European Journal of Industrial Relations

http://ejd.sagepub.com

Workplace Resistance in Western Europe: A Preliminary Overview and a Research Agenda

Paul Edwards, David Collinson and Giuseppe Della Rocca

European Journal of Industrial Relations 1995; 1; 283
DOI: 10.1177/095968019513001

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://ejd.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/3/283

Published by:
SAGE Publications
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for *European Journal of Industrial Relations* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://ejd.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://ejd.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations (this article cites 29 articles hosted on the
SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
http://ejd.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/1/3/283

© 1995 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.

European Journal of Industrial Relations

© 1995 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)

Volume 1 Number 3 pp 283–316

Paul Edwards, David Collinson
Industrial Relations Research Unit, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

and

Giuseppe Della Rocca
Università della Calabria, ITALY

Workplace Resistance in Western Europe: A Preliminary Overview and a Research Agenda

ABSTRACT ▪ There has long been a lack of attention to the informal and subtle ways in which employees can resist or shape the rules of work, often within the act of work itself. Yet they are increasingly important in understanding how systems of industrial relations are actually experienced. The paper provides a conceptual framework for analysing workplace resistance. It illustrates the approach through a historical introduction and analysis of the periods of 'Fordism' and 'post-Fordism'. The main empirical examples are drawn from France and Italy. A central hypothesis is that forms of resistance may have been similar across Europe in early industrialization, diverging under distinct state and employer policies. It is possible that contemporary developments point to a reconvergence. This and related hypotheses are used to propose a future research agenda.

Introduction

Industrial conflict has long been a standard part of any text on comparative industrial relations. Although analysts have recognized that conflict can take a wide variety of forms, attention has traditionally focused on the most easily measurable form, the strike. The purpose of this article is to provide an initial view of other, more covert, forms of conflict which may be labelled worker resistance. As we explain, one difficulty in doing so is the lack of a clear definition, but in broad terms resistance refers to small-scale and informal means through which workers counter managerial control of the workplace. The paper is not a synopsis of the extent of resistance across Europe but an

© 1995 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

endeavour to provide a framework through which analysis may be carried forward, together with some illustrations drawn from existing research.

Why is this of interest? Is it not the case that resistance has gone out of fashion or has even disappeared as a result of the combined effects of sustained high levels of unemployment, economic restructuring (which has reduced the size of the sectors, notably coal and mass-production manufacturing, where resistance used to be most common), the ever-growing power of multinationals and new management practices aimed at the production of worker commitment? Strikes offer the only satisfactory measure of trends; data on developments throughout Western Europe show that the strike has not by any means withered away (Edwards and Hyman, 1994). The evidence on Eastern Europe (Clarke and Fairbrother, 1994) and on countries such as Korea (Wilkinson, 1994) also suggests that overt conflict is of increasing, and not diminishing, importance. More generally, there is a growing body of evidence (reviewed by Edwards, 1992a) suggesting that conflict at workplace level is not so much being removed as re-organized and expressed in new ways. The literature on 'Japanization' for example speaks routinely of work intensification and stress rather than an outbreak of harmony (e.g. Skorstad, 1994). This is perhaps the key reason for a contemporary focus on resistance. As suggested elsewhere (Edwards et al., 1994: 4), new forms of work organization are being introduced throughout advanced capitalist countries and along with them goes a growing managerial emphasis on the point of production, as distinct from legal regulation or an industry-wide collective agreement, as the key site for generating competitive advantage. Understanding workers' responses, together with the reorganization of forms of conflict and consent, is a major issue for comparative analysis.

Three specific aspects of resistance are important. First, it constitutes the primary means by which employees can *voice discontent and dissatisfaction* about workplace processes that otherwise seem to be out of their control and through which they may continue to be subordinated. Employee discontent can be expressed in a great diversity of overt and covert ways that are likely to be shaped by current economic, social and political conditions and likely consequences. Second, oppositional practices can help subordinates in *surviving and accommodating to* the highly rigorous regimes of control, surveillance and commodification that increasingly characterize paid employment. Resistance practices constitute a means by which employees may create some space and autonomy in order to exercise a degree of control over various aspects of the work process and its rules, norms and environment. The examination of such processes can highlight the active and skilful agency of employees as an important empirical and theoretical issue for any critical analysis of the workplace. Equally, by engaging in resistance, employees often begin to construct an alternative, more positive sense of self, dignity and identity to that provided, prescribed or circumscribed by the organization. Third, the study of workplace resistance also raises issues about *management control* in European corporations. Although managers are willing to tolerate certain resistance practices such as petty 'fiddling' because they may be 'a relatively cheap way of getting workers to keep working' (Edwards, 1988: 192), there are many other cases where workplace resistance can be treated as highly problematic by managers who may well respond in more punitive and repressive ways. Concerned to generate employee consent, loyalty and commitment, management theorists and indeed managerial practitioners have often tried to dismiss the oppositional practices of subordinates as the 'irrational' behaviour of 'troublemakers' (Hollway, 1991). Such explanations reduce resistance to a psychologistic account of individual pathology that explicitly rejects the way in which conflict might be embedded in the social organization of production. By emphasizing the so-called 'personality problems' of those who dissent and by imputing negative motives to them, these managerial strategies seek to negate the legitimacy of particular grievances. Where managers respond to employee resistance by implementing greater 'scientific' control, they may reinforce the very conditions which stimulated dissent in the first place.

Defining an Agenda

These points might suggest that we have a task that is too large for a book, let alone one article. How could we review analytically the nature of resistance and provide some overview of its character across Europe? Let us explain how we have proceeded. The study began with Collinson and Edwards working together. They approached experts based in several countries, asking them about literature on resistance and their own views on research on the topic. The response was that there was little material available, and in some cases that resistance was in effect an improper topic of inquiry. The idea of social partnership and the peace obligation is so entrenched in some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, that research on covert resistance would be virtually unthinkable. This at least reassured us that there was no mass of literature which would need to be synthesized. But what else could be done? It happened that Della Rocca was visiting Warwick, and we held detailed discussions about the concept of resistance and its concrete manifestations in Italy, a country which has made social protest a central feature of its development.

We developed a three-fold approach. First, we needed to provide a framework for understanding resistance. Second, we wished to provide some kind of empirical illustration. Since we are operating at the level of Europe as a whole, we thought that it might be instructive to explore whether there were any overall trends in the ways in which resistance has evolved historically. We have found it useful to use the common distinction between initial industrialization, the period of mass production labelled 'Fordism', and 'post-Fordism'. We make no comment on the massive debates on these terms, and use them simply as devices to organize some suggestions and to address debates which are central to this study. In particular, is there any evidence that the period of 'post-Fordism' is marked by a break from the past in the extent and nature of workers' resistance? We see this discussion less as a summary of current knowledge and more as a set of suggestions and hypotheses.

Third, within this approach we look at certain countries. Drawing on Della Rocca's special knowledge, we use Italy as something of a case study, while also commenting on France and making briefer reference to other cases. We cannot claim any sharp logic to this approach but it has certain justifications. The case of Britain has been extensively discussed, and we do not wish to repeat our own views (Edwards, 1988, 1992a; Collinson, 1992, 1994). There are, however, some issues around contemporary restructuring in Britain which call for comment. Evidence seems particularly hard to assemble in the cases of Germany and the Nordic countries (though we hope that such a statement will provoke colleagues to prove us wrong). A German colleague, for example, says that resistance in his country is a 'taboo subject and too difficult to research'. Another colleague directed us to one of the rare studies in German (Hoffman, 1981). This offers a general commentary which draws heavily on Anglo-American studies and says little about the specifics of the German case. It seems likely, as we hint below, that in such countries resistance tends to be squeezed out of the system. In Italy and France, by contrast, the idea of worker mobilization and class conflict has been much more overt. There is more possibility that resistance will flourish. We discuss, in effect, where covert workplace resistance fits within a rhetoric of class opposition.

The other large exclusion is the case of eastern Europe. There is a small but important literature on resistance under state socialism, on which we have again commented elsewhere (Edwards, 1986: 297–312). Recent work has addressed developments since the collapse of this system (Burawoy and Krotov, 1992; Clarke and Fairbrother, 1994). There are some major issues of analysis, but we do not have the space to address them here.

Let us underline the exploratory nature of our analysis. We hope that it will stimulate analyses that not only pursue the agenda of 'resistance research' but also challenge our assertions and suggestions. We begin by discussing in more detail the analytical problems of the exercise.

The Problem of Evidence

There are at least four main problems in assembling evidence on the extent and character of worker resistance. First, there is the question of defining in theoretical and empirical terms which practices actually constitute workplace resistance. One working definition that acknowledges the wide scope of resistance is 'a reactive process where agents embedded in power relations actively oppose initiatives by other agents' (Jermier et al., 1994: 9). Hodson's (1995: 80) definition is more specific: 'Any individual or small group act intended to mitigate claims by management on workers or to advance workers' claims against management'. Yet resistance does not come in pre-packaged forms. While absenteeism, for example, is often cited as a possible form of conflict, not all absences can be interpreted as oppositional: employees do become sick! There are also cases where employees might not consciously define their actions as oppositional even though a detailed analysis identifies resistant tendencies in their behaviour. Conversely, employees might claim that their behaviour is oppositional in order to justify actions that seem to be driven more by a narrow form of self-interest (e.g. some cases of pilfering). This raises problems regarding whose definition, what behaviour, and which conditions and consequences should be emphasized when exploring resistance practices: these are addressed in the first main section of the paper.

Second, oppositional behaviour at the level of the workplace by its nature tends to be covert and difficult to uncover. To understand these practices therefore calls for research that has good access to the realities of life in a workplace and which is highly demanding in terms of the time taken to build up trust and to understand the complex dynamics of employment relationships. Particularly because many of them are so informal, resistance practices and the way they are interpreted are also likely to vary extensively. Covert workplace resistance is likely to take culturally specific forms which are difficult to unravel for 'outsiders'.

Third, these features mean that the single-case study has been the dominant mode of investigation. The difficulty for the analyst is to make meaningful comparisons. In terms of the 'dependent variable', different authors focus on different types of behaviour: sabotage in one setting, pilfering in another, and so on. Indeed, not all studies of workplace behaviour consider resistance directly, even when they appear in a context where such a focus might be expected. For example, in a volume which explicitly makes resistance one of its themes, Hadjicostandi (1990) discusses women's formal and informal work in Greece. She says little about resistance. Does this mean that it was largely absent in this case? We cannot say. As for the explanatory factors, one study may highlight the internal dynamics of employer strategy while another may concentrate on external forces, for example, explaining how tight market situations led to an intense regime of workplace control. It is thus hard to conduct what psychologists call a 'meta analysis', that is, an analytical synthesis of existing studies.

Fourth, as explained elsewhere (Edwards, 1992b; Edwards et al., 1994), the dominant tradition of research in many European countries has not encouraged a focus on the workplace, let alone on the more covert features of its organization. This reflects the structures of industrial relations and of academic organization. Where industrial relations are characterized by legal systems and national- or industry-level collective bargaining that set the key substantive terms of the employment contract, there would appear to be relatively little left to decide at the workplace. The academic tradition has also tended to divide the area known in English-speaking countries as industrial relations into distinct specialisms of sociology or labour law. Workplace dynamics have not fitted easily into this division of labour.

This is not to say that these dynamics have been entirely neglected in European research. Within French industrial sociology, for example, there is a strong tradition with a concern for the negotiability of organizational rules. It is represented in particular by the texts of Crozier and Friedberg (1977) and Bernoux (1985). The former presents a wide-ranging analysis of power and negotiation, citing the classic American texts of Gouldner (1954) and Dalton (1949). The basic truths of life in organizations – that rules are negotiable and that there is often an 'under-life' quite different from surface appearances – are well analysed. Yet it has been rare for close analysis to be conducted asking how these eternal verities operate in a given context. As Segrestin (1993: 647) points out, major intellectual traditions 'tended to devalue empirical work and rather emphasize the function of social critique'. In what way do French workers differ from others in their organizational bargaining; how does the institutional context of employer and union policy and national agreements shape the outcome; and so on? We indicate some efforts to answer such questions but they are at best sketchy.[1] In the following section, we begin by considering ways of conceptualizing resistance.

Conceptualizing Resistance: Multiple Conditions, Processes and Consequences

The work of Hirschman (1970) has been particularly influential, especially in the US, in providing a framework for conceptualizing workplace resistance. He argues that individuals are likely to take one of two options. Depending upon the circumstances, they will either resign from (exit) or try to change (voice) products, conditions or processes that they find objectionable. Contending that both of these behaviours will produce constructive organizational change, Hirschman suggests that voice is less likely where there is the possibility of exit and more likely where loyalty is present and when there is an absence of opportunities for exit. In the context of resistance, there are various possible applications of this approach. While employee resignation could constitute a form of exit, the role of unions in collectively organizing labour has been interpreted as an example of voice (see Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Graham (1986: 2) has applied Hirschman's category of voice to analyse what she terms 'principled organizational dissent', which refers to 'the effort by individuals in the workplace to protest and/or to change the organizational status quo because of their conscientious objection to current policy or practice'. Subscribing to Hirschman's emphasis upon positive outcomes, Graham highlights the potential of whistle blowing as a form of principled organizational dissent (voice) to stimulate constructive organizational change.

Hirschman's categories offer some useful basic distinctions.[2] Yet his wider analytical claims are questionable. The categories are ahistorical and universalistic, and they fail to address the multiple and complex *conditions, processes and consequences* of workplace resistance practices. They tend to treat consumer and employee behaviour as synonymous, thereby failing to recognize the distinctive nature of power relations within employment. It is usually less problematic for individuals to stop buying a product than it is to resign one's job. Moreover, by insisting that managers will listen to employee voice and change their practices accordingly because it is beneficial to the organization, Hirschman subscribes to a highly rationalistic, voluntaristic and apolitical understanding of behaviour in organizations which ignores managerial power and the possibility of victimization for those who risk dissent. The asymmetrical nature of contemporary employment relations is reinforced by the large multinational corporations that frequently limit employee resistance in a variety of ways (Ramsay and Haworth, 1989). Followers of Hirschman have therefore tended to neglect the crucially important historical, cultural and asymmetrical power dynamics of workplace conditions that both stimulate and constrain oppositional behaviour. Equally, although his rather static and one-dimensional categories begin to acknowledge different kinds of context-specific strategies of resistance, they do not fully allow for the complexity, multiplicity and variability of possible oppositional processes. His approach cannot, for example, acknowledge how resistance may combine elements of both exit and voice simultaneously (Collinson, 1994). Oppositional practices may also be more ambiguous and contradictory in their consequences than Hirschman suggests. In assuming the likelihood of positive outcomes emerging from these expressions of discontent, Hirschman's overly simplistic and reductionist analysis underestimates the costs and overestimates the possibilities of both exit and voice for employees (see also Ahrne, 1990; Flam, 1993). Hence, in order to begin to make sense of resistance in European organizations we need to develop more sophisticated understandings of the multiple and inter-related conditions, processes and consequences of resistance.

Conditions

Employee resistance is shaped by the extensive power asymmetries in contemporary organizations and the structured antagonism between management and labour, and is a response to conditions of managerial control mediated through the commodification of labour (R. Edwards, 1979; P. Edwards, 1986). Worker opposition has to be placed in its historical, economic and political context, for the nature and extent of resistance are shaped by factors external to the workplace, such as shifting product and labour market conditions, as well as those internal to it, such as current managerial strategy and policy. Many have also argued that managerial control is never complete and that forms of resistance are always possible. Managerial control has been shown to be inherently contradictory in its attempts to treat employees as *both* disposable and dependable labour (Cressey and MacInnes, 1980; Hyman, 1987). Managers aim, on the one hand, to harness employee commitment and creativity, while on the other, to limit this very same worker discretion that might be applied in ways deemed 'unacceptable'. These contradictory and irreconcilable managerial practices which seek consent while exercising coercion often result in a shifting emphasis first upon direct control, then upon responsible autonomy before returning to direct forms of control as different expressions of resistance expose the failure of the latest managerial technique to secure employee commitment (Friedman, 1977).

Asymmetrical power relations will not, however, produce employee resistance in any simple, mechanical or pre-determined way. The complex inter-relations between control and resistance are likely to generate a variety of important organizational effects, many of which cannot be specified outside of particular workplaces, industries or countries. Insofar as resistance is reactive, it is likely to draw upon and redefine the forms, strategies, materials and discourses of control that it seeks to reject (Collinson, 1992). Developing this theme, Hodson (1995) contends that the logic of diverse managerial control systems provides openings for different types of worker resistance. While recognizing that resistance practices are not directly reducible to specific forms of managerial control, he argues, for example, that where the direct control of supervisors is abusive, workers may resist by: constructing alternative value systems; venting frustration through sabotage and 'having fun'; theft and pilferage; and widespread collective support and solidarity. Where technical control predominates, he contends that resistance is likely to focus more upon the intensity and duration of work by, for example: playing dumb, output restriction, tardiness, work avoidance, absenteeism and quitting. Hodson's arguments do highlight the need to develop further analyses of the complex *inter-relationships between* control and resistance.

Processes

No matter how asymmetrical the power relations, workers do often find ways of resisting. Most of the available empirical studies (which tend to be largely Anglo-American, e.g. Mars, 1982; Jermier et al., 1994) reveal the intractable and multi-dimensional nature of workplace resistance. It takes a great diversity of shifting and complex forms. Employees can deploy a whole variety of options, cultural resources and strategic agencies in mobilizing oppositional practices. The meanings and motives of resistance are invariably multiple

(Kondo, 1990) and are extremely difficult to unravel theoretically and empirically. The majority of research studies have tended to focus upon the most visible, explicit and collective oppositional practices such as output restriction (Roy, 1952; Lupton, 1963) and sabotage (Taylor and Walton, 1971; Jermier, 1988). Most of these studies have also tended to focus primarily upon (male) manual workers in the traditional unionized manufacturing sectors. These are important practices requiring further analysis in the context of European workplaces.

Yet there are also many other oppositional practices in both these and different sectors of the economy, that are often more subtle, covert and secretive and frequently less collective and organized. These include: knowledge/information restriction (Collinson, 1994), the public disclosure of information, sometimes known as 'whistle blowing' (Near et al., 1993; Vinten, 1994), theft and pilfering (Mars, 1982), indifference and 'foot dragging' (Scott, 1985) and even irony and satire (Rodrigues and Collinson, 1995). Although these may be equally as important, they have received far less attention in the literature. The disruptive effects of such oppositional practices should not be underestimated for in certain cases the 'mental strike' or indifference of one individual or the public disclosure of 'sensitive' information by a disaffected or ethically motivated employee could be more damaging to management than a strike by an entire work force.

One currently topical example is whistle blowing;[3] a form of resistance that illustrates certain important dimensions of workplace resistance. It shows that resistance can be a relatively individualized oppositional practice. Equally it is not an activity exclusive to the most subordinated workers but might also be enacted by more senior, managerial and 'professional' level employees (LaNuez and Jermier, 1994; Hodson, 1995). Research suggests that cases of whistle blowing not only occur at various hierarchical levels of organizations, but may also be accompanied by severe managerial sanction. The case of Stanley Adams illustrates these points. Before resigning in 1973 as world-product manager for the Swiss-based drug corporation, Hoffman-La Roche, Adams revealed to the European Community the multinational's involvement in illicit price fixing, market sharing with competitors and oppressive control of the world-wide vitamin market. Roche was subsequently fined $430,000 by the EC. However, Adams's identity as the whistle blower was disclosed to the company and after being accused of industrial espionage, he was arrested in Switzerland, charged and given a 3-year suspended sentence. During his detention, Adams's wife committed suicide (Adams, 1984; Madeley, 1986). The possibility of punitive managerial responses to public disclosure by employees was also illustrated in the UK during the 1980s where, after a spate of whistle blowing, particularly in public-sector organizations, the government introduced 'gagging clauses' into employment contracts, for example, in the National Health Service.

Studies informed by feminist analysis reinforce this growing awareness of the multiplicity of oppositional practices. They reveal how male-dominated shop-floor counter-cultures are frequently characterized by highly masculine breadwinner identities, aggressive and profane forms of humour, ridicule and sarcasm and the elevation of 'practical' manual work as a confirmation of working-class manhood, independence and autonomy (Willis, 1977; Collinson, 1992). Yet research on female-dominated workforces also suggests that women often engage in similarly aggressive, joking and sexualized cultures of resistance (e.g. Pollert, 1981; Westwood, 1984). Indeed it seems reasonable to assume that certain commonalities would exist between men's and women's experience of subordinated work, for example, in relation to class, control and deskilling. However, without collapsing into biological essentialism, it is also necessary to recognize the potential importance of certain gender differences, particularly when we consider the phenomenological accounts, relationships and resistance practices of employees themselves and the gendered power relations through which they live their lives in particular cultures and historical periods. While men manual workers may insist that resisting management is all part of being a 'real man', women's counter-cultures, rituals and solidarity are often shaped by everyday concerns about feminine identity and sexuality. Hence, studies of the potentially gendered nature of workplace opposition reaffirm the need to recognize the possible multiplicity of different kinds of resistance.

Consequences

The consequences of resistance practices are illustrated by Willis's (1977) study of a group of young working-class men, whom he calls 'the lads'. It shows how oppositional forms can unwittingly reproduce and reinforce the very practices of control they seek to resist. Despite being rebellious and resistant, the lads' counter-culture facilitated their smooth transition into the very shop-floor work that would subordinate them possibly for the rest of their working lives. Such a focus upon the consequences of employee resistance avoids an overly-romanticized and rationalistic[4] interpretation that merely 'celebrates' rather than critically examines the articulation of workplace opposition. This kind of analysis also produces a much more complex picture of resistance, where the inter-relations and boundaries between opposition, control and consent become increasingly blurred. That some forms of resistance could be interpreted as an attempt by workers to exercise control, for example, is illustrated by feminist analyses of the exclusionary and segregating practices of organized male-dominated labour (Pollert, 1981). These studies reveal how worker resistance against the employer (e.g. over the 'breadwinner wage') can simultaneously constitute a form of control (e.g. through the exclusion of female labour).

A growing number of studies have also highlighted the blurred boundaries between consent and resistance (Mitchell, 1990; Kondo, 1990), thereby questioning earlier tendencies to overstate *either* consent or resistance and thus to treat oppositional practices as all but non-existent or as all-pervasive (Collinson, 1994). In practice, rather than being polarized extremes, resistance and consent and accommodation are often inextricably and simultaneously linked in contradictory ways within particular organizational practices. Resistance frequently contains elements of consent and consent often incorporates aspects of resistance. So, for example, members of shop-floor counter-cultures who are highly suspicious and critical of managerial motives and practices can simultaneously express a deep-seated commitment to 'management's right to manage' (Collinson, 1992). By distancing themselves from organizational decision making, they thereby tend to legitimize and reinforce managerial prerogative and power. Conversely, when workers obey managerial instructions to the letter, knowing that this is counter-productive for production, they are both resisting and conforming simultaneously. The overlapping nature of consent and resistance is also illustrated by the practice of whistle blowing mentioned earlier. The available research suggests that when they begin to raise concerns about specific organizational practices, whistle blowers tend to believe that those in authority will listen to them and respond in a constructive way (Rothschild and Miethe, 1994). It is only when managers ignore, try to silence or discredit the employee and their 'bad news' that whistle blowers feel compelled to publicize the issue outside the organization. Since whistle blowers are to some extent constructed by the organizational response to their initial attempts to resolve particular problems, they could be said at least in the early stages to be loyal and conscientious rather than oppositional workers. Each of the foregoing cases suggests that dualistic understandings of either consent *or* resistance do not adequately account for the complexity of these processes.

The contradictory character of accommodation and resistance is illustrated by the ways in which order is negotiated, job regulation and rules are agreed and customs and norms are constructed in ways that lead employees to accommodate to systems of control (Edwards, 1988). 'Secondary adjustments' (Goffman, 1961) such as output restriction and the manipulation of incentive systems often contain elements of cooperation with, as well as restriction of, the production process. These workplace 'fiddles' can grow out of and reinforce the traditions of specific occupations. Similar arguments are developed by Kondo (1990) in her ethnographic study of a Japanese factory. Questioning much of the literature on resistance (e.g. Scott, 1985; Willis, 1977), Kondo rejects the notion of a 'pristine space of authentic resistance' and of a fixed, static and singular identity such as a 'true resister' or 'class warrior'. She contends that actors should be seen as 'multiple selves whose lives are shot through with contradictions and creative tensions' (1990:224 and 220). Kondo describes how the counter-cultures of Japanese shop-floor workers that frequently highlight managerial inconsistencies can themselves be caught in contradictions and ironies, simultaneously legitimizing as they challenge dominant organizational and gendered discourses. Collinson (1994) identifies two different oppositional strategies, namely, 'resistance through distance' and 'resistance through persistence', both of which illustrate the importance of knowledge as a resource for resistance. In the former case, subordinates seek to withhold information, deny their involvement and distance themselves from the organization. Although these activities are characterized by a primary concern to construct identities alternate to those prescribed by the organization, there remains the contradiction that the working conditions that provoked the resistance remain unaltered and may even be reinforced. In the latter case, resistance takes the form of a demand for more information and a determination to render managerial practices more visible and accountable.[5] While relatively more effective in achieving piecemeal change, such resistance tends to take for granted and therefore to reproduce the hierarchical nature of organizations. Seeking to acknowledge the multiple, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory nature of resistance practices, these categories simultaneously combine elements of both exit and voice and are therefore quite different from Hirschman's overly rationalistic approach discussed earlier. All of the foregoing studies suggest that we need to avoid separating and/or over-emphasizing the extent of either consent or resistance. Oppositional practices are likely to be characterized by overlapping and mutually embedded practices of consent, compliance and resistance.

To summarize so far, in order to conceptualize workplace resistance across Europe, its complex, multiple and inter-related conditions, processes and consequences need to be explored. Resistance cannot be examined as if it were separate from managerial discipline, or from employee compliance and consent. Like managerial control, oppositional practices may be characterized by multiple, contradictory processes and outcomes. In many cases employees will express discontent in ways that simultaneously try to protect their continued employment within the organization. Accordingly, employees in advanced European capitalist societies can rarely be understood as (working) class conscious revolutionaries determined to overthrow 'the system', but neither are they totally subordinated, docile automata who passively accept current structures, ideologies and practices. Since the forms and meanings of informal oppositional practices are likely to vary widely over time and space within and across different European countries, national differences must be taken into account. Against this background, the following sections begin an exploration of these various differences.

History

A thesis underlying much historical work on resistance suggests that the forms of worker protest in Europe were broadly similar during the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century. Distinctive national forms emerged only when employers and states developed specific means to manage the problem of the shop-floor. In relation to strikes, this view finds its most elegant statement in the classic study of France by Shorter and Tilly (1974). These writers proposed two theses to explain the long-run development of strikes. First, as industrialization proceeded, the form of strikes changed. From the mid-19th century, strikes were dominated by artisans, whose disputes were typically localized and brief and often concerned the defence of a traditional trade. With the emergence of mass production industry came the strike of the semi-skilled factory worker: large-scale, often concerned with wages, and typically led by a trade union. Finally, more modern production conditions produced a new group of technical workers whose strikes often involved qualitative demands concerning work conditions. In addition to these developments within industry there were political changes. In France, strikes became less and less weapons of economic struggle and increasingly directed at the national political centre, with short but massive protests being coordinated by the unions in order to put pressure on the polity. The implication is that the first set of developments was shared between countries, while political processes differed. Most obviously, labour's political exclusion in North America meant that the strike here retained its economic orientation.

Some broadly similar interpretations have been offered for other countries. Mikkelsen (1986), studying the Scandinavian countries in the period 1750–1940, stresses the twin processes of urbanization and proletarianization as leading to the growth of strikes; in these countries, relatively late industrialization meant that the strike was a rarity before 1870. In the 20th century, the rise of labour's political power led to a shift in focus towards the political arena.

But what of more covert forms of resistance? Here the evidence is necessarily sketchy, but we may take the benchmark of Britain as a starting point. A veritable flood of studies in the tradition of 'the new labour history' has revealed a dense web of workplace custom which shaped the 'rules of the game' and established for workers their own social space. Behagg (1990) explores the nature of this custom and in particular its often deliberately secret character. Reid (1976) illustrates the strength of custom: in Birmingham, traditional forms of leisure survived into the latter half of the 19th century. In short, workers' workplace activities established a rule of law which defined standards of behaviour. Within this rule of law forms of action flourished such as the work to rule and controls of entry to a trade. This is, of course, an idealized picture. We present the key qualifications below, but first use the model to compare evidence from the rest of Europe.

There is certainly evidence of a shop-floor culture with clear similarities to that which existed in Britain. Luedtke (1986), in a study of German factory workers around 1900, organizes his discussion around the concept of

Eigensinn, a pattern of self-reliance and self-organization which created space for leisure in work and horseplay. Luedtke makes the important point that such self-activity involved a political effort to control the workplace, a theme which is familiar in the British studies. As he comments, the political nature of workplace behaviour tended to be neglected by Marxist activists, for whom politics was equated with the sphere of national politics. The parallel with Burawoy's (1985: Ch. 3) well-known work, based on a comparison of contemporary labour processes in Britain and America, is notable: students of the labour process have neglected the role of the state in shaping 'factory regimes' while students of national politics have given too little attention to the politics within the productive arena.

Some similar themes emerge in Pred's (1990) analysis of workers, particularly dockers, in Stockholm at the end of the 19th century. Focusing on the language of resistance, he finds that words for work avoidance, pilfering and lateness were widespread. Though only 15 strikes were recorded in the period 1880–1900, there was a strong workplace culture which sustained a wide range of activities to avoid work and create a set of understandings at odds with formal rules. Pred (1990: 226) also makes the important observation that trade unions tended to operate outside this world and could be significant agents in its rationalization. Unions acted to restrain the dockers' fondness for drink, for example by appointing their own agents to oversee work gangs and to act against the sellers of alcohol. Again, the parallels with Britain are clear, notably in Price's (1980) study of the tensions in the building industry between work-group-centred, informal custom and the rationalized bargaining relationships favoured by unions.[6] Studies adopting a slightly broader perspective identify similar parallels. The accounts of European workers around the First World War assembled by Haimson and Tilly (1989) suggest that at this revolutionary period it tended to be the same groups, notably metal workers, who were in the vanguard of workplace politics and that there was a powerful combination of strong workplace-based action with a wider political programme. The examples of Russian factory workers, metal workers in Germany and British workers in munitions factories are particularly clear.

Yet we cannot conclude that workers were essentially the same. Even within one country there were widespread variations. Among groups with some collective organization, dockers, with their informal workplace norms developed in an environment of casual labour, differed markedly from engineering workers with strong apprenticeship traditions and a very different technical division of labour. Such groups contrasted even more strongly with the, much more numerous, groups who lacked any kind of collective tradition. When we compare countries, the nature of union organization and, perhaps more importantly, of employer and state behaviour differed, even at this early date. As is often remarked, British unions emerged after workplace organization had been established whereas on much of the Continent, Sweden being a good example, unions grew up with industrialization. Likewise, as Fox (1985) stresses, the British ruling elite came to accept a situation in which informal workplace organization could not be rooted out. In Germany, he argues, a much more aggressive policy was adopted. The policies of ruling groups in managing the 'labour problem' were critical to the shape which forms of resistance took.

These incipient differences became much more marked as employers and the state in various countries developed different means of containing what Sisson (1987) calls 'neutralizing the workplace'. In Britain, no systematic solution to this issue was developed. In most of Continental Europe a system of national- or industry-level collective agreements, often backed up with detailed legal regulation, emerged. It is possible that such formal regulation may have existed at some distance from shop-floor realities. Indeed, this was precisely the argument in Britain during the 1960s: the 'formal' and 'informal' systems were disconnected from each other. In much of Europe, however, this does not seem to have been so, at least to the same degree. The space for workplace resistance was much reduced, as we discuss.

The Period of 'Fordism'

By the period of 'Fordism' we mean the time from immediate post-war reconstruction until the 1970s or early 1980s. This was marked by relatively high employment and the establishment of reasonably coherent national approaches to the problem of the workplace. Sweden, for example, became celebrated for national agreements and solidaristic wages policy which were seen as devices to remove conflict from the level of the shop-floor. We comment on France and Italy before turning briefly to other cases.

France

The general character of workplace industrial relations in France is well-known (Sellier, 1985; Goetschy and Rozenblatt, 1992). Two features stand out. First, unions have been reluctant to sign formal collective agreements, and management authority has often remained unchallenged. As Gallie (1978:303) discovered in his comparison of French and British oil refineries owned by the same firm, 'broadly speaking, French management remained sovereign within the enterprise, whereas British management had conceded substantial rights of negotiation to the trade unions'. 'At the plant level', says Lorenz (1992:460), 'workers' organizations are weak, and joint determination of job allocation or pay is poorly institutionalized'. The result was that resistance emerged on the margins of the system. In Britain, a key shop-floor study could say that 'strike action is a continuous possibility' which 'merges into other forms of collective action and work behaviour'

(Batstone et al., 1978: 218). This was because established traditions of shop-floor bargaining linked 'spontaneous' worker action to more organized forms of pressure; managerial acquiescence was an important part of the way in which this system worked. In France, by contrast, there was no such linkage, and resistance would appear to have been either squeezed out or left to occur spontaneously when discontent with autocracy became severe.

The operation of the regime was studied by Linhart (1978), who took a job as an unskilled worker in the Citroën factory on the outskirts of Paris. His account stresses the unremitting demands of production, the autocracy of management and the inability of workers to respond. The implication is that there was little effort bargaining, and that anyone attempting it would be sacked. It is likely that this represents something of an extreme case. The plant was old, and it is possible that management relied more on autocracy here than elsewhere. The workforce described by Linhart also largely comprised immigrants who feared losing their jobs. In other cases, simple autocracy would be more difficult to sustain. (We should also note that Linhart's workers'-eye view prevents analysis of the position of skilled workers.) Variations over time can also be important. In a comparative study of Chrysler plants in France and Britain, Grunberg (1986) found that the socio-political climate of France in the early 1980s (the Socialist government, the Auroux laws and so on) had encouraged shop-floor militancy and challenged managerial unilateral power. None the less, Linhart's study illustrates some of the dynamics of the French case.

This is not to deny that informal bargaining could occur. The classic work by Crozier (1963) demonstrated the informal bargaining power of strategic work groups. Rolle (1962), in an overview of workers' relations with rate-fixers in the metals industry, noted the negotiability of piecework systems and workers' tendency to work slowly when under time study. Chabaud and de Terssac (1987), studying compositors in the regional daily press, found that the official target of 10, 656 key strokes per hour was rarely attained and that informal norms differed from formal ones. Likewise Fischer (1978) noted that workers can create social space for themselves within the workplace. But he did not see this specifically as part of a bargaining strategy against management. Such studies thus make the explicit point that workers can and do resist, in ways which are generically similar to practices noted in Britain or North America. But the implicit theme is that such practices are fragile and weakly institutionalized.

Two studies develop this point further. A rare analysis looking directly at effort bargaining, in a chemicals plant and a dairy in 1974, found that there were locally agreed bonuses and that managers would 'bend' the formal job grading rules to reward strategic groups (Slack, 1980). However, it concludes that these are only quasi-negotiations because of employer opposition to any institutionalized bargaining and because union policy at national level could override local deals. Hence there was a degree of customary bargaining, but it was constrained from developing into accepted custom and practice rules. An earlier study, using ethnographic observation during 1969 and 1970 in two mechanical engineering factories and a chemicals works, echoes the theme (Bernoux et al., 1973: 50–6). Cases were observed of what is known in Britain as 'using the back of the book' (carrying out work and not recording it at once, the reason being to equalize earnings between different periods and to exploit piecework systems by being paid at a more generous rate than the rules prescribe). But this was practised only by some workers, namely, those whom the authors define as adopting a 'workerist' perspective. There was no organized means to restrict output. We should of course note at this point that institutionalized bargaining and custom and practice rules were far from universal in Britain (Edwards, 1988). But they were certainly common in the type of large unionized plants in the engineering industry studied by Linhart and by Bernoux and his colleagues.

The second familiar feature of the French pattern was the use of the strike as a form of protest. Though weak in terms of membership and strike funds, unions have been able to organize massive protests. The obvious point is that, in contrast to Britain, such protests were not integrated within a repertoire of workplace tactics; they took place outside the system of employer autocracy. This is not to say that they were unconnected with the workplace order. Linhart describes a strike which lasted, unusually for France, for over a week. It was a reaction to managerial efforts to increase working hours, and was thus a response to workplace conditions. But it was organized as a protest, not as part of formal bargaining. Interestingly, as one of the leaders, Linhart found himself exiled to a small warehouse.

The importance of the strike is unwittingly illustrated by Bernoux's (1979) summary of studies of worker attempts to regain control of the work process *(réappropriation du travail)*. The main forms of conflict which Bernoux cites are not aspects of effort bargaining within the workplace but spontaneous strikes and actions against factory closures.

Italy

Up to the late 1960s, Italy shared many features with France, and comparative studies of strikes commonly treated the two countries together. 'It was not too misleading', note Ferner and Hyman (1992: 526), to bracket the two countries as examples of 'management authoritarianism, weak and politically divided unions, and underdeveloped collective bargaining'. There were also differences, however, in the details of shop-floor organization, and these became increasingly pronounced with the strengthening of shop-floor bargaining institutions following the *Statuto dei Lavoratori* of 1970.

In the 1950s and 1960s Taylorism in Italy involved hierarchical and autocratic management. Task fragmentation and the rationalization of production were both marked. Supervision was strict. A good illustration of the style of management policy was that labour relations departments were staffed by lawyers or ex-army personnel whose main aim was to manage employee relations in a strictly legal way and to maintain formal discipline (Berta, 1983). Workers were expected to comply with detailed procedures for the conduct of work. Yet resentment was tempered in various ways. First, workers' horizons were often limited. For example a study of the 1960s underlined the limited extent of mobility and the low importance of careers to many workers (Paci, 1973). At a time of economic growth, there may well have been acceptance of Taylorism. Second, a certain paternalism was practised by foremen. Mutual trust and respect could develop between supervisor and worker. Studies of piecework showed that, as in the classic British studies (see Edwards, 1988), workers developed informal rules to govern the pace and allocation of work, which foremen tolerated as long as output was secured (Della Rocca, 1982). In some cases unions opposed such practices because they cut across established bargaining relationships.

There were few studies of subtle forms of resistance in this period because Italy's extensive strikes formed a more obvious focus for research. Evidence suggests that resistance was mainly an informal means of managing the distribution of the workload and also a more oppositional challenge to work organization itself (Regini and Reyneri, 1971). A typical informal practice, in the car industry for example, was to skip a task every so often so as to gain some leisure. The fact that it has an accepted name, the *salto della scocca*, suggests that it had a recognized place among workers' tactics. During the late 1960s such practices became a more generalized form of resistance to Taylorism and they merged with the rise of worker lay representation (*delegati di reparto*) into a move to develop plant-level negotiation. Studies suggest that unions would agree a pace of work with management . If there was a feeling that management had broken the agreement, skipping a task would be used as an occasional tactic. Other studies relate to smaller plants. A participant observer study of women workers in an engineering plant with 700 employees (Della Rocca, 1982) revealed that workers could shape the allocation of work among themselves and would use the 'back of the book'. Informal bargaining was thus quite well established, and accepted by supervisors. This leads to an important general point. Most comparative studies are of large workplaces which are taken as representative of the 'national system'. Yet small firms are very different, and there may be major similarities between such forms across countries. We return to this issue in the conclusion.

By contrast, a distinctive area of Italian industrial relations appears to be the operation of the public sector. As Ferner (1994:68) notes, 'public employment has played a key role in the Italian system' with the state sector being crucial in the accommodation of diverse political interests and with patronage being a key feature of its operation. The public sector comprised three main parts: the nationalized industries, public services, such as gas and electricity, and public administration. The last of these was particularly strongly insulated from the market, probably to a greater degree than was the case in other countries. Employment in public administration was used to deal with chronic unemployment, particularly in the south, and recruitment was driven by political clientism. Workers often came to enjoy short hours, relatively good working conditions, and weak discipline. The concept of exploitation fitted workers' conditions very imprecisely (Matraia, 1984), and there was a widespread feeling that human resources were being underutilized, whether they were unskilled workers or teachers or nurses. Concern with the quality of performance was minimal.

In this context, resistance as a way to escape the pressures of work was scarcely an issue. A more important form of adaptation by workers was the reduction of the length of the working day. Absenteeism was very high, and it was common for workers to hold second jobs. A study of holders of second jobs in the private and public-sectors (Gallino, 1982) showed that an important reason for holding a second job was, particularly for intellectual and white-collar workers, a low level of satisfaction with public-sector work. Other jobs increased professional skills as well as income. Among blue-collar workers, effort restrictions are illustrated by telephone installation workers. They would set informal quotas for the number of installations per day and thus control working time.

Under Fordism, therefore, there was autocracy combined with the possibility of some workplace adaptation. A critical difference from France was the role of the unions. The French unions, in particular the CGT (*Confédèration générale du travail*), opposed any decentralization of bargaining whereas in Italy union policy towards shop-floor *delegati* was more flexible. We have also noted the tolerance by some supervisors of shop-floor bargaining. Perhaps this also encouraged moves towards more institutionalized bargaining at this level, though further research would be needed to assess this point.

'Other Countries'

Germany is one country where the shortage of workplace studies is particularly acute. Well-known features of the industrial relations system certainly suggest that informal effort bargaining is tightly limited. These features include the unions' monopoly on the calling of industrial action, the comprehensive peace obligation, the ban on works councils becoming involved in action and the fact that the councils provide a sophisticated mechanism for the aggregation of workers' interests and the voicing of these interests to management. Issues such as restructuring or lay-offs, which in Britain would be resolved through negotiation at workplace level and which could provoke mistrust and argument, are subject to discussion in the works council. Moreover, collective agreements regulating wages and conditions of employment are not only usually concluded by industry and region, but are also legally binding (Sorge and Warner, 1986). This highly centralized system therefore effectively removes many points of (local) tension.[7]

One study which looked directly at workplace issues is Maitland's (1983) comparison of tyre plants in Britain and Germany. This confirmed a higher level of strikes in Britain and much more extensive informal bargaining over pay. The workplace order in Germany was more clearly institutionalized. The study also notes, however, a relatively high rate of dismissals in Germany (pp. 21–2), a phenomenon also noted in other accounts (see Edwards, 1992b: 431). One study at workplace level offers some interesting figures (Rydzy, 1989: 133). At the Opel plant at Rüsselheim during the 1970s the number of dismissals for reasons of personal conduct ran at over 1000 a year. In some years, this represented up to 5 percent of the workforce, though by 1982 the rate was only 0.7 percent. The 1970s figures are likely to have been well in excess of those for comparable plants in the UK. This is at first sight surprising. The 1969 Dismissal Protection Act provides that any ordinary dismissal must be 'socially justified', an approach which goes back as far as 1920 (Blenk and Viethen, 1992: 177). The legal regulation of dismissal is certainly substantial. Whether or not those dismissed were practising some form of individualized resistance is impossible to say, and Rydzy, for example, offers no commentary on the above figures. It may be that the system protects only 'insiders'. New recruits and those who for some reason fall foul of the system could find themselves liable to dismissal. The significance of dismissal would warrant further study.

In similar vein, press reports comment on high levels of absence. For example Ferdinand Piech, chairman of Volkswagen, is attributed this view:

> The standard Japanese rate is 2 to 3 percent compared with around 9 percent at VW in normal circumstances . . . [T]he fault lies with management, which forgets that factory workers are human beings. (Parkes, 1993)

The idea here, that absence is an individualized escape from work pressures, would also bear closer examination, in particular in relation to how far patterns were related directly to the German system of workplace order.

One other study pursues the theme. Marianne Herzog (1976) took a series of jobs among semi- and unskilled women workers, some of them in very large firms. She describes a regime of intense work pressure and autocratic management which stands in stark contrast to the usual picture of a workplace rule of law. There was little by way of resistance, other than an apparent tendency for workers to leave if they found conditions too tough. Like Linhart's work, this is a politically committed book, and the account is highly coloured. None the less it could suggest that there is an autocratic as well as a consensual aspect to the German model, which might well apply to other marginalized groups such as *Gastarbeiter*. The implication is thus that the system generally institutionalizes control of the effort bargaining so that there is little space for resistance to flourish. On the edges of the system there may be a more autocratic approach, but this also means, albeit for different reasons, that resistance is contained.

Similar points may apply in the Nordic countries. In Sweden the institutions of collective bargaining together with labour's political influence helped to shift contention away from the shop floor. This is not to say that consent reigned. One interesting inquiry (sponsored jointly by management and unions) in the Kockums shipyard at the height of the Europe-wide shop-floor actions of the early 1970s (see Fulcher, 1973) argued that the bargaining system could neglect workers' concerns. Unions became bound up in their relations with management and shop-floor discontents found no means of expression. The specific source of problems was a rationalization of the work process and a change in payments systems. Workers no longer felt a satisfactory balance of effort and reward. Lacking any substantial degree of solidarity, they could not use an unofficial strike, and instead quit in increasing numbers. Swedish manufacturing plants have also been well-known for their high levels of absenteeism. A manufacturing example of Swedish employees' 'resistance through distancing' can be found in Palm's participant observation study of LM where workers sought to 'flee from work' through 'silent and expensive protest actions' (1977: 126) such as absenteeism, long sick leaves, resignations, and by 'escaping' into thoughts about future time, leisure, wishing away work time/daydreaming and planning evening and weekend activities. Seeking to examine the fundamental experience of shop-floor production, Palm highlighted the incentive system, class prejudice/status differences and the deep-seated sense of being a disposable commodity as the main conditions that stimulated worker resistance at LM.

It is hard to draw precise conclusions. As we pointed out above, absence does not necessarily signal resistance. We would need to know more of workers' motivations and the managerial response. But we would suggest two points. First, as the Kockums example demonstrates, open resistance could emerge in Sweden under particular conditions, but these seem to have been relatively unusual. Second, there were underlying issues which the system did not resolve. Absenteeism was widely seen as a rejection of the demands of rationalized production, and particularly in the car industry new production systems were introduced, with the reduction of absence being one of their goals (Berggren, 1992; Sandberg et al., 1992). Though absence is likely to have been a highly individualized and variable response, and thus not a conscious act of direct resistance, it also acted as an indicator of continuing tensions.

Reorganizing Work

In this section we consider how far the workplace order has been changing in response to the widespread reorganization of work associated with flexibility, just-in-time production systems and so forth. As noted above, there are some suggestions that common forces are at work across Europe and indeed the world, though these are likely to stimulate highly variable responses. There are two possible trends. The first is the well-known thesis of a move towards flexible specialization or diversified quality production, implying increased worker control and autonomy. As against this, other writers focus on reduced autonomy. Ritzer (1993) for example speaks of the 'McDonaldization' of society, meaning the extension of rationalized, standardized and calculable forms of work.

The situation has been most fully studied in Britain. An extensive body of evidence (summarized by Elger, 1990; Geary, 1994, 1995; Terry, 1995) indicates the following conclusions. First, the old model based on collective bargaining is crumbling. Second, it is not being replaced by a new model of high commitment and employee communication. Third, many managements have made extensive steps to introduce new forms of work organization, of which just-in-time systems, new technology, and Total Quality principles are among the most significant; associated with these developments have been moves towards merit pay and the widespread use of employee-appraisal systems. A context of high unemployment and of changes in the structure of the labour market, with full-time 'male' jobs in manufacturing being replaced by part-time 'female' jobs in services, has not only eased the introduction of change but has also removed large parts of industry where effort bargaining was most firmly entrenched. The car and coal industries and the docks have all experienced major reductions in employment. Fourth, these initiatives often involve by-passing trade union representatives at the workplace.

Finally, though there is little evidence of concerted managerial strategies, there seems to be a drift towards a situation in which managerial authority is reorganized: it is not a matter of a re-assertion of old forms of power, but what Geary calls a 're-regulation' of labour. This involves exposing workers more directly to competitive pressures and often the granting of autonomy over specific tasks combined with increased responsibility for and surveillance of their performance. For example JIT systems have been described as being based on 'management by stress' (Turnbull, 1988). In the public sector and privatized enterprises 'commercialization' has often been associated with an intensification of work and job losses, though for those who keep their jobs pay levels have offered some compensation (Bach and Winchester, 1994). Management has been increasingly concerned to render employee performance more visible, measurable and thus accountable.

Some studies paint a picture of unrelieved managerial control. Sewell and Wilkinson's (1993) account of a Japanese-owned site claims that covert resistance was entirely absent and that electronic surveillance effectively controlled workers. Yet the authors note in passing a high rate of labour turnover, which may indicate some continued rejection of the system. The case may also be a particularly extreme one, in which managerial organization was unusually strong and workers were particularly quiescent. Other studies of Japanese-owned firms (Broad, 1994) show that managerial organization can be far from effective and that uncertainty, with the possibility of informal bargaining, remains. Non-Japanese firms are even less likely to have developed a totalizing workplace regime. Collinson (1993) for example reports how insurance workers manipulated and evaded performance measurement systems by, among other things, focusing on work which could be processed quickly and finding ways of leaving the work station. Yet worker resistance has been constrained: the power of the shop steward has been reduced, and managers are less willing to tolerate delay in the introduction of change. Workers may well accept or even welcome aspects of the change. Consider Batstone's (1986) important characterization of the 'old regime'. This was often portrayed as a case in which 'bad industrial relations' caused low productivity. In fact, said Batstone, the reverse could be the case: poor productive organization produced delays and breakdowns which lowered the degree of trust between management and workers and encouraged scepticism or hostility when change was mooted. To the extent that new technology has removed some of these conditions, workers may well find the new regime more acceptable. In short, the situation is one where more intense demands on workers are common and where resistance is limited (because of fear or because of resigned acceptance of the inability of mounting effective opposition, or because of some acceptance of change).

Some evidence from France points in a similar direction. Mahieu (1986) reports from 2 months of participant observation in a press shop that technical reorganization and just-in-time principles were central. The result was increasing emphasis on budgets as a means of measuring performance. The implication is that worker behaviour was being constrained, though evidence on how workers in fact responded is absent. Demailly (1992), studying administrative work at the Ministry of Education, reports a reduction in work fragmentation in some respects (de-Taylorization) but also a growth in bureaucracy associated with new administrative procedures. This would be consistent with the British evidence of limited autonomy within a labour process tightly bounded by requirements to meet output targets and standards. Nikolopoulou (1993) by contrast reports that change was implemented in the Paris newspaper industry through collective agreements rather than imposition. This could reflect the distinct economic structure of the industry, and certainly contrasts with sweeping changes in British industry.

France may also be seeing a shift in patterns of overt protest. Fillieule (1994) notes a decline in strikes but argues that spontaneous mass demonstrations are an important, and by implication alternative, form of protest. Using police and other files, he estimates that there are around 8000 street demonstrations a year. The demands are traditional, relating to employment issues and material questions, not such 'postmodernist' issues as social values. The implication of these two developments in France is that workplace resistance is becoming increasingly limited by new managerial tactics, combined with continuing union weakness, while other forms of action allow the French to continue to protest.

Some commentators on France also focus on new forms for the organization of protest. Rozenblatt (1991) discusses the French *co-ordinations* and the Italian *cobas (comitati di base)*. These are informal workplace groups which express immediate shop-floor grievances, often through strikes. Examples in France include train drivers and airline workers. For Rozenblatt, the *co-ordinations* represent a potentially important emancipatory development which could help to democratize the unions. However, they are often limited to the public sector and they generally reflect an outburst of protest rather than a continuing organization. They thus reflect a continuing split in France between day-to-day work experience and modes of resistance, together with a weak institutionalization of bargaining.

As for the *cobas*, these too are predominantly public sector organizations. They also often involve specific elite groups who are able to use their relative job security to try to preserve their position, train drivers being an example from manual workers but with middle-class groups such as pilots, doctors and teachers being particularly prominent. The *cobas* generally oppose the solidaristic approaches of union confederations. They thus reflect a conservative defence of existing positions rather than a necessarily radical challenge. Yet they also illustrate how the restructuring of work can intensify rather than relieve workplace tensions. The involvement of middle-class groups may, moreover, suggest that some of these groups are increasingly subject to the rationalization of work which was formerly more limited to blue-collar jobs. In countries such as Britain, overt resistance to such rationalization has generally been muted, but it is possible that Italian conditions permit a fuller expression of a common condition.

One well-known case of change in Italy is Fiat, which has been claimed by Bonazzi (1993, 1994), for example, to illustrate a more harmonious approach. According to Bonazzi, Fiat's move towards the 'integrated factory' was achieved on the basis of consent, and the reaction of employees ranged from 'prudent observation to open support'; this was a gentler route to total quality than the 'management by stress' observed in Britain and North America. 'Control has increasingly been transformed from an external disciplinary fact into intelligent conformity with procedures', he concludes, so that 'the zero-sum game, typical of the Tayloristic era, is disappearing' (1994: 279, 288). Certain aspects of this analysis are important. Bonazzi stresses the role of improved plant layout and physical working conditions in making work more pleasant; he thus implicitly follows Batstone's argument that production organization is an important determinant of levels of discontent and thus of overt protest. He also shows that certain skills of the Taylorist era, for example, the ability to handle heavy equipment, were not actually valued in their own right: they were necessary in order to survive the uncertainties of the Taylorist organization of work, but their loss was no hardship. But the conclusion that the problems of Taylorism have been resolved is too extreme. Bonazzi (1993) admits that there may be new forms of stress as workers are put under pressure to take responsibility. He quotes a shop steward complaining of 'greater restrictions imposed on the work' and an 'increase in saturation' (p. 293) – the last term being a literal translation from the Italian, meaning a more demanding job in which the worker has to take responsibility.

Bonazzi's account of Fiat may also be over-dependent on the views of managers and shop stewards. A study drawing on extensive interviews with workers documents a very traditional outlook among many foremen, competition and lack of integration among middle managers and new technicians, and a lack of integration between maintenance and production workers (Cerruti, 1993; Rieser, 1993). The authors stress incessant pressure of time which makes it hard for workers to pay proper attention to the quality of the process. For some maintenance workers on the robotized lines, the time for repairs is very short and good maintenance can be done only at week-ends.

In many ways, therefore, the Fiat case suggests that lean production fails to dissolve workplace contradictions. But managing through the demands of the new system can reduce workers' traditional space to resist. There is the possibility that effective resistance could involve not avoiding the rules, but actually relying on them and thus undermining flexibility. Recent research (Della Rocca, 1995) of work under the *kaizen* system shows that strict time measurement allows workers insufficient time to carry out the demands of continuous improvements and that workers thus tended to insist on following the formal procedures. Workers thus have some space to renegotiate the system, albeit in new ways.

This appears to contrast with the British situation, where managements have been able to exploit the uncertainties of de-bureaucratization in their own interests. We might speculate that Italian workers have been in a stronger position because lean production was introduced in a different socio-economic climate. As Terry (1993, 1994) also shows, during the 1970s Italian shop-floor union organizations were able to develop a strategy on production issues, whereas British unions were comparatively weak and reactive. The continuing weakness of British organizations suggests that, in the 1990s too, Italy and Britain may illustrate differing ways in which workers can reshape lean production.

Conclusions

This paper has made a very tentative start to a critical analysis of workplace resistance across Europe. We need more information about: the extent to which European workers are satisfied with their working experience; the subtle ways in which they may express discontent; how such practices may vary over time, place, sector and organization; to what extent gender influences the ways in which employee protest is articulated; and the changing role of management practice in shaping the extent to which workers can create an independent social space in which they can build norms of solidarity. We also need detailed conceptual work which begins to treat seriously the changing forms of workplace resistance and its links with managerial control and employee compliance and consent. Empirical studies could begin to challenge the self-fulfilling view that no research is needed because resistance is unimportant or absent, and because no research is conducted it is assumed that resistance does not exist and is therefore an unimportant feature of organizational life. As we have made clear, detailed ethnographic work, particularly that of a participant–observer kind, is likely to be a fruitful means of addressing these points.

In order to stimulate research, we have suggested various areas where research is particularly needed and have offered some hypotheses. On the former point, it is particularly pressing to try to grasp how worker protest is changing under new forms of work organization. As discussed elsewhere (Edwards, 1992a), there have been suggestions in relation to countries such as Italy that forms of 'micro conflict' are emerging. Such conflict differs from traditional large-scale strikes in being small-scale and informal. Yet some accounts still see it as collective and a conscious attempt to put pressure on management. But there may also be even more hidden forms of conflict which are individualized and are more a form of escape than of overt protest. We need to understand such behaviour within the interstices of organizational life. One particular site where this needs to be done is that of white-collar and managerial labour. Little research has been done among these groups, and the reorganization of work tasks associated with 'delayering' and the end of guaranteed careers suggests that modes of employee response will be particularly interesting. For example, as already mentioned, such forms of resistance as whistle blowing are most likely among these groups. One study of a high technology firm in the US (Kunda, 1992) pursues the theme of resistance through distancing. It argues that the firm promoted a culture in which managerial employees could no longer delimit their contribution to the firm: total dedication was expected. Yet the employees found ways to maintain distance, notably by retaining a sharp division between home and family life and by expressing cynicism about corporate messages. Such employees are also being pulled in two ways: the individualism of such cultural messages, often backed up by performance-related pay (which seems to be growing in France as well as in the UK); and a possible collective response to common problems of insecurity and work pressure.

As for our hypotheses (which are often little more than speculations), we have suggested that there may have been a commonality in modes of resistance during early phases of industrialization and that small firms continue to display marked similarities across nations. Ram (1994) for example argues that many of the practices which he observed in small Asian-owned clothing firms in Britain have parallels with the apparently very different case of small firms in the Far East (Deyo, 1989). In both cases, negotiated forms of paternalism existed in which there were close personal ties between managers and workers. These ties created bonds of reciprocity. Workers were not the powerless victims of managerial power that they are often portrayed; instead, they could use the firms' dependence on their skills to shape the effort bargain in their own favour. Kondo's (1990) study cited earlier makes by implication some similar points. It may be, therefore, that relatively small firms in Italy or elsewhere share many features with those in Britain. The negotiation of inter-personal ties may be a common aspect of such firms.

Among large firms, distinct national patterns seem to have emerged and to have become established during the postwar period. In Germany and the Nordic countries, for example, day-to-day resistance seems to have been squeezed to the margins of the system. Work among marginalized groups, notably migrant workers, could well be illuminating. Cohen (1987: 179–219), for example, has analysed what he terms habitution and resistance among migrant farm workers in the USA and among African workers. Similar themes could well be pursued in Europe.

The obvious question is whether the combined forces of European integration and the globalization of markets are pressing countries into more similar lines of development. Our own view is that there are tendencies in this direction (notably a reduction in the independent space enjoyed by workers), but that nationally specific features also remain important and that the effects of globalization are likely to vary significantly between industries. Where, for example, domestic competition remains important, globalization will have slow and indirect effects. Much of the Anglo-American literature speaks of a heightening of labour subordination. However, as noted earlier, it is the reorganization of consent and compliance, rather than a simple increase or decrease, which is critical. New work systems can also have costs for employers. For example, if voice mechanisms are closed off there may be unanticipated problems of repressed discontent. The negotiation of consent has been a perennial issue, because of management's essential need to balance control and commitment. The current era is no different in this respect from the past, although the balance of advantage can shift for quite significant periods of time and although forms of resistance are far from static. In short, there is unlikely to be movement in one direction, be it upskilling or McDonaldization. Different forces are at work in different industries, and national characteristics will remain important. It may be more accurate to speak of polarization between more and less advantaged groups.

This paper has been designed above all to stimulate research and debate around such issues. We believe that the detailed examination of the conditions, processes and consequences of workplace resistance has the potential to develop new understandings about the nature of European industrial relations. In the longer term it may also create the conditions that facilitate the transformation of contemporary European organizations for the benefit of the employees who constitute these corporations.

NOTES

This paper is part of the workplace change programme of the Industrial Relations Research Unit's Centre for International Employment Relations Research, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The authors thank Jacques Bélanger, Sabine Erbès-Seguin, Cor Lammers, Walther Müller-Jentsch, Åke Sandberg, Arndt Sorge, Torbjorn Stjernberg and Ad Teulings for their advice and assistance.

1 Let us add hastily that much Anglo-American literature in the loosely defined area that calls itself organizational behaviour has the same problem of repeating long-established and universal truths. See for example Mills and Murgatroyd (1991). We also hope that our comments on France can be proved wrong.

2 In an earlier issue of this journal, Crouch (1995) used Hirschman's categories to analyse post-Fordist, post-Keynesian European industrial relations and to highlight the way in which the exit model is currently 'loaded towards the interests of employers and the wealthy' (1995: 69) who are 'exiting' from obligations to workers and from the obligations to pay taxes. By contrast, he argues for the need to 'maximize the voice possibilities of Post-Fordism'. This focus on exit by employers is an important extension: most theorizing in the Hirschman tradition looks solely at workers and their organizations.

3 This US term is problematic, particularly because it tends towards the kind of psychologistic explanation of resistance that we criticized earlier. It encourages a focus upon the individual rather than the issues that they raise. Concentrating upon the personality of the individual and negating their motives and message is precisely the way that research suggests managers often respond to the disclosure of 'bad news'. Nevertheless, because of the term's widespread use in both everyday discourse and academic research we have decided to use it here.

4 There is a growing interest in emotions in organizations (Fineman 1994), which encourages us to examine the 'non-rational' as well as the rational nature of workplace resistance.

5 Similar arguments regarding the potential effectiveness of persistent kinds of resistance have been outlined in relation to the disclosure and strategic acquisition of financial analysis by McBarnet et al. (1993) and Ezzamel (1994). The latter draws upon a detailed case study of a UK university to demonstrate how resistance can be effectively deployed by using technical knowledge of budgeting to challenge successfully a managerial change initiative designed to reallocate resources and implement redundancies.

6 Incidentally, the debate around this work, which caricatured Price as the advocate of a stark contrast between vibrant shop-floor activity and union

bureaucrats, seems in retrospect not to have advanced understanding very far. It was a matter of a tension between different models of worker behaviour and collective interest representation, not a clash between levels of unions (see Edwards, 1986: 134–7).

7 This is not to say that works councils are powerless. Thelen (1991) and Wever (1994) report cases in which councils effectively pressed demands on management, in some cases even using forms of industrial action. The concern here, however, is more informal activity at the level of the individual or work group.

REFERENCES

Adams, S. (1984) *Roche Versus Adams.* London: Jonathan Cape.

Ahrne, G. (1990) *Agency and Organization.* London: Sage.

Bach, S. and Winchester, D. (1994) 'Opting out of Pay Devolution? The Prospects for Local Pay Bargaining in UK Public Services', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 32: 263–82.

Batstone, E. (1986) 'Labour and Productivity', *Oxford Reveiw of Economic Policy* 2(3): 32–42.

Batstone, E., Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. (1978) *The Social Organization of Strikes.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Behagg, C. (1990) *Politics and Production in the Early Nineteenth Century.* London: Routledge.

Berggren, C. (1992) *The Volvo Experience: Alternatives to Lean Production.* Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Bernoux, P. (1979) 'La résistance ouvrière à la rationalisation: la réappropriation du travail', *Sociologie du travail* 21: 76–90.

Bernoux, P. (1985) *La sociologie des organisations.* Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Bernoux, P., Motte, D. and Saglio, J. (1973) *Trois ateliers d'O.S.* Paris: Editions ouvrières.

Berta, G. (1983) *Lavoro solidarietà'e conflitti.* Rome: Officina edizioni.

Blenk, W.K and Viethen, H.P. (1992) 'Germany', in H.N. Wheeler and J. Rojot (eds) *Workplace Justice: Employment Obligations in International Perspective.* Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Bonazzi, G. (1993) *Il tubo di cristallo.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bonazzi, G. (1994) 'A Gentler Way to Total Quality? The Case of the "Integrated Factory" at Fiat Auto', in T. Elger and C. Smith (eds) *Global Japanization?* London: Routledge.

Broad, G. (1994) 'The Managerial Limits to Japanization: A Manufacturing Case Study', *Human Resource Management Journal* 4(3): 39–51.

Burawoy, M. (1985) *The Politics of Production.* London: Verso.

Burawoy, M. amd Krotov, P. (1992) 'The Soviet Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: Worker Control and Economic Bargaining in the Wood Industry', *American Sociological Review* 57: 16–38.

Cerruti, G. (1993) 'Automazione e integrazione alla Fiat di Termoli', in M. Carrieri et al. (eds) *Fiat: Punto e a Capo.* Rome: Ediesse.

Chabaud, C. and de Terssac, G. (1987) 'Du marbre à l'écran: rigidité des prescriptions et régulations de l'allure de travail', *Sociologie du travail* 29: 305–22.

Clarke, S. and Fairbrother, P. (1994) 'Post-Communism and the Emergence of Industrial Relations in the Workplace', in R. Hyman and A. Ferner (eds) *New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Cohen, R. (1987) *The New Helots*. Aldershot: Gower.

Collinson, D.L. (1992) *Managing The Shopfloor: Subjectivity, Masculinity and Workplace Culture*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Collinson, D.L. (1993) 'Introducing On-line Processing: Conflicting Human Resources Policies in Insurance', in J. Clark (ed.) *Human Resource Management and Technical Change*. London: Sage.

Collinson, D.L. (1994) 'Strategies of Resistance: Power, Knowledge and Subjectivity', in Jermier et al. (1994).

Cressey, P. and MacInnes, J. (1980) 'Voting for Ford: Industrial Democracy and The Control of Labour', *Capital and Class* 11: 5–33.

Crouch, C. (1995) 'Exit or Voice: Two Paradigms for European Industrial Relations After the Keynesian Welfare State', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 1(1): 63–82.

Crozier, M. (1963) *Le phénomène bureaucratique*. Paris: Editions du Seuil. English translation: *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. London: Tavistock, 1964.

Crozier, M. and Friedberg, E. (1977) *L'acteur et le système*. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Dalton, M. (1949) *Men who Manage*. New York: Wiley.

Della Rocca, G. (1982) 'Conoscenze illecite e mutamento dell' organizzazione del lavoro' in S. Mollica and P. Montobbio (eds) *Nuova professionalità formazione e organizzazione del lavoro*. Milan: Franco Angeli.

Della Rocca, G. (1995) 'Le relazioni sociali nella fabbrica automatizzata', *Meridiana* 21: 69–101.

Demailly, L. (1992) 'Simplifier ou complexifier? Les processus de rationalisation du travail dans l'administration publique', *Sociologie du travail* 34: 429–50.

Deyo, F.C. (1989) *Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Edwards, P.K. (1986) *Conflict at Work*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Edwards, P.K. (1988) 'Patterns of Conflict and Accommodation', in D. Gallie (ed.) *Employment in Britain*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Edwards, P.K. (1992a) 'Industrial Conflict', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 30: 361–404.

Edwards, P.K. (1992b) 'La recherche comparative en relations industrielles: l'apport de la tradition ethnographique', *Relations Industrielles* 47: 411–36.

Edwards, P.K. and Hyman, R. (1994) 'Strikes and Industrial Conflict: Peace in Europe?', in R. Hyman and A. Ferner (eds) *New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Edwards, P.K., Bélanger, J. and Haiven, L. (1994) 'Introduction: The Workplace and Labor Regulation in Comparative Perspective', in J. Bélanger, P.K. Edwards and L. Haiven (eds) *Workplace Industrial Relations and the Global Challenge*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Edwards, R. (1979) *Contested Terrain*. London: Heinemann.

Elger, T. (1990) 'Technical Innovation and Work Re-organisation in British

Manufacturing in the 1980s', *Work, Employment and Society* 4 (additional special issue, May): 67–101.

Ezzamel, M. (1994) 'Organizational Change and Accounting: Understanding the Budgetary System in its Organizational Context', *Organization Studies* 15: 213–40.

Ferner, A. (1994) 'The State as Employer' in R. Hyman and A. Ferner (eds) *New Frontiers in European Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ferner, A. and Hyman, R. (1992) 'Italy: Between Political Exchange and Micro-Corporatism', in A. Ferner and R. Hyman (eds) *Industrial Relations in the New Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fillieule, O. (1994) 'La mobilisation collective: comment manifeste-t-on en France aujourd'hui?', *Sciences humaines* 40 (June): 10–13.

Fineman, S., ed. (1994) *Emotion in Organizations*. London: Sage.

Fischer, G-N. (1978) 'L'espace comme nouvelle lecture du travail', *Sociologie du travail* 20: 397–422.

Flam, H. (1993) 'Fear, Loyalty and Greedy Organizations', in Fineman (1994).

Fox, A. (1985) *History and Heritage*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Freeman, R.B. and Medoff, J.L. (1984) *What Do Unions Do?* New York: Basic Books.

Friedman, A.L. (1977) *Industry and Labour*. London: Macmillan.

Fulcher, J. (1973) 'Discontent in a Swedish Shipyard: The Kockums Report', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 11: 242–58.

Gallie, D. (1978) *In Search of the New Working Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gallino, L. (1985) *Il lavoro e il suo doppio*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Geary, J.F. (1994) 'Task Participation: Employees' Participation Enabled or Constrained?', in K. Sisson (ed.) *Personnel Management*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Geary, J.F. (1995) 'Work Practices: the Structure of Work', in P. Edwards (ed.) *Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Goetschy, J. and Rozenblatt, P. (1992) 'France: the Industrial Relations System at a Turning Point?', in A. Ferner and R. Hyman (eds) *Industrial Relations in the New Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Goffman, E. (1961) *Asylums*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Gouldner, A. (1954) *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. New York: Free Press.

Graham, J. (1986) 'Principled Organizational Dissent', *Research in Organizational Behaviour* 8: 1–52.

Grunberg, L. (1986) 'Workplace Relations in the Economic Crisis: A Comparison of a British and a French Automobile Plant', *Sociology* 20: 503–30.

Hadjicostandi, J. (1990) 'Façon: Women's Formal and Informal Work in the Garment Industry in Kavala, Greece', in K. Ward (ed.) *Women Workers and Global Restructuring*. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Haimson, L. and C. Tilly eds (1989). *Strikes, Wars and Revolutions in an International Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herzog, M. (1976) *Von der Hand in der Mund*. Frankfurt/Main: Rotbuch Verlag. English translation: *From Hand to Mouth*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980.

Hirschman, A.D. (1970) *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hodson, R. (1995) 'Worker Resistance: An Underdeveloped Concept in the Sociology of Work', *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 16: 79–110.

Hoffman, R-W. (1981) *Arbeitskampf im Arbeitsalltag: Formen, Perspektiven und gewerkschaftspolitische Probleme des verdeckten industriellen Konflikts.* Frankfurt/Main: Campus.

Hollway, W. (1991) *Work Psychology and Organizational Behaviour.* London: Sage.

Hyman, R. (1987) 'Strategy or Structure? Capital, Labour and Control', *Work, Employment and Society* 1(1): 25–55.

Jermier, J. (1988) 'Sabotage At Work: The Rational View' in N. DiThomaso and J. Bacharach (eds) *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, vol 6. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Jermier, J., Knights, D. and Nord, W., eds (1994) *Resistance and Power in Organizations.* London: Sage.

Kondo, D.K. (1990) *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kunda, G. (1992) *Engineering Culture.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

LaNuez, D. and Jermier, J. (1994) 'Sabotage by Managers and Technocrats: Neglected Patterns of Resistance at Work', in Jermier et al. (1994).

Linhart, R. (1978) *L'établi.* Paris: Editions de minuit. English translation: *The Assembly Line.* London: John Calder, 1981.

Lorenz, E.H. (1992) 'Trust and the Flexible Firm: International Comparisons', *Industrial Relations* 31: 455–72.

Luedtke, A. (1986) 'Cash, Coffee Breaks and Horseplay', in M. Hanagan and C. Stephenson (eds) *Confrontation, Class Consciousness and the Labor Process.* New York: Greenwood.

Lupton, T. (1963) *On the Shopfloor.* Oxford: Pergamon.

McBarnet, D., Weston, S. and Whelan, C (1993) 'Adversary Accounting: Strategic Uses of Financial Information by Capital and Labour', *Accounting, Organization and Society* 18: 81–100.

Madeley, J. (1986) 'Whistleblower Paid a High Price', in P.J. Frost, V.F. Mitchell and W.R. Nord (eds) *Organizational Reality: Reports from The Firing Line.* Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.

Mahieu, C. (1986) 'Organisation et gestion de la production dans une unité d'emboutissage', *Sociologie du travail* 28: 316–34.

Maitland, I. (1983) *The Causes of Industrial Disorder.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mars, G. (1982) *Cheats At Work.* London: Counterpoint.

Matraia (Cooperative) (1984) 'Indagine sugli atteggiamento verso il lavoro dei pubblici dipendenti della Provincia di Torino', unpublished report.

Mikkelsen, F. (1986) 'Workers and Industrialization in Scandinavia, 1750–1940', in M. Hanagan and C. Stephenson (eds) *Proletarians and Protest.* New York: Greenwood.

Mills, A.J. and Murgatroyd, S.J. (1991) *Organizational Rules.* Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Mitchell, T. (1990) 'Everyday Metaphors of Power', *Theory and Society* 19(5): 545–78.

Near, J.P., Morehead Dworkin, J. and Miceli, M.P. (1993) 'Explaining the

Whistleblowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory', *Organization Science* 4(3): 393–411.

Nikolopoulou, H. (1993) 'La modernisation négociée dans la presse parisienne', *Sociologie du travail* 35: 163–80.

Paci, M. (1983) *Mercato del lavoro e classi sociali in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Palm, G. (1977) *The Flight From Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Parkes, C. (1993) 'Interview with Ferdinand Piech', *Financial Times*, 25 October.

Pollert, A. (1981) *Girls, Wives, Factory Lives*. London: Macmillan.

Pred, A. (1990) *Lost Words and Lost Worlds: Modernity and the Language of Everyday Life in Late Nineteenth Century Stockholm*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Price, R. (1980) *Masters, Unions and Men*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ram, M. (1994) *Managing to Survive: Working Lives in Small Firms*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ramsay, H. and Haworth, N. (1989) 'Managing the Multinationals: The Emerging Theory of the Multinational Enterprise and Its Implications for Labour Resistance', in S.R. Clegg (ed.) *Organization Theory and Class Analysis*. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Regini, M. and Reyneri, E. (1971) *Lotte operaie e organizzazione del lavoro*. Milan: Marsilio.

Reid, D.A. (1976) 'The Decline of Saint Monday, 1766–1876', *Past and Present* 71: 76–101.

Rieser, V. (1993) 'Crisi dell'automazione e riaggustomento organizzativo alla Fiat di Cassino', in M. Carrieri et al. (eds) *Fiat: Punto e a Capo*, pp. 399–455. Rome: Ediesse.

Ritzer, G. (1993) *The McDonaldization of Society*. Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge.

Rodrigues, S. and Collinson, D.L. (1995) 'Having Fun with Animals: Humour and Resistance in Brazil', *Organization Studies* 16: 589–612.

Rolle, P. (1962) 'Norme et chronométrage dans le salaire au rendement', *Cahiers d'étude de l'automation et des sociétés industrielles* 4: 9–38.

Rothschild, J. and Mietha, T.D. (1994) 'Whistleblowing as Resistance in Modern Work Organizations', in Jermier et al. (1994).

Roy, D. (1952) 'Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop', *American Journal of Sociology* 57: 427–42.

Rozenblatt, P. (1991) 'La forme co-ordination', *Sociologie du travail* 33: 239–54.

Rydzy, W. (1989) 'Settlements of Labour Disputes in Private Industry: The Example of Adam Opel AG', in T. Hanami and R. Blanpain (eds) *Industrial Dispute Resolution in Market Economies*, 2nd edn. Deventer: Kluwer.

Sandberg, Å., Broms, G., Grip, A., Sundström, L., Steen, J. and Ullmark, P. (1992) *Technological Change and Co-determination in Sweden*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1985) *Weapons of The Weak*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Segrestin, D. (1993) 'The French Sociology of Work between Crisis and Renewal', *Revue suisse de sociologie* 19: 643–62.

Sellier, F. (1985) 'Economic Change and Industrial Relations in France', in H.

Juris et al. (eds) *Industrial Relations in a Decade of Economic Change*. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.

Sewell, G. and Wilkinson, B. (1993) 'Human Resource Management in "Surveillance" Companies', in J. Clark (ed.) *Human Resource Management and Technical Change*. London: Sage.

Shorter, E. and Tilly, C. (1974) *Strikes in France, 1830–1968*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sisson, K. (1987) *The Management of Collective Bargaining*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Skorstad, E. (1994) 'Lean Production, Conditions of Work and Worker Commitment', *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 15: 429–55.

Slack, E. (1980) 'Plant-level Bargaining in France', *Industrial Relations Journal* 11(4): 27–38.

Sorge, A. and Warner, M. (1986) *Comparative Factory Organization*. Aldershot: Gower.

Taylor, L. and Walton, P. (1971) 'Industrial Sabotage: Motives and Meanings', in Cohen, S. (ed.) *Images of Deviance*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Terry, M. (1993) 'Workplace Unions and Workplace IR: The Italian Experience', *Industrial Relations Journal* 24(2): 138–50.

Terry, M. (1994) 'Workplace Unionism: Redefining Structures and Objectives', in A. Ferner and R. Hyman (eds) *Industrial Relations in the New Europe*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Terry, M. (1995) 'Trade Unions: Shop Stewards and the Workplace', in P. Edwards (ed.) *Industrial Relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Thelen, K.A. (1991) *Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Turnbull, P.J. (1988) 'The Limits to Japanization', *New Technology, Work and Employment* 3(1): 7–20.

Vinten, G., ed. (1994) *Whistleblowing: Subversion or Corporate Citizenship?* London: Chapman.

Westwood, S. (1984) *All Day, Every Day: Factory, Family, Women's Lives.* London: Pluto Press.

Wever, K.S. (1994) 'Learning from Works Councils: Five Unspectacular Cases from Germany', *Industrial Relations* 33: 467–81.

Wilkinson, B. (1994) 'The Korea Labour "Problem"', *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 32: 339–58.

Willis, P. (1977) *Learning to Labour*. London: Saxon House.

PAUL EDWARDS and DAVID COLLINSON are at the Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick.

GIUSEPPE DELLA ROCCA is at the Università della Calabria. At the time of writing he was Leverhulme Visiting Professor at the Industrial Relations Research Unit.

ADDRESS: Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. [email: irrupe@wbs.warwick.ac.uk]