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Time Society 1997; 6; 171

DOI: 10.1177/0961463X97006002004

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Leisure and the Modularization of Daily Life

Hugo van der Poel

ABSTRACT. The modularization of daily life refers to the growing exchangeability of forms of spending time in the unwinding of daily life (daily paths and life paths) due to increases in the scale of the supply of standardized time-units – filled with more or less predictable, calculable and re-combinable activities – and the simultaneous growth in the opportunities for individual actors to choose from this supply and reflexively organize their daily lives. After having introduced this concept, its relation to leisure is discussed. A distinction is made between having leisure and ways of spending it. In the first case, it is argued that there is no monolithic leisure area, where everybody can do whatever he or she likes. Rather, there exist different leisure-scapes, designating differences in the freedoms people are entitled to, depending on the differences in sources of income. In the second case, the discussion focuses on the relation between leisure and consumption. Particular attention is given to how the search for moral satisfaction shapes the ways people assemble time-modules in their daily life paths. **KEY WORDS** • daily life • leisure • modularization • sociology of time

Leisure and Modernity

It is quite possible that people in ancient times played games, danced and made music, but does that mean that they enjoyed leisure in a way that resembles the way we enjoy leisure today? As a social construction, leisure presupposes the existence of certain structural conditions that make the production and reproduction of leisure in social practices possible. People need to be able to

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communicate about leisure – there has to be a word for and a concept of leisure, and a group of people must be able to recognize and understand this concept and use it in conversations in a meaningful way. There have to be forms of organization and specific means to give shape to leisure practices. And, finally, there must be a set of norms and values that regulates who is entitled to spend time according to their wishes; when, for how long, and to what extent. The fact that in ancient times people participated in certain activities which today we commonly refer to as leisure activities is thus not enough. Slaves, or prisoners in our own times, may very well participate in activities such as dancing, making music or playing chess. However, we need to know more of the context in which these activities take place before we can say that the participation in these activities constitutes leisure practices.

To be sure, leisure and non-leisure should not be seen as being mutually exclusive. It is obvious that in order to be able to speak about leisure, certain conditions need to be in place; it follows, in turn, that activities and practices may have a lower or higher leisure content or leisure character, to the extent that these conditions are being met. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that for leisure to exist as a mass phenomenon – a phenomenon that is relevant to and highly valued by a large majority of the population and has vast economic and politico-organizational consequences – these conditions are only fully met in the contexts of high modernity, when, at the same time, leisure becomes integral to (modern) daily life.

Modernity is a multidimensional set of dynamic institutional changes taking place on an unprecedented scale. Modernity is inherently global and, at the same time, intensive, uprooting even the most intimate aspects of daily and personal life (Giddens, 1990; 1991). Although some aspects of modernity date back to ancient times, their consolidation into a set of increasingly disruptive and irreversible changes may be located in post-feudal Europe, particularly in the North Sea area since around 1500. These changes were fuelled by the expansion of merchant capitalism and an emerging world economy, protestantism and scientific discoveries, bourgeois revolutions and processes of state formation (see Maddison, 1982; De Vries and Van der Woude, 1995; Taylor, 1996). Steaming full ahead into the 19th century, modernity soon covered the whole of the earth, leaving virtually no areas unaffected by the globalizing nation-state system, the industrialization of war, the impacts of the world market and western cultural ideas, values and norms, (such as a secular association with nature and appeals to universal human rights).

Giddens (1990: 53) identifies three dominant sources of the dynamism of modernity: 'the separation of time and space' as 'the condition of time-space distancing of indefinite scope'; the development of 'disembedding mechanisms', which "'lift out" social activity from localised contexts, reorganising social relations across large time-space distances'; and 'the reflexive appropria-

tion of knowledge', implying that 'the production of systematic knowledge about social life has become integral to system reproduction'.

More specifically for our purposes here, the dynamism of modernity altered the sequencing of practices into daily and life paths, and therewith the time-spatial organization of daily life, including leisure. Translating the description of the sources of modern dynamism on a societal level to the level of the changes in the organization of daily activities, the following three sets of changes are important. First, there has been an increasing 'supply' of ways to spend time, that is, of (time-)modules. Second, these ways of spending time have become interchangeable. Individuals have gained more choices, and the supply of optional modules to choose from has become organized by way of a (time-)market, making possible the exchange of modules into money and vice versa (the 'commodification of time'). Third, both 'producers' and 'consumers' have developed a 'calculating' interest in exchanging modules, animated by a search for those modules that actors assume best fit their attempts to create 'a life of their own'. Taken together, these three developments may be referred to as the modularization of daily life.

I will discuss the conceptual assumptions in forming the concept of the modularization of daily life in more detail below. In focusing on leisure as part of this process, I shall argue that it is pertinent to make the analytical distinction between getting or having 'free time', on the one hand, and spending it, on the other. With respect to getting free time: what are the social mechanisms that 'produce' free time or leisure? And what does it actually mean to have leisure? Does everybody have the same quality of leisure, or are there (structural) differences in what freedoms different groups of people are entitled to? Regarding the issue of spending free time, we first need to contrast the structural differences found in the ways people secure access to leisure with the activity patterns open to them. Furthermore, attention needs to be given to the relation between leisure and consumption. To conclude, I will discuss the importance of considering the varied forms of normative regulation which condition the use of time-modules, especially with regard to how they relate to the ways people define their personal identities.

The Modularization of Daily Life

A crucial condition for the modularization of daily life is the emergence of a time market, that is, the possibility to exchange time-modules for money and vice versa, in the context of a capitalist world economy. Essentially, the modularization of daily life refers to the growing exchangeability of forms of spending time in the unwinding of daily life (daily paths and life paths) due to increases in the scale of the supply of standardized time-units – filled with more

or less predictable, calculable and recombinable activities – and the simultaneous growth in the opportunities for individual actors to choose from this supply and reflexively organize their daily lives. For a time market to exist, time and space must have become separated, while their abstract forms must have won importance over their concrete forms. Furthermore, time needs to be considered ‘linear’ as opposed to cyclical, and felt to be in scarce supply. Last, but not least, a particular way of ‘spending time’ has to be experienced as one choice among other alternative ways of spending time. This is a choice for which the individual is kept accountable, and therefore becomes part of the reflexive project of the self. This latter aspect will be addressed in a separate section on normative regulation, values and the stylization of life.

The modern notion of time: abstract, linear and exchangeable

In his study of the 14th-century village Montaignou, Le Roy Ladurie (1981) found that the use of various indications of time and space differed strongly between the villagers and the clergy. While the former would say things like ‘when they caught the cathars in Carcassonne’, the latter referred to ‘April 13th, 1319’. In the first expression, time and space are still interwoven in the localization of activities. Also, this form of localization is ‘bound’ in its meaning by the shared knowledge of the specific community under consideration. A stranger not knowing what cathars are, not having heard of this particular event nor being familiar with Carcassonne, would be unable to grasp the full meaning of the words ‘when they caught the cathars in Carcassonne’. He or she would not be able to relate other events to this particular event, being unable to mediate the life-stories of those living in the village to his or her own personal biography. A ‘universal’ calendar, a calendar which is used widely across time and space, can fulfil such a mediating role precisely because it is devoid of pre-given, place-bound or concrete meanings. Its abstract, formal character provides for an ideal-typical time sequence, one which can be substantiated with sequences of concrete events in separate places at the same ‘abstract’ time. Similarly, the achievement of the pendulum clock by Christiaan Huygens made reasonably accurate (abstract) timekeeping possible from the end of the 17th century onwards. The spreading of these mechanical clocks and wrist-watches further expanded the possibilities of locating practices vis-a-vis each other in time, and therewith the linking of social practices across time and space. Clock-time became emblematic of modernity.

The introduction of both the calendar and clock-time as well as, more generally, the spreading of the arts of writing (recording) and reading, helped to strengthen the notion of linear time, as did the Jewish and Christian ideas of a ‘beginning of time’ and an ‘end of time’. A third factor was the growing impact of commercial trade on the hitherto feudal economy of western Europe. Profits

could be made by being quicker than competitors in making deliveries, while losses often occurred when one forgot about interest when lending out money. In the feudal economy, time, in the form of a more or less enslaved labour force forced to work the land, was abundantly available as a production factor for the landowners. In contrast, the burghers of the cities, being involved in trade and trade-related manufacture (and having to hire seamen and labourers) and therefore dealing with capital and loans, were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of good book-keeping. As a result, they started experiencing time as a scarce resource, as a chain of unique moments (opportunities) that should not be wasted, but rather put to best use. In modernity, the aspect of linearity becomes more and more fused with ideas of progress, the promise of a better future, or even the makeability of the future.

In early modernity, utopia was not so much historically situated in the future as it was geographically in yet 'unknown' quarters of the world. The first nucleus in the emerging world economy, the first 'hegemon' (Taylor, 1996) – the Republic of the Seven United Provinces – was the 'world centre for geographical knowledge in the 17th century'. Amsterdam 'became the world publishing centre of maps, atlases and travel books. This was where the early modern geographical imagination was nurtured and nourished' (1996: 129–31). The 'emptying of space' was enhanced by these factors:

... allowing for the representation of space without reference to a privileged locale which forms a distinct vantage-point; and those making possible the substitutability of different spatial units. ... The progressive charting of the globe that led to the creation of universal maps, in which perspective played little part in the representation of geographical position and form, established space as 'independent' of any particular place or region. (Giddens, 1990: 19)

The diffusion of more abstract and universal forms of mapping and measurement, such as the metre by Napoleon, led to a new way of looking at the world. Gradually the world lost its 'unknown' quarters; it appeared to be round (global) and circumnavigable, and rapidly losing its opportunities for further colonization. New opportunities for colonization had to be sought in the colonization of time, most particularly the night (with the growing availability of artificial electric light) and, as mentioned before, the future, both further downplaying the effects of place and separating time and space.

The substitutability of spatial and temporal units links the time–spatial reorganization of modes of social life to the institutional changes which characterize modernity. Here substitutability refers to the universalization of markets and the commodification of abstract time and space. Although all social practices remain localized, that is, they are produced and reproduced in a spatial and temporal setting, most of these settings (or locales) themselves are no longer tied to specific places (i.e. time–space intersections of tradition and physical

environment). Increasingly, locales are shaped by the outcomes of 'absent' practices. Food and drinks, clothes, furniture, building materials, music, means of transportation and so forth originate from ever more distant practices, implying that locales are less reflective of the concrete, place-bound, traditional ways of dealing with the material environment and more reflective of how practices are tied into networks of distanced practices. Urban expansions, transport infrastructures and seaside resorts are increasingly alike and exchangeable throughout the world. Even the backpack tourist, in a self-defeating search for unique places, finds her- or himself moving in a tourist space, in an increasingly interchangeable touristic environment of campsites and hotels, excursions and souvenir sellers, planes and buses, brochures and travel guides (see also Harvey, 1989; Urry, 1994).

The commodification of time and the calculation of its use

The commodification of time is an elliptical phrase intended to refer to the process of labour-time becoming a commodity. Crucial to this process is the introduction of the labour contract, in which the exchange value of the supplied labour force is expressed as the product of the job rating and the total amount of hours worked (Giddens, 1981: 8–9, 130–3; 1987: 148–53). Thus, labour-time – or more specifically, the 'duration' of the labour input in the capitalist production process – has the double existence of all entities that are taken up in social relations and correlated in value. On the one hand, labour-time, as lived time, remains an inherent element of the constitution of practices and the coordination of one's actions with the actions of others. On the other hand, labour-time, in its objectified, abstract form of clock-time, takes on the character of marketable, formless duration, to be bought and sold in a time market. This process has been analysed extensively by Marx and others, seeking to explain the dynamism of the capitalist economy. In these analyses priority is given to the labour contract, in which the discrepancies between the use-value and exchange-value of time are made most clear.

Struggle over time is the most direct expression of class conflict in the capitalist economy; the length of the working day is not determined by tradition or convention but by the outcome of such struggle. 'Time is everything' Marx says, 'man [sic] is nothing; he is at most the incarnation of time. Quantity alone decides everything: hour for hour, day for day.' (Giddens, 1981: 120)

However, the working of the time market is not restricted to the formation of labour relations (see also Urry, 1994; Glennie and Thrift, 1996). Time has to be considered as a 'production factor' in all forms of social life, including leisure activities, identity formation and consumption. In the words of Bourdieu, the accumulation of cultural capital needs time. Free time, that is, the time when

one loses income, is the prerequisite for the initial accumulation of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1989: 128).

Historically, then, the time market is related to the 'freeing' of labour from feudal bonds and the – at the beginning mainly hypothetical – availability of various options to make one's labour power remunerative. Today, given temping agencies, 'McJobs', lifelong education and the social security system, the availability of various options in the labour market has become less hypothetical, which of course is not the same as saying that all these options are available to everybody in a similar way. However, in the last few decades, what are being considered are not only the advantages and disadvantages of one job over another but also the advantages and disadvantages of more work over less work and of one way of spending a particular leisure time-unit over others.

Calculating the effectiveness and efficiency of extra work hours compared with other forms of spending time, especially in relation to the goals one has set to maintain or achieve a desired self-identity, calls to mind the well-known theory of the 'labour/leisure trade-off'. This theory is easily criticized for its decontextualized approach to the individual actor and the choices made by this actor. But we do not have to throw out the baby with the bathwater. People make choices, but most often they do so in a routine way, and always under particular conditions they only partly acknowledge and are capable of changing themselves. Having said that, it can be assumed that given the circumstances people live in, they reflexively monitor the relative advantages and disadvantages of doing more or less paid work. Research indicates that this is particularly so in double-income households (see Hochschild, 1990; Karsten, 1992; Droogleever Fortuijn, 1993).

In the same way, people are considering the relative 'time costs' of ways of spending their leisure. With rising discretionary incomes per hour of leisure, saving on time per activity becomes more of an issue than saving on money. Together with the growing exchangeability of time-modules in the context of a capitalist consumer culture, people will increasingly reflect on the relative input of money *and* time while packaging time-modules into their daily paths.

There are two important ways in which processes of modularization may save on time. First of all, by the sheer fact of the supply of modules itself. The package holiday is a good example. Instead of going somewhere on one's own and needing time to make arrangements both before the trip and at one's destination, now one can save most of this time by buying modules (excursions, means of transport, etc.) from the travel agency. One also trusts the travel agency to deliver services of a certain quality, so one does not need time to find out about the best places to go, where to find a comfortable hotel, and so on. Other examples are prefabricated garden sheds, convenience food and self-assembly bookcases. In some cases, modules are more expensive than making or doing things oneself, but this is not necessarily the case. Modularization

combines the adjustment to personal tastes, preferences and possibilities with large-scale production and/or servicing. In many cases, ready-made foodstuffs such as mayonnaise, chutneys and sauces are cheaper than self-produced ones. Of course, an important criterion here is whether the input of time in self-production is taken into account, and if so, at what price.

The second way in which modularization saves time is in the rationalization of production and distribution processes (see Blair, 1988; Ritzer, 1993). This is often true for the supply of modularized goods, services and time-units, but also indirectly in the 'production' of leisure. People can be said to be 'contracting out' household and leisure chores, in order to be able to concentrate on their 'core business', such as hobbies, activities, friends and so on, which they consider to be essential for their self-identity. Time not spent on the production of meal components, such as beef cubes, sauces and fried potatoes, allows people to concentrate on preparing the meal as a whole. Modularization thus allows an individual to move time from activities not considered very important to his or her self-identity to those which are considered important. As noted by Zweig in his study among British workers in 1952, 'hobbies probably express a man's [sic] whole personality more truly than work itself does, because he works through necessity, but follows his hobby through choice' (quoted in Friedmann, 1992).

Leisure-scapes

The concept of the modularization of daily life suggests that people today have more options when choosing how to spend their free time than people in earlier times had. There has been a general increase in discretionary time and income. Most popular leisure pursuits (watching TV and videos, listening to CDs and the radio, playing sports, going on holidays, many hobbies, etc.) did not exist a century ago, or were accessible only to a small minority. Furthermore, the 'annihilation of space through time' (Harvey, 1989: 299) has made it possible to have access to a worldwide range of foodstuffs, music styles, clothes, forms of entertainment, and so forth, in one place. Also, the range of options for free time has widened in the sense that many discriminatory rules have been abandoned, and there is now more tolerance for 'deviant' ways of spending free time, compared to earlier rules of conduct.

Still, this is not to say that all options have become open to everyone everywhere, and that everyone is equally free to play with 'multiple identities', go 'lifestyle shopping' or assemble a very personal image from the items available in the 'emporium of styles' that is the market place. There are still limits to how far one can go when playing with one's identity, particularly the disciplinary regimes indicative of the context in which this playing takes place, as well as the

(financial and other) resources one can draw on. Here I will focus on the different amounts and forms of free time available to us. These differences constitute various leisure-scapes or normatively regulated time-landscapes, which are implied by the specific disciplinary regimes people have to follow to secure their livelihoods. Each provides them with a set of prerogatives and obligations, including a specified range of freedoms to which they are entitled and activities in which they may participate.

To illustrate the importance of different leisure-scapes for the formation of leisure patterns and lifestyles, and the different limits people have to deal with while assembling time-modules in their daily life paths, I want to point to positions such as those of priests, physicians, judges and politicians. Take for example the position of a judge. When does a judge cease to be a judge? That is to say, can we designate a certain time-span (free time, leisure) in which a judge can forget she or he is a judge and can do what she or he wants?

We can start with the following argument: EU Directive 93/104 on working hours declares that all member states underwrite to ensure a maximum of 48 hours' paid labour per week, with employees having a right to a minimum of four weeks' paid holiday per year, as of 23 November 1996. So, a judge may argue, there is a limit to my working hours, and to the amount of hours I can be called upon to act as a judge. My being partial or impartial has to be assessed on my performance while working as a judge, not on what I do in my free time. Taking me for a judge for 24 hours per day makes me a sort of slave, having no time of my own. This formulation of time disappeared – at least in most countries in western Europe – with the introduction of the labour contract.

Still, I would argue that a judge is a judge 24 hours per day. As a judge one has to be free of any suspicion of being partial. For instance, accepting gifts from one party, however small, is likely to arouse suspicions. This does not imply, however, that judges cannot enjoy leisure time. Judges do have a right to free time so long as they adhere to the obligations associated with their position as a judge, including the maintenance of this status of impartiality. I will try to elaborate upon these statements and their implications for the existence of leisure-scapes.

The leisure-scape of a judge is not the leisure-scape of a factory worker

'A judge never ceases to be a judge.' 'A woman's work is never done.' The latter saying is often rehearsed – for instance, in time budget studies – to indicate that any comparison of hours of free time between men and women is a false one, because the entity which is being compared is not identical. Whereas a man in paid labour may be temporarily free from claims on his time by his employer while enjoying his leisure at home, a woman may be 'on call' 24

hours per day, particularly when there are children to care for. Gray (1992), in her study on the use of video recorders in the household, provides examples of the differences which can be found between male 'breadwinners' and female 'housewives'. As she writes:

All the men in the study were in full-time employment and appeared to view time at home as being at their disposal. [However, many] of the women spent quite long periods of time in the house on their own. But even during this time they did not feel free of the constraints of their position as wives and mothers. This manifested itself in feelings of guilt at taking time off, whether it be to read or watch television, and many engaged in complicated 'reward' negotiations with themselves in order to justify this 'indulgence'. (1992: 76)

Adam (1995), referring to these types of argument, contends that 'free time has to be understood not as free *per se* but as *produced* time which makes the concept inapplicable for all those outside paid employment' (1995: 105). Free time, and its correlate leisure, are to be understood as being derived from commodified work time.

They are *produced time*, time that has been wrested from employer's time, a *not-work time* that exists only in relation to the time of markets and employment ... This means that outside the framework of economic time the idea of 'free time' must remain relatively meaningless since its very definition is tied to the history of labour and paid employment. (1995: 96)

If one pursues this line of reasoning, one could argue that the position of a judge can best be seen as 'outside the framework of economic time'. Judges, like priests and politicians, are 'public figures'. As such, they have a history that goes back long before the rise of capitalism, industrialism and the related processes of commodification, including the commodification of time. Similarly, monarchs never stop being monarchs, and doctors cannot refrain from taking action when confronted with someone in need of medical help; their Hippocratic oath obliges them to be a doctor whenever there is a need for one.

So, following Adam (1995), one does not only exclude from leisure 'housewives' and the unemployed but also certain individuals who do paid work. After all, Adam argues that the shortening of working hours

... creates an *appearance* of ever-increasing free time, even of 'time wealth'. The association of commodified time with freedom and wealth, however, is misleading since, as Rinderspacher ... notes, it is a time produced through *increased efficiency* and is not 'free' in the sense of belonging to people in the first place. (1995: 96, italics added)

This statement suggests that everyone not in paid employment, or who has a job in which productivity (efficiency) cannot be substantively increased, suffers from a lack of leisure. To a large extent this is true for judges and politicians, for queens and artists, for police officers and lecturers, for 'housewives' and the

unemployed; indeed, for almost everybody outside relations of 'production' in a narrow, 'commercial' sense. Leisure may thus be seen as a by-product of industrialization, a concept with limited use outside the world of production and, as such, an essentially British invention (the Industrial Revolution!) that was adopted abroad, together with related concepts such as sports and tourism. Although this is not untrue for specific types of leisure, I want to argue that this is only part of the story that can be told about leisure. The historical focus is too narrow, and basing the concept of leisure on increased productivity leaves us with an undertheorized notion of leisure.

Our historical focus, in my view, needs to encompass modernity as a whole. The emergence of modern leisure is not only linked to the rise of (industrial) capitalism, but also to the advent of a nation-state system and the 'rationalization' of culture (secularization, de-traditionalization). The history of modern leisure cannot be seen apart from the differentiation between the spheres of the economy, politics and culture. When, in post-feudal times, the economy became more and more insulated from politics (the rise of the 'free market'!), at the same time it became possible to leave the 'economic island' temporarily; put another way, people started to experience some time in which they were free from work obligations.

To broaden the historical scope, it may be useful to focus on the Republic of the Seven United Provinces of the 16th and 17th centuries. According to Taylor (1996: 123), this was 'the "laboratory" where commercial capitalism was modernized'. In his words:

Typically, 'modern' is contrasted with 'traditional' implying, in most analyses, a single duality: societies or institutions are viewed as being either traditional or modern. However, given that the modern world-system has experienced three hegemonic cycles, it follows that there should be three specific cultural structures, or, if you will, three modernities. Hegemons not only create new political economies, they are directly implicated in the production of the distinctive cultures which we think of as modern. In short the hegemon is the 'most modern of the modern' in its era. (1996: 4)

The Republic was the first nation-state in which trade was not dominated by politics (i.e. the whims of the ruler); instead, politics stimulated a 'free economy' which provided the opportunity for enhancing tax revenues. This placed the Dutch in a unique position in the 17th century, because 'as long as success in war depended upon the length of one's purse, the Dutch were always likely to outstay the others' (Kennedy, 1989: 89). According to Taylor (1996: 123), the liberalization of their economy and its outstanding performance made the Dutch the first 'hegemons, creators of modernity', implying that new social relations were not only invented there, but also started to spread globally from there.

Conceptually, one can accept the idea of leisure being 'produced' rather than

thinking of it as being derived from a pre-given freedom, but only if 'production' is understood in the more generic sense of 'brought about by human actions'. Freedom in general, and leisure in particular, are products of social interaction. To be more precise: they are to a large extent the products of disciplined social interactions and behaviours (see the analysis, based on Foucault's work, in Mommaas and Van der Poel, 1985). Modern leisure refers to freedoms people are granted or allowed, most of the time as a reward for displaying disciplined or 'civilized' behaviour. One is relatively free to do whatever one likes, as long as one adheres to the role-prescriptions of one's social position(s).

Returning to 17th-century Amsterdam can illustrate these two points. Here labour was introduced as a means of disciplining 'unruly' immigrants and the (criminalized) poor. In the Amsterdam *Tugthuis* (House of Correction), as in similar places set up in other cities, work and prayer were introduced as 'the regime that was supposed to turn idlers, spongers, beggars and assorted ne'er-do-wells into industrious responsible members of society' (Schama, 1987: 19). In this context, the 'work ethic' is a problematic characteristic of a predominantly Protestant nation, for it is at best an ideology that befits the life-world of the *kleinburgerij* (lower middle class/petit bourgeoisie). Second, it is an active concept in so far as it is an important element for disciplining the poor. Third, the imposition of the work ethic on the poor had more to do with the formation of a 'respectable' citizenship than with achieving economic advantages. In the eyes of the regents, poor people performing labour were taking a first step in the direction of becoming citizens, that is, they were becoming economically 'independent' and thereby contributing to 'the common cause'. Ideally, they would then gain some form of ownership, the end goal being to accumulate enough personal wealth to be independent of the need to work for others. The aim was to realize a situation in which work was performed at leisure. Only then could one be considered a free burgher, and as such part of the political community. In most cases this was merely the story-board; hardly ever was it reality.

What does this historical excursion suggest to us about the case of the judge, or, in more general terms, the impact of different leisure-scapes? It suggests that leisure should not simply be seen as a by-product of the increasing productivity of labour; that is, as being produced by an increased efficiency in factory work and commercial services. On the contrary, we should understand the production of leisure in more generic terms as the result of human interactions, thereby agreeing with Adam (1995) that it is not something which belongs to people in the first place, but something which has been and is being (re-)produced in interactions situated in different time-space contexts. Focusing on the context of modernity, then, labour may be seen as producing leisure, not so much for its increasing efficiency, but rather for its disciplinary power. It thus operates

alongside other sources of (time-)discipline, such as property, religion and family relations (see also Glennie and Thrift, 1996).

Property has a longer history of producing leisure than does labour. Until recently, few people seemed to be very concerned about the way the wealthy spend their free time – Veblen's critique of the 'leisure class' (1899) was one exception to the rule. The wealthy gained access to political rights first because they were considered to be 'independent' in their voting behaviour. They did not have to obey orders from others in order to secure their source of income. Property still provides for a better 'quality' of leisure, a type of leisure that is generally valued more highly than the type of leisure produced via labour. Precisely for this reason, its disciplinary power may even be stronger. To secure their capital, owners will be very hesitant to endanger the workings of the free market, or the state system that supports this free market. This is the sort of capitalist system pioneered by the Dutch in the 17th century, later taken over and expanded by the new hegemony, the British and the Americans.

With respect to the question of whether judges have leisure, we should focus on the primary source of income, and thus the type of discipline to which a judge has to adhere in order to secure that income. The source of income of a judge is the state, not the sphere of production understood in its narrow sense. Coming from the state, the discipline to which a judge has to adhere has modern traits, as the (nation-)state is part of modernity. But judges also have a pre-modern history and, more important, in western democracies the judicial system constitutes a realm of its own. The rules of this system are different from those in the sphere of industrial production: judges do not produce and/or sell products in order to maximize profits. They administer justice, assessing people's behaviours in terms of right or wrong, and sentencing people, sometimes to life-long imprisonment. The symbol of this judicial power is a blindfolded goddess with scales in one hand and a sword in the other, signalling that impartiality is the essence of being a judge. Given that challenging the impartiality of the judge (and/or jury) is part of the legal game, a judge must make every effort to ensure that his or her impartiality is never compromised. Put otherwise, a judge cannot take leave of his or her obligation to remain impartial, at least not with respect to any cases at hand.

Accordingly, I would suggest that people are confronted with different disciplinary regimes which lead, in turn, to particular sets of rights and obligations which they have to uphold. These differences in disciplinary regimes originate from differences in the sources of income, and imply that there are, in fact, different types of leisure, or leisure-scapes: *Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi* (What is allowed to Jupiter, is not allowed to cattle).

The production of leisure is not the same as the production of complete freedom

The insight that the leisure of a 'housewife' is organized differently from the leisure of a farmer, a judge or someone working for a temping agency, already helps us to recognize that the image of leisure as a monolithic free time-space, which prevails in much of the empiricist leisure studies literature, is unsatisfactory. The rights and obligations tied to one's source of income always spill over into one's leisure time, although the ways in which this happens may be acknowledged only to a limited extent. This is because as long as one keeps to the activities one is entitled to participate in, no obligations may be felt and a sense of freedom may be experienced. To illustrate this spill-over effect, take the example of bank employees. Recently, some 1500 employees of one of the larger banks in the Netherlands were given personal advice regarding their clothes, hair and make-up (*Volkskrant*, 20 November 1996). The point here is that although the employees did not have to pay for the advice (given by a specialist firm at a rate of about 500 guilders per employee), they were expected to spend their own discretionary (?) time and money on clothing themselves according to the advice they had been given. Similarly, an example of limits being placed on the activities one can enjoy (limits which are often unrecognized until transgressed), is provided by a bank director who warned his (female) personnel to stop visiting male striptease groups, because this would endanger the interests of the bank (*Volkskrant*, 11 February 1992). Leaving the workplace does not imply one can leave all one's responsibilities towards the employer, for associated with the way we earn our sustenance are the attendant obligations we have to fulfil in our 'free time'.

This observation is reminiscent of Berger's (1963) comment: if sociology has taught us anything, it is that there is no such thing as time free from moral constraints. So, even if we are spending our free time in a way that cannot harm our employer, we are still members of a society in which we have to follow rules of law, religion, decorum, and so forth. Again, following these rules may be taken for granted and accomplished on a routine basis, but at the end of the day they limit what we are allowed to do 'in our own free time'.

These limits vary, of course, according to the social positions one occupies. Here social position refers to the set of rights and obligations (role-prescriptions) that an actor, who is accorded a certain social identity, may activate or carry out. A social identity is negotiated on the basis of a specific, culturally relevant criterion or criteria, such as occupation, gender, kin, age, ethnic background, and so forth (Giddens, 1979: 117–18). Children below a certain age are 'restricted' in their leisure because they are not allowed to buy liquor or cigarettes, to enter facilities such as night clubs and casinos, or to drive a car.

Access to leisure spaces can be effectively restricted, for instance to men, by executing explicit or implicit forms of ballottage.

As we have seen, the social position of a judge implies being impartial, and avoiding any activities which might endanger this aura of impartiality. But there is more. Even if one agrees that displaying this impartiality should be limited to the execution of the job itself, the credibility of the judge (and the fairness and justice of his or her verdicts) relies heavily on the impeccability of the judge's overall conduct. It would be intolerable for a judge to find someone guilty of public drunkenness if it were known that the judge him- or herself indulges in this sort of activity when not at work. A judge cannot escape being a judge: even in the performance of other (socially accepted) roles (as father or mother, club member, etc.), a judge has to respect the rules of that role.

Spending Time: Leisure and Consumption

We need to distinguish the constitution of leisure-scapes from what happens within these leisure-scapes, that is, from the way people spend their 'free time'. An activity such as watching television may appear in a variety of leisure-scapes, and yet it carries a different meaning in various disciplinary regimes. Compare, for example, the watching of television by those who are imprisoned, by the housewife also busy ironing and keeping an eye on a baby, by school children in the classroom, by night porters, or by the employees of an advertising agency anxious to see their campaigns on the screen. Time budget studies tell us a great deal about what activities people participate in during their free time in daily life. However, they tell us relatively little about the leisure-scapes within which these activities are undertaken.

Apart from the social position(s) one negotiates, the specific leisure-scape varies according to one's resources. With money one can buy privacy. The private house is a place where people can indulge in activities with which they may not want to be associated in public. The rich use cocaine at parties in private homes, the middle class in cafés and discos, and the poor on the street. My point is that the conditional character of leisure points to the fact that it is not only about a certain time-span ('free time') that is available to spend without being directly accountable to the people who supply our means of maintenance, such as our employer or the civil servant who decides about our unemployment benefit. It also has to do with how we spend that time. We are left 'free' as long as we use our freedom 'wisely'. One of the main arguments used against the introduction of the eight-hour working day referred to the 'uncivilized' manners of the labourers, their preference for drinking and pub singing, animal games, betting, and so on. If these labourers were granted more leisure, it was argued by some, this would undoubtedly lead to more drunkenness and disorderly con-

duct. In several European welfare states today, there is still a lingering fear of the potential disorders leisure may engender. Nevertheless, when this fear becomes acute it tends to be framed in relation to specific subgroups, such as unemployed youth. The majority of people are left largely to themselves, because over the years they have shown themselves to be mainly interested in 'non-threatening' forms of leisure, such as socializing, holidaying, watching television, practising hobbies and playing sports, not in social disruption, vandalism, addictions, and so forth. In short, 'consumption' has proven to be the 'wisest' way to spend our leisure (Cross, 1993).

Consumer culture, commodification and the search for the real self

Consumption is not simply 'using up' goods and services for which we have a 'real' and/or 'false' need. It is not the opposite of production, but rather another form of production or production in another (leisure) context, and an important element in the making of identities and lifestyles (e.g. de Certeau, 1984; Tomlinson, 1990; Shields, 1992). Willis (1990: 20) stresses

... the extraordinary symbolic creativity of the multitude of ways in which young people use, humanise, decorate and invest with meanings their common and immediate life spaces and social practices [including almost all their leisure practices]. Nor are these pursuits and activities trivial and inconsequential. In conditions of late modernisation and the widespread crisis of cultural values they can be crucial to the creation and sustenance of individual and group identities, even to cultural survival of identity itself. There is work, even desperate work, in their play.

In a similar vein, Kellner (1992: 148) has argued that 'television and other forms of mass-mediated culture play key roles in the structuring of contemporary identity'.

An important question here is what distinguishes consumption from recreation, sport, do-it-yourself home improvements or enjoying an opera? It is difficult to think of leisure forms that do not imply the use or consumption of materials and ideas, provided through the market and/or the state. Besides, am I not 'consuming' paper, computers, desks, carpets, secretarial assistance, electricity, and so forth, while being 'productive' in my job? Conversely, am I not 'producing' something when I bake a cake, teach my son to ride a bike, paint my house, water my garden, play an instrument or train myself to be a good golfer? Certainly, the concepts of consumption and production need to be unburdened of their ideological overtones, as does the idea that commodification is necessarily a bad thing.

Illustrative here is the question raised by Wearing and Wearing (1992: 4) in an article in *Leisure Studies*:

is commodified leisure enabling us to find an identity related to 'self' where the key is to play, to recreate, to think and enjoy, or do we become just another consumer of market products, thus eliminating the key elements of leisure, individual choice and freedom?

One of the things that strikes me most in this quotation is the assumption that being 'just another consumer' excludes 'individual choice and freedom'. Further, is it not a reification to speak of market products? Markets do not *produce* products, but are social practices characterized by the exchange of products. People routinely monitor the range of products that suit what they want and make choices concerning what to buy. They have certain freedoms to do that, irrespective of the fact that there are obvious inequalities between people and groups of people concerning the 'amount' of freedom they have to do this (and despite the fact that they may have little or no influence on the range of options on offer).

Similarly, one can criticize the assumption made by Wearing and Wearing that commodified leisure – an unhappy term in itself – is somehow irreconcilable with the formation of self-identity. If I want to play soccer or read a book, I need a ball or a book, i.e. leisure commodities. How does this harm my self-identity? If I want to develop a self-identity as a cosmopolitan traveller, then I purchase aeroplane tickets, pay rent for hotel rooms, and spend money on all of the other leisure commodities one needs to get around the world. Wearing and Wearing do see possibilities for satisfying identity development in leisure, but they see this in opposition to 'commodified leisure' rather as a form of 'resistance'. They use the results from research among rock-climbers undertaken by Cziksentsmihalyi to provide:

... evidence of Simmel's insight that certain leisure activities have the ability first to provide situations outside of consumerism and more importantly the ability to develop individual identity. In reviewing these ideas it is possible to see that leisure certainly has the ability to confront consumer motivation and offer alternatives for lifestyles and identity which incorporate a sense of self-worth. (Wearing and Wearing, 1992: 14)

However, I do not think this argument is convincing. When I hear of rock-climbing and mountaineering, I see images of Mount Everest growing ten centimetres per year because of all the waste left behind by the mountaineers. Rock-climbing is a hobby, which surely can be important in the formation of self-identity. The point is that almost all hobbies, with the possible exceptions of socializing and contemplation, imply 'consumption'. The rock-climber buys and 'consumes' specific equipment, as does the model railway fanatic, the gardener and the person who loves knitting. One cannot move 'outside' consumerism, or at least not outside consumption. This would mean moving outside modern social life.

Normative Regulation, Values and Stylization of Life

The creation of freedoms by a denial of responsibilities

Leisure has been crucial in opening up people's futures, not least because of the manifold ways one can spend that leisure given the enormous and varied supply of consumer goods and leisure services. Although for many the problem with consumption is still a lack of choice, for others it is an excess of choice.

People become aware of the openness of the future via increasing educational levels, social mobility, the growing availability of mediated information and the increasing frequency of moving house; via unexpected events such as the demolition of old neighbourhoods, car accidents, Chernobyl or unexpected deaths in the near family; and/or via the enormous and varied supply of ways to spend time. When they perceive this openness, they may also become aware that the things they routinely do imply very many choices influencing the shape and direction of their own life path.

People may make good use of the new opportunities in leisure to work at a desired self-identity, but they may also be overwhelmed by the abundance of choices they can and have to make. People have to find a balance between the long-term life planning that is involved in working at the desired self-identity, and the need to make choices immediately from the mass of information and opinion continually thrown at them via the media. Not only does the rate at which the number of options grows generate problems; so does the novelty of these options. Options become available in areas where hitherto there was nothing to choose, and hence those areas have never been subject to tradition or forms of regulation (see Giddens, 1994). In the area of leisure, what are the consequences of new forms of leisure generated by innovations in leisure technologies, and how are these new forms to be evaluated and regulated? What to do with child abuse, vandalism and killing in virtual reality, presented as computer games and thus as forms of leisure? What to do with betting on the Internet, bungee-jumping and cage fighting?

Individuals, as well as governments, are confronted with these questions. Take the example of a jet skier quoted in a Dutch newspaper: 'If people cannot stand the noise, they should not come to the beach.' Everybody is entitled to his or her own sort of fun, powerboats are also noisy, and 'if swimmers want to swim, they should be careful too, not only the jet skier. One simply mustn't harp on too much about these things. Otherwise one cannot do anything anymore in this country!' (*Volkskrant*, 12 August 1991, author's translation). This person seems to be well aware of some of the consequences of his preferred leisure activity; he does not deny he is making a lot of noise and being a potential danger to swimmers. Yet he does not come to the conclusion that he should stop his activity. He creates freedom (a leisure opportunity) by denying his responsi-

bility for the consequences of his actions. This is a classical political issue. Can this person be left to his hobby, his individual choice of a pleasurable activity, his interpretation of leisure as a time when he can do what he likes, even if it implies a noisy environment for all the other people on the beach and a potential danger to swimmers? Or should he be restricted in his 'freedom' to enjoy himself for the sake of the community at large?

Individualization and lifestyle

The conditions for the constitution of social practices have had an ever more differentiating effect on the formation of people's daily lives, leading to interactions in which more and more 'strangers' appear. The unwinding of the daily path has thus become a more individual affair. One may be able to familiarize oneself with others, but these others usually 'belong' to specified practices, and do not 'travel' with the actor from one practice to the other.

The individual actor experiences his or her daily life as a totality, while ever fewer others share such a view. The integration of the practices that make up daily life, that is, their reciprocity (Giddens, 1979: 76), is brought off by the individual actor via the 'chaining' of practices in face-to-face interactions with others. Here we find a new sort of freedom for individuals: the creation of lifestyle options. Given that the others one encounters in various face-to-face interactions are met only in certain settings, people's dealings with each other are more and more dependent on each other's 'face value'. The identity of the other becomes 'practice-bound' and open to manipulation, namely, because one cannot oversee the other's daily path or life path. A teacher, for example, may be more conscious of her behaviour during her free time if she lives in the same town as her students. Moving to another city, where she need not fear meeting one of her own pupils while desperately throwing coins into a slot-machine, creates new options to organize her daily path. Similarly, the clergy lose their (moral) power over a community when members of the community start commuting, children are sent to state schools and shops turn into chain stores controlled by centralized management.

As Kellner (1992: 174) argues, 'multiple and unstable identities' and 'change, fragmentation and theatrical play with identity' are more easily accepted today than only a few decades ago.

On the one hand, this increases one's freedom to play with one's identity and to change one's life dramatically (which may be good for some individuals) while, on the other hand, it can lead to a totally fragmented, disjointed life, subject to the whims of fashion and the subtle indoctrinations of advertising and popular culture. (1992: 174)

To what extent this latter development really takes place is an empirical

question. Nevertheless, it can do no harm to stress that the emergence of lifestyle options not only means new opportunities to give form to one's free time, or more generally, to one's daily life; it also creates confusion and uncertainty because 'in conditions of high modernity, we all not only follow lifestyles, but in an important way are forced to do so – we have no choice but to choose' (Giddens, 1991: 81). Even adhering to old customs and traditions is understood as a choice of a traditional lifestyle.

Lifestyles are largely routinized practices, but 'the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile character of self-identity' (Giddens, 1991: 81). The organization of one's daily life has become the object of planning, that is, the setting of goals in life and the calculation of the most efficient and effective input of time-modules to reach those goals. This planning is not a fully cognitive process, nor does it take place in a stable context. On the contrary, it can perhaps be best understood as an attempt to get to grips with the dazzling dynamism of modernity. This leads to continuous, unexpected and risky changes in the conditions for the formation of the daily path, and also a 'restlessness' (Rojek, 1993) 'within' actors, who feel that this open future holds opportunities for pleasant and satisfying experiences beyond the simple fulfilment of basic needs, as well as threats to the continuation of what is already pleasant in today's daily life. To survive in this context, one can no longer simply follow pre-given rules and traditions. The individual is challenged to reflect on the direction to take in life, on how to make optimal use of the openness of one's leisure to become the person one wants to be. Our conduct, our choice from the multitude of available time-modules, will remain normatively regulated, but increasingly these norms will refer to values which express the identity we desire.

Ethics and leisure

Berger (1963: 29) suggested that leisure had something to do with 'those things that we want to do for their own sake or those things that we feel ethically (as distinguished from expediently) constrained to do'. In leisure studies, much effort has gone into studying the intrinsic motivation of leisure. In most of these studies the meaning of the term 'intrinsic motivation' is only rarely developed further than to mean 'for its own sake'. Berger himself was much more interested in the 'ethical constraints', to the extent that one gets the impression that he wanted to equate 'for its own sake' and 'ethically constrained'. In his words:

Leisure styles are created by the kinds of leisure activities that, empirically, tend to cluster together: these are not random, and the sociological analysis of them is the study of how social structure facilitates or obstructs the efforts of men [sic] to

find in their freest time the moral satisfactions which value systems must provide.
(1963: 37)

I want to suggest that leisure-scapes need to be understood as being crucial to the 'social structure that facilitates and obstructs' what people can and are allowed to do in their free time. Equally interesting, however, is the question of the importance of 'moral satisfaction' in the choices people make in their free time, at least when we disregard the functionalist framework with which Berger worked (see Van der Poel, 1993). Obviously, we need a better understanding of what 'moral satisfaction' is. But leisure and consumption are forms of social (inter-)action, which by definition means both are normatively regulated. What, then, is the role of norms and values in our leisure behaviour (including consumption)? This is still a very important question, both theoretically and pragmatically, but it has often been lost in our fascination with the spectacular in leisure over the last decade.

Conclusion

The concept of the modularization of daily life recognizes that time is a crucial factor in the process of marketing products and services previously made for one's own use. This marketization of activities leads to a more fixed duration of these activities (modules), or at least to a fixed relation between the duration and the price of the activity. Moreover, this concept points to the fact that, in the form of time-modules, activities are 'competing with each other' not only in terms of price, but also for the restricted amount of time people have available to spend on them. It also indicates a development in which not only products and services are modularized, but also our daily lives. Activities are increasingly becoming detached, that is, taken out of their original context and distributed on a global time market. People are flooded by a multitude of options about how to spend their time. Their choice among these time-modules reflects less the authenticity or status of the encapsulated activities, than people's perceptions of the contributions these time-modules may make to their desired identity.

The modularization of daily life presupposes leisure, that is, individuals being entitled to make choices about what activities to undertake for certain time-spans. In this article I have tried to emphasize that leisure should not be seen as a monolithic entity. We should take very seriously the differences in what judges are allowed to do compared with housewives, factory workers or doctors, when they are not involved in activities directly relating to their livelihoods. This is despite the fact that the range of optional activities people are allowed to participate in has grown over the years, and that there is now a

considerable overlap among the various leisure-scapes in the activities that may be experienced.

While it is relatively clear how leisure is normatively regulated in terms of 'restrictions', we need further research and analysis on how people choose to spend leisure in a particular way. What determines people's preferences for particular time-modules to construct their daily lives, given the conditions they live in? Concepts such as 'intrinsic motivation', 'moral satisfaction', 'use-value' or 'desired identity' are too abstract and often tautological. Studies in consumption and consumer culture may be of help here, yet these studies often emphasize the spectacular and the aesthetic. Notwithstanding how valuable such work may be to our understanding of leisure behaviour, there remains the task of finding out to what extent leisure behaviour is ethical, or value oriented. That is, how this behaviour is regulated by norms which are not experienced as restrictions imposed on one's behaviour by others, but rather as freely accepted rules following from individual beliefs. As Bauman (1993: 4–5) stresses in his *Postmodern Ethics*:

It is the actions one needs to *choose*, actions one has *chosen* from among others that could be chosen but were not, that need to be assessed, measured and evaluated. Evaluation is an indispensable part of choosing, of decision-making; it is the need by humans as decision-makers, one that is seldom reflected upon by those who act by habit alone.

The more we think of leisure as 'individual freedom', the more individuals will be assessed on what they do in their leisure time, and be held responsible for the consequences of their leisure choices. Some people may create freedoms by denying these responsibilities, but that does not make them go away. Increasing our freedom to choose means increasing our responsibilities for the choices we make.

Note

This article is based on research papers presented at the Third International LSA Conference 'Leisure in Different Worlds' (Loughborough, United Kingdom, 14–18 July 1993) and the VTW Conference 'New Strategies for Everyday Life' (Tilburg, The Netherlands, 12–14 December 1996), respectively.

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