (p. 170; see also Cooke, 1992).

Stewart and Clarke here hit upon the central dilemma of transporting to the public sector a notion and related policies that have been nurtured in the world of business. The two sectors are (were?) qualitatively different: The former is dominated by managers who have delegated authority to allocate the resources under their jurisdiction. These managers are accountable to shareholders and consumers only through the mechanism of the market. Public servants, by contrast, are supposedly accountable to their public through the much more complex and indirect mechanism of the system of representation. This system, furthermore, is not simply concerned with consumption but with the much broader issue of *citizenship*: the right not only to receive certain goods and services but to participate, both directly and indirectly through representation, in the decision-making process that leads to the allocation of these goods and services. This raises a number of complex issues, not least of which is the role of elected representatives (for whom there is no equivalent in the private sector) in the process of getting close to the customer (see, especially, Bennington & Taylor, 1992).

However, before venturing into the difficult terrain of political participation, I wish to comment upon the appropriateness generally of the business ethos to public sector organizations.

IS FLEXIBILITY DESIRABLE
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR?

The literature stressing the desirability of change in the public sector is replete with such notions as flexibility, informality, initiative, personal service, and getting to know the customer. Rigid rules and regulations are anachronistic; mission, vision, and self-regulation render formal procedures virtually redundant. Although flexible organizations may be desirable, perhaps essential, in business firms competing in an increasingly frenetic global environment, I want to suggest that they are inappropriate, even dangerous, in public sector organizations, for two reasons.

First, as we have seen, the very notion of public administration means that goods and services are supposed to be administered in the interests of, precisely, the public. Because the market cannot provide the mechanisms that will permit such a process of allocation, other criteria—particularly criteria that embody the principles of equity and distributive justice—must be developed, as well as the organizational structures to underpin them. This means that bureaucratic principles, the standardization of procedures, and the precise specification of roles and duties that these embody constitute the core foundations of public administration. Without a measure of structural stability, there is a danger that administration increasingly becomes concealed within a set of interpersonal exchanges, that it retreats into the private sphere. That is, the more flexible public organizations become, the more likely it is that decisions are taken and resources allocated on an ad hoc, nonstandardized basis.

I would like to suggest that the British experience over the past decade demonstrates that the imposition of the market-driven ethos onto public service organizations has led precisely to such a retreat. Such a claim may now seem uncontroversial in the light of the increasing body of evidence in relation, say, to the British Public Health Service, which, since the introduction of an internal market, is run by more than 3,000 members of nonaccountable QUANGOS (disposing some £40 billion per annum). In the field of higher education also, there have been a number of well-publicized scandals relating to the antics of the chief executives of certain colleges and universities.

In December 1994, the vice chancellor of Portsmouth University was forced to resign his post following allegations about the misuse of expense accounts and an attempt to cover up these and other abuses by engineering the dismissal of his deputy. Interestingly, this gentleman, in addition to his

£90,000 per annum plus expenses and a Jaguar car for the university post, was drawing £19,000 a year for chairing a local hospital trust. His wife, furthermore, sat on another health service trust, which also had a representative on the university's board. Other similar examples could be cited here—the governors of a college in Derby who illegally granted themselves £16,760 allowances, awarded contracts to the tune of £1.4 million without putting them out to tender, and whose principal appointed his daughter's unqualified boyfriend to a visiting lecturer post (see *The Lecturer*, a publication of the [UK] University and College Lecturer's Union, April and October 1994). However, more germane to the argument of this article is the less sensational but nonetheless insidious intimidation that the cultural revolution has brought in its wake. At the Derby college, two staff representatives on the board of governors who had criticized the imposition of a far-reaching restructuring program were suspended at a hastily convened meeting. The college librarian was later told to shred the minutes of the meeting, which he had placed in the library. In October 1994, four lecturers at Swansea University were suspended for revealing that master's degrees were being awarded for inferior work. (After a lengthy inquiry they were later reinstated.) Again in 1994, a lecturer at a college of further education informed his management that he suspected students in his Business and Technology Education Council course were cheating. When managers took no action, he took his concern to the council. Thereupon, college management offered him £25,000 to withdraw his submission and when he refused, sacked him. Experiences such as this have convinced the lecturers' union, the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), of the necessity of setting up a whistleblowers hotline, the purpose of which is to offer advice to teaching staff who believe that they are being, or are likely to be, victimized. Since it was established in the autumn of 1994, the hotline has received a steadily increasing volume of complaints. Although most of these complaints turn out to be about poor management rather than outright abuse, they tell us something about the climate of unease and insecurity that the imposition of the business ethos has engendered.

Second, and in a more general sense, a number of writers would contend that the very conception of public administration is founded upon the notion of organizational structures that have a *facticity*; that is to say, an existence that is, to a minimal degree, independent of role incumbents. The all-pervading theme of the separation of private from public interests, of incumbent from office, demands the independent existence of a formal structure, of formal procedures and processes, of statuses, roles, and rules.

Indeed, the very possibility of ethical behavior in public organizations turns upon the existence of structures that make possible the formal demarcation of public and private spheres. Without such a demarcation, it becomes impossible and impractical to separate ethical from unethical behavior (see especially Du Gay, 1994). Thus, it would seem that bureaucracy is not only a vital component of public administration but forms the crucial institutional boundary between the state, on one hand, and civil society, on the other. Accordingly, it appears that to the extent that bureaucracy declines or is "reformed" out of existence, the state retreats from the purview of civil society.

CONCLUSION

It is undoubtedly the case that public bureaucracies can be rigid, inflexible, and insensitive to the needs of those they are supposed to serve. It is also undoubtedly the case that old-style administrative professionalism cannot always provide a guarantee of high-quality public service. However, to respond to these limitations by dismantling what are assumed to be outdated institutional patterns and seeking to replace them by highly intangible symbolic forms imported from the commercial world would appear to carry considerable risks. Furthermore, it seems that the belief that business cultures can rejuvenate public service organizations is also highly questionable. In fact, there is a growing body of evidence from both the United States and the United Kingdom that the preoccupation with "businessing the bureaucracy" (Du Gay, 1994), far from making administration more responsive, has actually increased the incidence of abuse (see, especially, Frederickson, 1993).

Much of the enthusiasm for business culture stems from a profoundly Anglo-Saxon suspicion of the state and everything the state does. During the economic turbulence of the 1980s, it is not therefore surprising that the state in the form of public bureaucracies became fair game. However, we should not forget that a central role in the diagnosis of the problem—that is, in targeting the administrative apparatus—was played by politicians. These politicians, it may not be overly cynical to suggest, may have had a vested interest in deflecting public criticism away from their own failure to arrest the economic and social decline of Western societies. Whatever the motivation, it seems certain that the current travails of mature capitalist societies are ultimately explicable only in terms of sea

changes in the world economy. This would suggest that the problem of the state and the abuse of public authority must at some point be analyzed in relation to the process of globalization. But because this is a vast and complex terrain, it cannot be explored in this context. However, it may be pertinent at this point seriously to consider the likelihood that a major consequence for Western states of the process of globalization is that the public domain is undergoing a process of contraction.[10] Because this contraction is likely to have far-reaching consequences, especially for the accountability of those who occupy positions of public power, the key question is how this decline might be arrested. Accordingly, the central problem of governance in the West in the immediate future seems likely to be that of how to reinvigorate politics, to revitalize the notion of citizenship. Contrary to much current thinking about organizations, the problem is unlikely to be bureaucracy, nor the solution its elimination.

NOTES

1. For surveys of corruption in both developed and less developed societies, see Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine (1989) and Theobald (1990).

2. For Osborne and Gaebler (1992), such an example, far from being the exception, embodies the very essence of public administration.

3. For an excellent analysis of the various approaches to management, see Reed (1989).

4. Not surprisingly, *In Search of Excellence* has produced a considerable amount of critical comment. A useful survey is to be found in Guest (1989).

5. This single text has had a most remarkable impact on the rhetoric, if not the practice, of managers in the British public sector, producing a plethora of "Excellence" seminars, conferences, and even annual awards (e.g., the winner of the annual Local Government Chronicle Leadership Award earns the chance to go on a 2-week Tom Peters "skunk camp"). See Hoggett (1991, pp. 247-248).

6. For a detailed discussion of such initiatives in U.K. local government, see Sanderson (1992).

7. "When people strongly share a culture, they are in effect using the same unconscious models to interpret what is going on around them and to design their responses to change. Since they all see the world in much the same way [sic], they are unable to provoke each other to different insights. We usually see the organisational challenge and the difficulty as one of bringing about a common culture. In fact it is far more difficult to keep different cultures alive, because of the power of group conformity. Top management should therefore see its role as one of actively promoting counter cultures in the organisation rather than trying to change diverse cultures into a common one" (Stacey, 1992, p. 201).

8. Compare Deal and Kennedy's (1988, pp. 193-194) enthusiasm for McDonald's with the much darker view expounded by Ritzer (1993).

9. But see Hoggett (1991):

> Fergus Murray coined the phrase "the decentralisation of production and the centralisation of command" to describe these processes at work in Italian companies such as Olivetti. . . . In the case of state institutions operational devolution to schools, hospitals, executive agencies, etc., occurs in the same movement as the centralisation of strategic command via enhanced control over expenditure, the nationalisation of the curriculum, etc. (p. 249)

10. See especially Fainstein and Fainstein (1993) and Theobald (1995).

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