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Europeanism and Americanism in the Age of Globalization
Hannah Arendt's Reflections on Europe and America and Implications for a Post-National Identity of the EU Polity

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ABSTRACT: The article examines Hannah Arendt's analysis of 'pan-nationalist Europeanism' and anti-Americanism which may serve inherently problematic identity-generating functions for the European project. For Arendt, this specific form of Europeanism is often intimately linked to mobilizations of widely spread fears of global sociocultural and economic modernization, which is frequently perceived as 'Americanization'. In addition, however, those fears may reflect self-referential politics of 'Americanism' abroad and also originate in 'objective' structural international imbalances. According to Arendt, then, Americanism on one side and Europeanism on the other side of the Atlantic should be challenged as two ideologies facing, fighting and, above all, resembling each other as all seemingly opposed ideologies. In light of the current transatlantic cleavages, it is argued with Arendt that it is in the EU's best interest to avoid binary, culturalized legitimizations of Europeanism and (anti-)Americanism. Instead, it is the eminent political task to positively resignify the EU as a new, truly post-national project and polity in its own right. Adapting and expanding Arendt's framework, conceptual and normative implications for a self-reflexive, unique and future-oriented EU political identity and response to globalization are indicated and discussed.

KEY WORDS: *Americanism, anti-Americanism, Arendt, Europeanism, globalization, political identity, post-conventional politics, post-nationalism, transatlantic relations*

Introduction

The European-American intellectual Hannah Arendt is one of the most influential political theorists of the 20th century. She is widely recognized for

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139

rearticulating the idea of public and political freedom, and for her conceptual contributions to both the analysis of totalitarianism and a 'post-metaphysical understanding of democracy'.[1] This fascination for Arendt has by now virtually turned into an 'Arendt cult', as Walter Laqueur terms it[2] – no other political thinker has at present time as wide an echo. However, her political and theoretical writings on 'Europeanism' or European identity, 'Americanism' and the relationship between Europe and America in an increasingly globalized modern culture have so far received little attention. Addressing one of the key political issues of our times, her reflections are a by-product of what may be considered her most productive years, namely the early postwar period.

Since 9/11 and in course of the debates on US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the interrelated subjects of 'Europeanism', 'European identity', 'Americanization', 'Americanism' and 'anti-Americanism' have once more become central topics in politics and the media on both sides of the Atlantic.[3] The often polarized public and political discussions about Europe and America have, to some extent, been matched by an equally polarized academic discourse. However, the issues at stake, and especially the debates about 'European anti-Americanism' and 'Americanism', still suffer from a lack of political-theoretical conceptualization[4] and self-reflexive discussion of 'deeper structural reasons' that may be involved beyond immediate conflicts over foreign policy.[5] Although theoretical conceptualizations, such as Arendt's from the early 1950s, cannot simply be transferred from one era to another, I will argue that her reflections on a troublesome relationship between Europe and America may offer one conceptual and normative approach which illuminates some of the underlying problems and cleavages involved in current political-cultural constructions of Europe and America in the age of globalization. Drawing upon empirical observations of postwar Europe, Arendt unfolds a distinct view on the structural misperceptions and conflicts that may trouble transatlantic relations. Here, Arendt's primary focus is the European view of America and its contemporary functions, though she also addresses the American view of Europe and the related, if not complementary, topic of Americanism.

For Arendt, European perceptions of the United States oddly express problems of the *modern condition* as such, as well as European ambitions to create homogenized identity narratives as the basis for a unified European polity. Thus she fears that the political institutionalization of a European body politic and government, and Europe's integration in general – both of which she strongly endorses in principle – are in danger of being approached as an act of liberation from America's democracy and democratic political culture, and from America as a symbol of advanced modernity at large. Fifty years ago, in a lecture series at Princeton University dealing with European images of 'America' (that is, of the United States),[6] Arendt states:

> If it is true that each nationalism (though, of course, not the birth of every nation) begins with a real or fabricated common enemy, then the current image of America in Europe may well become the beginning of a new pan-European nationalism. . . . Since Europe is apparently no longer willing to see in America whatever it has to hope or to fear from her own future development, it has a tendency to consider the establishment of a European government an act of emancipation from America.[7]

Arendt warns, on the one hand, of a political-cultural undercurrent which she interprets as a rising pan-Europeanism or pan-European nationalism which reproduces the initial problems of nation-building instead of reinventing politics. Its very basis, she claims, is neither a common European history and experience, nor a pre-existing European cultural identity. It is foremost driven by anti-Americanism, i.e. a generalized opposition towards 'America' and the citizens of the United States to which, according to Arendt, this pan-European nationalism is intimately related. In the hegemonic European image, Arendt argues, America(nism) essentially (1) serves as a common foe, a counter-image with an identity-creating function for Europe herself; (2) along with 'Americanization', it represents all the negative aspects of advanced, increasingly globalized socio-cultural and technological modernization; and finally (3) becomes emblematic for the (European) legacy of totalitarianism and is often seen as its successor. On the other hand, Arendt sees American tendencies toward an exclusive Americanism, structural imbalances in the international system, and processes of technical and sociocultural modernization which are reinforcing and igniting these European perceptions. For her, both Europeanism and Americanism are self-deceptive and malign approaches based upon blurred images of constitutive cultural others which do not help to find political solutions in an increasingly complex modern social world.

In my article, I will first reconstruct, conceptualize and explore Arendt's distinct theses of the 1950s on the relationship between the political construction of a European identity and the problems of pan-Europeanism, Americanism, anti-Americanism. Arendt's main thesis is that within the context of the postwar constellation, a rising *(pan-)Europeanism* takes hold which is intimately linked to domestic problems of modernity, identity and the legacy of totalitarianism, one which tends to envision America as a counter-narrative responsible for such problems. Accordingly, Arendt fears that even the welcomed project of a European federation may be overridden by Euro-nationalistic overtones in which the problems of the old European nationalisms resonate on a new level.[8] On the other hand, opposition to America has 'objective' reasons, such as the structural imbalances in the international system and a complementary new 'Americanism' abroad. In a second step, I will add some critical reflections on her theses, but also possible implications from Arendt's approach in light of new European and global challenges, as well as current transatlantic political-cultural turmoil and misperceptions (which some view as a new 'culture war'[9] between the continents). These considerations point beyond conventional politics of Americanism and

141

pan-national Europeanism. In search for a self-reflexive political theory of European political identity in a globalized world, it is argued with Arendt that it is in the EU's best interest to avoid culturalized legitimizations of Europeanism and (anti-)Americanism. In turn, I suggest that the eminent political task is to positively resignify the EU as a new, truly post-national project in its own right, based on post-conventional modes of politics and community-building, which will be explored in a final section.

Dream or Nightmare? Arendt on European Identity, Americanism and Europe's Image of America

Negative perceptions of America have been present in cultural and intellectual European discourse since the late 18th century. At the beginning of the modern era, America was for Europeans the ambiguous embodiment of hope *and* fears, of promise *and* threat. While this to some degree remains the case, Arendt argues that the ambiguous image of America has undergone a tremendous change since the mid-20th century, namely after the Second World War, the collapse of Nazism and the end of the conventional European nation-state system.

For Arendt, the European image of America has to some extent always reflected actually existing underlying conditions and processes, in particular the modern condition at large. It may also be an evaluation of sorts of America's role in international politics. Furthermore, political and cultural distortions, Arendt claims, are not exceptional with regard to images used to form international relationships, and this, of course, also applies to the American image of Europe. There are, however, several respects in which the image of America abroad does not conform to the general rule, and even less so in the postwar world. First, the European image of America pre-dates the latter's existence: 'without an image of America, no European colonist would ever have crossed the ocean', and this 'image of America was the image of a New World'.[10] Its content was a new ideal of equality and a new idea of freedom; both of these, as Tocqueville said, were 'exported' from Europe. Through the American Revolution this image became reality. A new world was being born because a new body politic had come into existence. At that very moment, Arendt says, Europe and the United States parted company: 'Whatever image Europe had of America, this image could never again become a model or guiding idea for whatever was done or happened in the United States.'[11] Since then, America, as an independent body politic, has mostly represented both dream and nightmare in European images. Until the end of the 19th century, the content of the dream was freedom from both want *and* oppression, plus the assertion of human autonomy and power against the weight of the past that seemed to hinder the full development of new forces, i.e. sociocultural modernization. Simultaneously, this very dream was a nightmare to those who were apprehensive of the modern development it made manifest. However, the image of America remained 'the sometimes fantastically exaggerated and distorted

142

picture of a reality where the most recent traits of European civilisation had developed in an almost undiluted purity'.[12]

While America remains a symbol of radical modernization, Arendt argues that the view that the United States is simultaneously a European project and thus strongly affiliated with old European history and civilization, as Tocqueville and many other European writers believed in the 19th century, is conspicuously missing in Europe's image of America after the collapse of totalitarianism and the conventional European nation-state system. All the other dreams and nightmares have somehow survived, though in Arendt's words, 'they have degenerated into clichés whose triviality makes it almost impossible to consider seriously the constantly increasing literature on the subject'.[13] However, in the constellation of today, Arendt suggests, the United States is, when not otherwise constructed as diametrical opposite, considered to have no more special relations to Europe than to any other region or country. For Arendt this is a dramatic turn of perception which calls for explanations.

'Anti-American Europeanism': Pan-National European Cultural Identity Narratives and America(nism) as a Counter-Image

In the dominant European perception, Arendt points out, 'America' is no longer intermingled with but largely split off from the European self-image of her development and civilization. After the Second World War, Arendt argues, 'America' is increasingly constructed in the framework of a fundamental binary opposition that substitutes the notion of an intrinsic linkage between Europe and America, and more and more replaces the notion of the latter's ambiguity. America, according to Arendt, now only seems to represent all the *evil* aspects of modernization: modern technologies of mass destruction and destructive potentialities in general; a new cultural conformism of mass society; an 'inferior' consumer and money culture that is combined with a lack of communal tradition, history and 'essence'; a nation of individualized immigrants and blended cultures instead of 'rooted' cultural communities; and a foreign policy solely based on economic imperialism and power interests instead of diplomacy and mediation.[14] To the contrary, in the image of most Europeans, Arendt suggests, their continent is positively redefined by the sheer opposite of everything that is identified as American.

It is Arendt's intention to expose this – allegedly hegemonic – European construction as false and distorted. According to Arendt, this image mainly reflects European rather than American issues, problems and realities. However, it needs to be noted that she tries not only to refute but also to *understand* the European view, and that Arendt partially identifies or sympathizes with some of the issues raised. Arendt, hence, also intends to stimulate self-reflection on actual dangers within contemporary America and modern society as such. It seems that she 'deconstructs' the 'anti-American' European perception and underlying European identity models while at the same time presenting this misperception as a

143

sort of convex mirror: instead of fully rejecting anti-Americanism as a mere ensemble of projections, she analyses it as a reflection of modern problems which is completely out of proportion. She simultaneously views anti-Americanism as a stereotypical perception that bears some truth or reflects the modern condition.

Arendt also uses the critical discussion of the European image of America to address an American audience which she wants to become aware of problematic tendencies *within* America and within modern societies in general, such as McCarthyism, modern conformism or the use of new military technology such as atom bombs. She also addresses a self-referential and nationalistic 'growing Americanism at home' which 'expresses a more general mood than traditional iso-lationism or the limited appeal of America First movements'. Therefore Arendt thinks that 'Americanism' oddly corresponds with the dangerous, inherently anti-democratic European anti-Americanism abroad.[15] For Arendt, hence, the peril of anti-Americanism is mirrored and 'reinforced' by 'Americanistic' attitudes and ideologies in the United States (which she doesn't really specify), though not so much by a globally oriented foreign policy. And while the 'image of America which exists in Europe may not tell us much about American realities', Arendt argues, if we are willing to learn, the European fears may point to justified 'fears of the whole Western world, and ultimately of all mankind'.[16]

Secondly, Arendt also strongly endorses the concept of European unification, to which she sees no alternative. The 'European crisis which made possible the German conquest of the continent'[17] presumably points to the irrevocable collapse of the European nation-state system in the wake of Nazi totalitarianism.[18] Arendt, of course, is a strong advocate of constitutional republics as the arenas of granted rights, political sovereignty and the exercise of democratic self-government (and these republics have largely been organized in nation-state formations since the Westphalian Treaty of 1648). She is sceptical about abstract universal notions and cosmopolitan ideas not anchored in living 'communities in action'.[19] But she is also a theorist of political freedom, contingency and the power of new democratic beginnings – this is restated even in the face of the Nazi crimes that have exploded all conventional categories of our political thinking.[20] She thinks that under special circumstances refoundations of political communities may better preserve valuable political traditions than the restoration of old but dysfunctional political orders. This points to Arendt's paradoxical notion of freedom *and* commitment to the treasure of tradition, of beginning anew *and* preserving – a paradox that, according to Arendt, needs to be balanced but cannot be resolved, as Agnes Heller reminds us.[21] However, for Arendt 'beginning anew', understood as the deliberate interruption of continuity, is also the very essence of human action. Hence she promotes the possibility, or even necessity, to found new political communities through (political) action after previous ones have failed.[22]

Arendt particularly opposes the restoration of the prewar European nation-state order and system of collective security because Nazism and the successful

rise of ethnic nationalisms have proven its weakness and failure. Arguing against any form of communal essentialism, she thinks it will not be possible to revive the broken and lost European national traditions by copying out mottoes from old books. The conventional European nation-states no longer function, Arendt argues in an article published immediately after the end of the war, and hence they are inevitably outmoded political entities that need to be replaced by a new, *post-national* political order:

> The truth was that the national State, once the very symbol of the sovereignty of the people, no longer represented the people. . . . Whether Europe had become too small for this form of organisation or whether the European peoples had outgrown the organisation of their national states, the truth was that they no longer behaved like nations and could no longer be aroused by national feelings.[23]

In addition, though, Arendt is a consistent critic of any *ethnically based* nationalism in which, she argues, modern *pan-national* ideologies originate, and which in Arendt's conceptualization represent dangerous European substitutes for national identity narratives. In chapter 8 of her *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt provides case studies of such ethnic, (pan-)nationalist ideologies by reconstructing the origins and development of pan-Slavic and pan-German ideologies that evolved in the late 19th century. In continental Europe and within the context of a 'continental imperialism', these ideologies became the full-fledged 'perversion' of political sovereignty based on national constitutions and political communities.[24] For Arendt, these imaginary, (ethnic) pan-nationalisms and racist as well as anti-Semitic pan-ideologies, which find their prototype in the German ideology of a blood nation (*Volksgemeinschaft*) that accepts no national borders, are the immediate ideological predecessors to totalitarianism.[25] In their essence, in Arendt's view these are *antinational* ideologies and *transnational* movements[26] on which she throws much of the burden for the rise of totalitarianism. Given the background of spreading pan-nationalist ideologies in continental Europe, Arendt argues, it was easy for Nazi totalitarianism to utilize a political vacuum and to fully transform the atomized, disintegrated masses of Europe into 'races', especially after the breakdown of European class society.[27]

In 1950, after her first visit to Germany and Europe since the Second World War, Arendt realized that these dangerous pan-ideologies, based on counter-images and constructions of enemies, were still more powerful in Europe than she had previously hoped.[28] This obviously induced some disillusionment. It also led her to reassess the initially high hopes that she had invested in a new democratic European body politic or federation. Thus survival of the most dangerous pan-ideologies, she fears, might now be moulded into a European pan-nationalism or *Europeanism* that *substitutes* the actual creation of a unified European political community. A true *political* community without essentialist ethnic boundaries is, on the other hand, what the American Republic represents in Arendt's view. It owes its origin to the greatest adventure of European mankind, which 'embarked upon a common enterprise whose spirit proved to be stronger than all national

145

differences'.[29] In Arendt's perception, 'America' is a European project, but it is also exceptional as the immigrant nation par excellence. Its democratic patriotism is not related to an ethnic identity or a 'counter-image' of an 'enemy'; its origins are not based upon an ethnically identified soil, but solely upon a common political and social enterprise preconditioned by the utmost mobility and freedom.

Therefore Arendt fears the mobilization of new cultural counter-images as expressed in European anti-Americanism that may replace the vision of Europe as a political enterprise. For Arendt, a European *political* federation needs to be founded in the idea of freedom and public deliberation, which in Arendt's view originated in the European anti-Nazi resistance. Our hope, Arendt adds with some disillusionment in 1954 is:

> . . . that the emergence of a federated Europe and the dissolution of the present nation-state system will make nationalism itself a thing of the past may be unwarrantedly optimistic. On its more popular levels – not, to be sure, in the deliberations of statesmen in Strasbourg – the movement for a united Europe has recently shown decidedly nationalistic traits. The line between this anti-American Europeanism and the very healthy and necessary efforts to federate the European nations is further confused by the fact that the remnants of European fascism have joined the fight.[30]

Their presence, Arendt continues:

> . . . reminds everybody that after Briand's futile gesture at the League of Nations it was Hitler who started the war with the promise that he would liquidate Europe's obsolete nation-state system and build a united Europe. The widespread and inarticulate anti-American sentiments find their political crystallisation point precisely here.[31]

Arendt conceptualizes this phenomenon, the interrelation between anti-Americanism and certain pan-nationalist forms of European identity narratives, as *anti-American Europeanism*.

The End of Longing: America as the Embodiment of Technological and Sociocultural Modernization

In Arendt's view, not only the old, totalitarian variants of Nazism and Communism, which both consistently agitated against America as the 'great threat to world peace', but also the more subtle, new forms of postwar pan-national Europeanism possibly replicate long harboured resentments against America as a symbolic narrative of modernity. America seems to embody modernity and capitalism like no other place in the world. But one hundred years ago, Arendt argues, the image of America was to a large extent the – often hated – image of democracy. Today, she says, 'the image of America is modernity'. It is the split-off image 'of the world as it rose from the modern age which gave birth to both present-day Europe and America'. Because of the destructive potentialities inherent in current problems of modernization, Europe 'tries to escape the consequences of her own history under the pretext of separating from America'.[32]

146   Arendt lists several underlying reasons for this symbolic narrative and the

separation or estrangement between Europe and America, including 'objective' ones. On one hand, actual American wealth and power are always responded to by affects of the powerless. America has been the 'land of the plenty' almost since the beginning of its history, and the high standard of living, or 'stupendous wealth', was early seen in connection with the principle of American democracy. 'Like an invisible Chinese Wall', Arendt writes, 'the wealth of the United States separates it from all other countries of the globe, just as it separates the individual American tourist from the inhabitants of the countries he visits.'[33] Furthermore, not only economic gaps but also huge differences in relation to political power in the post-Second World War order have caused a structural imbalance between America and the rest of the world, including Europe. Friendship involves equality. And 'although friendship can be an equaliser of existing natural or economic inequalities, there is a limit beyond which such equalisation is utterly impossible. In the words of Aristotle, no friendship could ever exist between a man and a god.'[34] Hence, mistrust of American intentions, the fear of being pressured into unwanted political actions, suspicion of sinister motives when help is given without political strings attached – 'these things are natural enough and need no hostile propaganda to arouse them'.[35] Indeed, to cite Aristotle, the benefactor might love his beneficiaries more than he is loved by them. On the other hand, Arendt adds, the new dynamic of transatlantic estrangement is also fuelled by traditional leftist (and formerly especially Communist) perceptions that the United States became rich from imperialist exploitation. Transforming the Marxian division between capitalist class and proletariat into terms of foreign policy, concepts that divide the world into have and have-not countries (with the United States as the only country falling into the first category) have become powerful interpretations since the second half of the 20th century.

Related to this change of perception, Arendt notes a radical shift in the class structure of those Europeans who are in sympathy with America and those who are not.[36] For centuries, America has also been the dream, a locus of longing, of Europe's lower classes and freedom-loving people; at the same time, it remained a nightmare for the traditional European bourgeoisie, the aristocracy and European intellectuals who saw in equality a threat to culture rather than a promise.[37] In fact, with the growing perception of America as a less and less accessible country that pursues only the interests of the rich and powerful, today sympathy for America can be found rather, as Arendt puts it, 'among those people whom Europeans call "reactionary", whereas an anti-American posture is one of the best ways to prove oneself a liberal'.[38]

But more importantly, along with traditional leftist tirades against 'American imperialism', which may already employ some culturalist reifications of real political conflicts, Arendt observes and conceptualizes an increasing general *sociocultural* hostility against American culture and US citizens, namely a *cultural anti-Americanism*. In Europe this general opposition to what America embodies is 'well on the way to becoming a new *ism*. Anti-Americanism, its negative

147

emptiness notwithstanding, threatens to become the content of a European movement.'[39] (By negative emptiness, Arendt means that the anti-American movement has a shallow content that is mostly based on hostile feelings and resentments towards an 'other', not on a positive, *political* self-definition of Europe.) These diffuse, and often projective, cultural resentments towards, or fears of, American culture and modern culture are as much at the heart of a new pan-European nationalism, Arendt argues, as their simultaneous identity-generating functions.

For Arendt, this resentment against American *modern culture* is also related to collectivistic affects against America's modern democratic, individualistic, legalistic, pluralistic and egalitarian political culture. This political culture, it is argued, is not based on ethnic identity notions – which Arendt fiercely rejects – but founded on the notion of a modern 'melting pot'. The hostility against American political culture thus may *also* be interpreted as a feeling of unease with modern democracy as such, even if democracy is the reference point for criticism of the US. Arendt underlines that modern democracy is most prominently embodied in the institutions and political practices of the American republic,[40] and generalized European sentiments against the US are always in danger of aiming at precisely this fact.

Be that as it may, a more general refusal of the specific 'American political experience', its peculiar tradition of egalitarian democracy, liberalism and individualism, has been constitutive for much of the postwar Communist and socialist left and of the nationalist right, as Sergio Fabbrini argues.[41] According to Arendt, those affects against modernization, which were always part of the European image of America, have now become predominant and to some extent replaced the ambivalent or positive image of America as the embodiment of democracy. Those inarticulate feelings against political and sociocultural modernization, however, are simply split-off domestic contradictions, inherent in European modernity, projected onto the New World. Modern technology and the rapid advancement of modern society 'are so clearly part and parcel of European history since the beginning of the modern age that it is obviously absurd to blame its consequences on America'.[42] Arendt argues that there has been an astonishing, albeit growing, 'tendency both to look upon all technical achievements as inherently evil and destructive and to see in America chiefly . . . the epitome of destructive technicalisation which is hostile and alien to Europe'.[43] Despite the irrationality of this binary code which is constructing the problematic aspects of technology and modernization that affect all modern societies as essentially non-European phenomena, when Europeans think of technology – and by implication, of America – they often do not see a television set in their homes, but the mushroom-cloud of Hiroshima. Since the atomic bomb was dropped, American political power, Arendt contends, is increasingly (and conveniently) 'identified with the terrifying force of modern technology, with a supreme, irresistible power

148 of destruction'.[44]

Again, to be sure, Arendt does also share some of the underlying 'European' fears towards modernization and 'Americanization' and does not just simply dismiss them as unjustified or irrational. With the appearance of atomic weapons, Arendt contends, the agreement of western civilization is no longer universal that nothing should happen during a war which would make a future peace impossible. And this is exactly what Kant states in the sixth preliminary article of his *Perpetual Peace*:

> No state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace. . . . For it must be possible, even at wartime, to have some sort of trust in the attitude of the enemy, otherwise peace could not be concluded and the hostilities would turn into a war of extermination (*bellum internecinum*).[45]

With the appearance of atom bombs and their American use in Japan, this eminently important precondition for any future peace is deeply affected, if not transformed; their ultimately destructive use, and future threats related to this military technology, bear long-term effects. And after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is not surprising that these bombs are identified with America. However, Arendt also concedes that an irreconcilable 'war of extermination', in Kant's words, was not an American but a European, namely a German, invention; the German war of extermination against Jews and on the Eastern front was genocide without precedent.

Finally, Arendt believes that anti-Americanism would vanish or dissolve if Europe were united. With greater industrial resources and political power, and once the Union is fully established, integrated and functioning, she thinks that the 'escape route' of anti-Americanism would automatically be closed and no longer serve as a substitute for a European political identity or source of externalizing problems. Consequently, the debate 'presently in disguise as a discussion of foreign policy would quickly show its true face'.[46] Eventually, the estrangement of Europe from America would come to an end because it would be obvious that modern technological and sociocultural advancement is not just an American affair but has only come to a climax in America first. Arendt claims that only

> . . . as long as Europe remains divided, she can afford the luxury of dodging these very disturbing problems of the modern world. She can continue to pretend that the threat to our civilisation comes to her from without. . . . Both anti-Americanism and neutralism are, in a sense, clear signs that Europe is not prepared at this moment to face the consequences and problems of her own development.[47]

Arendt herself, however, also contradicts this thesis. She indicates that the cultural resentments and ever *new* functions of pan-European nationalism and anti-Americanism lie deeper and are more complex than can be solely rooted in the division of Europe.

Balancing the Bills? Perceptions of America as a 'Totalitarian Power'

Arendt suggests that the fear of modern technology as a source of annihilation exclusively embodied in America is closely linked to a tendency among many Europeans to perceive the American superpower as the – actual or potential – 'new totalitarianism' in the post-Second World War constellation. While Americans are confident that 'it can't happen here', Europeans tend to think that the social and political conformism of the McCarthy era, for example (and now, one may add, of the Bush administration), was already conclusive proof that it can and indeed has happened in America.[48] However, blurring political distinctions and intellectual differentiations, the equation of political problems in American democracy, such as 'Americanism', with the totalitarian terror that took place in Europe, and particularly current American actions with the Nazi concentration camps, may serve the functions of re-establishing collective self-esteem after defeat and foreign liberation, overcoming national feelings of inferiority towards the liberators and exoneration from guilt. Another function of the charge of American totalitarianism, criminality and imperialism in European discourse may point to Europe's own unconscious guilt related to her own largely unmastered *colonial* and imperial past – issues which can also be downplayed by exclusively blaming America for 'imperialism'. On the other hand, it would be similarly unjustified to hold Europe as a hostage of her history, viewing European democracies always in the context of their totalitarian legacy. None the less, a special feature of the perception of 'American totalitarianism', Arendt claims, is that even well-informed Europeans expect Americans to have the same opinion, especially with regard to the dangers of conformism originally exemplified by McCarthyism and commercial culture (and today, one may argue, by Bushism and McDonaldization). Europeans, Arendt suggests, view McCarthy's political conformism 'not as an opinion of individual American citizens, but as American opinion in general'. Since the conditioning of the individual to the demands of society and economy was early considered a characteristic trait of American democracy, this perceived threat of conformism and, ironically, totalitarianism 'could develop into the nightmare of Europe'.[49]

To put it differently: many Europeans fear that terror and violence may not be necessary in order for individual freedom to disappear in America. Freedom may dwindle away through some kind of conformist, mutual adjustment and agreement. However, the potential danger of conformism and its silent threat to freedom – another European fear that Arendt shares – is, in her view, inherent in all mass societies. Where safeguards against the worst dangers of modern conformism and totalitarianism exist (such as liberal-democratic constitutions and stable 'institutions of liberty'), they have in part been imported from America. European safeguards such as traditions and customs, on the other hand, had proven useless in modern predicaments. While Arendt once more gives credit to what she perceives as the hegemonic 'European view' by stating that it is justified

to be alarmed by conformism in America, and while she agrees that possibly anything can happen in an inevitably contingent human history (and especially in these two continents which share so many features and origins), she suggests that this specific fear in relation to the challenge of *defending liberal democracy in an age of global change and turmoil* mostly points to Europe's own domestic fears. Europe 'feels that her political institutions are less stable, less firmly rooted, and her liberties even more exposed to crises from within'.[50] In reality, Arendt concludes:

> . . . the process which Europeans dread as 'Americanisation' is the emergence of the modern world with all its perplexities and implications. It is probable that this process will be accelerated rather than hindered through the federation of Europe, which is also very likely a condition *sine qua non* for European survival. Whether or not the European federation will be accompanied by the rise of anti-American, pan-European nationalism, as one may sometimes fear today, unification of economic and demographic conditions is almost sure to create a state of affairs which will be very similar to that existing in the United States.[51]

Beyond Europeanism and (Anti-)Americanism: Arendtian Perspectives on Current Dilemmas, Structural Misperceptions and New Common Challenges

In her analysis of popular views of America, Arendt critically examines European tendencies to blame America – pars pro toto – for the problems of the entire modern, (post-)industrial world, and for Europe's domestic problems in particular. As much as she endorses a European Union as a political project, she is afraid that it may be built on binary codes opposing and devaluating 'others', in particular American democracy – narratives which could be mobilized as a catalyst for fabricating a non-existent *cultural* European identity. She thereby sees anti-Americanism as one possible, albeit problematic foundation of an identity-generating pan-Europeanism, which may substitute a post-national political identity, and as a potentially dangerous, essentially anti-democratic undercurrent of most European societies which may be revived under conditions of crises or other special circumstances. At the same time Arendt also tries to hermeneutically *understand* the historical, social and political origins of an evolving *anti-American Europeanism*, and she critically interprets an *American 'Americanism'* as a peculiar, reinforcing counterpart of this process on the other side of the Atlantic.

On one hand, Arendt anchors those origins of anti-American Europeanism in the problems of the modern world and modern civilization as such. On the other hand, she sees European feelings of inferiority, the legacy of totalitarianism and Nazism, and a lack of collective identity after the collapse of the nation-states as major causes of Europeanism and cultural opposition to the US. But Arendt, addressing an American audience and the American public, also utilizes her critique of those generalizations and blurred counter-images (which she observes in Europe) in order to inspire a more specific, self-reflexive critique of malign

151

tendencies *within* American society and politics. She sees such problems related to general issues of modernity, i.e. modern individualism, conformism, technology and especially to the increasingly dominating action mode of *labour* and capitalist consumption,[52] or the decline of political *communities in action* and of the public sphere in which they are rooted. Arendt believes that these tendencies, which deeply affect and undermine the sphere of politics, do not only find expression in a potential *anti-American Europeanism* abroad, but are also exemplified in American isolationism and Americanism which may undermine the distinct liberal-democratic, pluralistic and inclusive American political culture with its institutions of liberty and its legal tradition based on a universalistic 'rule of law'. National trends of Americanism or American exceptionalism, then, may also have their share, as Arendt states, in reinforcing European fears and projections in relation to American society, power and hegemony.

Although Arendt criticizes a potentially 'anti-European' Americanism that may be an interrelated part of the problem, it can be argued that her description of the US rather tends to idealize American political culture and its – certainly unique – democratic achievements. In general, such collective self-idealizations and idealized images tend to go along with devaluations of implicitly constructed others. In addition, her reference to Hitler 'who started the war with the promise that he would liquidate Europe's obsolete nation-state system and build a united Europe' when discussing the European project, and her almost exclusive emphasis on the international or pan-national character of fascism and totalitarianism, show that Arendt may underestimate the destructive role of the European nation-state itself in history, and of the crucial impact of nationalism in the success of fascist totalitarianism. While she endorses a new post-national European order after the Second World War because of the 'irreversible' *failure* of the nation-state system in Europe, she does not put much blame on nationalism and the nation-state as such (only on the ethnic-nationalist variants of nation-state formation), and thus cannot fully grasp the magnitude of progress which is represented by a post-national European unification that has largely transcended or mediated previous national conflicts and politics of exclusion.[53]

Nevertheless, Arendt's analysis points to, and may help illuminate, some of the current *structural (mis)perceptions* involved in transatlantic relations, the difficult search for a unified European identity, and American and European political cultures in the wake of globalization and 9/11 (respectively the 'war on terror'). In recent years, many (primarily but not at all exclusively American) theorists observe and criticize a rise of a European 'soft anti-Americanism'[54] spreading in the course of debates on 9/11 and the new rise of Americanism related to the significant domestic and foreign policy shifts introduced by the Bush administration, and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in the context of revived discussions on problems of globalization, as well as on European cultural and political identity.[55] In contrast to this observation, several (primarily but not exclusively European) theorists either dismiss the charge of rising anti-

Americanism or exclusionary Europeanism in this context, insisting that what some see as anti-Americanism on a pan-European level should be conceived as a rising European consciousness which includes legitimate opposition to the American administration in particular, American foreign policies, hegemony or violations of international law in general.[56] In his widely discussed book *Après l'empire*, credited by many with having influenced the position of the French government on the war in Iraq,[57] French nationalist Emmanuel Todd has pushed this view further: 'A single threat to global instability weighs on the world today: America, which from a protector has become a predator.'[58] Other European political analysts and theorists do not deny the current rise of anti-Americanism but openly endorse the 'struggle' against 'American Herrenvolk democracy',[59] and equate the newly founded US Department of Homeland Security with the excessive totalitarianism of the Nazi 'Reichssicherheitshauptamt'.[60] Jean Baudrillard has endorsed the 11 September attacks as a 'dream come true' the whole world had wished for,[61] suggesting that terrorism is an immediate reflection of, and justified response to, American power and therefore believe that 'America had it coming'. In turn, some American intellectuals suggest that there is a 'war' between America and Europe.

However, the emotional intensity with which even political theorists argue may also indicate that 'domestic sources of European anti-Americanism' (and, to be sure, anti-European Americanism) matter, and that they may currently be even 'at least as significant as the external sources, and probably more resilient than the latter'.[62] Indeed, global comparative surveys indicate that internal problems and internal stress are stronger determinants of anti-Americanism than, for example, US penetration or influence, and this is especially the case in Europe. The most widespread European anti-Americanism is found in France, the only major state in Europe against which the United States has never fought a war.[63] There are, at any rate, currently some rather hostile European perceptions of America, at least on the radical edges of society,[64] while the charge of anti-Americanism has also been politically overused. The sustained and remobilized mood of suspicion in European public opinion towards America, of course, is also inherently related to America's role as the world's last remaining superpower, and also reflects actual issues, including a new Americanism abroad. Nevertheless, Arendt's framework may help to take first steps in developing a differentiated understanding of additional, 'undertheorized' origins of European anti-Americanism, and in critically analysing a culturally exclusive, *pan-national* (instead of *post-national*) Europeanistic model which proclaims *fundamental* oppositions to American culture and democracy in the age of globalization. (In turn, these critical conceptualizations will allow us to further develop the framework of an alternative, normatively more coherent and more effective way for construing a political identity of the EU polity, namely one based on *post-nationalism* and Arendt's post-conventional understanding of politics.)

A) First of all, there are severe identity crises within Europe today, which have

153

not yet been substituted by a post-national 'European consciousness'. European citizens perceive a much lamented 'democracy deficit', which becomes manifest in the largely absent 'European public sphere' (documented by the lack of relevant European-wide parties and media), a still strikingly lacking legitimacy of EU institutions (which becomes manifest in EU elections) or the failure to achieve a higher level of the envisioned sociocultural and political integration across national borders (documented by the still very limited intra-European migration). While slowly more and more Europeans develop hyphenated identities that combine European and national references, it is not apparent, say, to most Swedes what they are supposed to share with the Portuguese. The still nascent European collective identity construct is particularly fragile and still only partially rooted within the diverse self-understandings of European societies. In turn, the simultaneous crises of conventional collective identity constructs are primarily experienced resulting from the very processes of Europeanization and globalization, which embody both new risks and new opportunities. The rapid sociocultural and political transformations going along with these processes have not only produced multiple hyphen-identities and sociocultural pluralizations, they have also been a favourable condition for a steady rise of anti-democratic, populist and nationalist parties and counter-narratives in Europe.[65] Those new parties have put established European democracies and their elites under additional pressure. In this context, anti-Americanism may indeed become a welcomed 'cultural' tool to bridge the gap between pro-European elites and their constituencies. But any homogenizing, illusionary and binary European identity model linked to anti-Americanism is not only based upon 'inventions of traditions' which are reminiscent of the nation-building of the 19th century. As Arendt reminds us, such an approach is also in peril of joining the ranks of reactionary and New Right populists and their essentially anti-democratic vocabulary, pushing for old Europe's 'cultural liberation' from 'Americanization'.[66] In addition, most of the resignified and fabricated founding myths of the '(re)birth of the European nation' belong, in Homi K. Bhabha's words, to 'those ideological maneuvers through which "imagined communities" are given essentialist identities'.[67] The mere recognition of actually existing, multiple 'other' narratives and identities within Europe, and of the interconnectedness and interdependencies of European and American sociocultural developments, disrupts the totalizing boundaries of this culturally ambitious and false imaginary which employs another form of 'enlarged culturalism'.[68] But even beyond the empirical argument against those counter-factional foundations on which pan-nationalist Europeanism is based, and beyond the question whether exclusionary cultural narratives that undermine European cosmopolitanism are normatively desirable,[69] it is questionable to what degree homogenizing narratives constructing a 'unified cultural identity', such as a pan-national Europeanism, can be helpful tools for symbolic integration and for coping with the identity crises and challenges which Europe faces today.

154 As Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande argue, such an exclusivist pan-European or

'Eurocentric' position, which works with (false) notions of cultural homogeneity and is often directed against a 'dramatised danger of an external threat' represented by the US, tends to 'ignore the interdependencies of a globalised world'. According to Beck and Grande, this recently revived view derives from a misconception of Europe, which is intrinsically interwoven into those interdependencies. Hence binary concepts of Europe as a counter-identity and 'counter-power' opposing America are 'illusionary' because they overestimate Europe's power and, most of all, they misperceive global challenges such as terrorism or ecological crises, which call for global responses. Therefore advocates of a pan-national European 'counter-power' rather undermine the prospects of post-conventional and post-national modes of transnational cooperation and, as Beck and Grande point out, pan-nationalist approaches miss the opportunity of transferring current global risks into a source of cooperation which generates legitimate alternatives in global politics;[70] thus they obstruct the very potential provided by the post-national politics of Europeanization, i.e. international democratization, institution-building and democratic interest or conflict mediation beyond the nation state. In addition, it needs to be remembered that Europe is inevitably an integral part of the transatlantic alliance and community of values – of a postwar synthesis of America and Europe which embodies the shared values of 'freedom, human rights and democracy and enabled the creation of the EU in the first place'.[71] In turn, pan-European models of the EU as a culturally and politically antagonistic counter-project to the US do not only deny the realities of an interdependent world and threaten Europe's important strategic partnership with the US in face of current challenges (which certainly cannot be resolved by Europe alone), but they also bear the risk of generalized devaluations of the very project of post-national liberal democracy and value systems, as well as, after all, internal separation processes within the EU. Recent internal conflicts in the course of the Iraq war over a 'fully independent' foreign policy as an anti-American counter-model and the subsequently revived separatist calls for a retreat to the concept of a 'core Europe' indicate this danger.

B) This leads to the second major contemporary problem already conceptualized by Arendt: in the European image 'America' is always in danger of serving as a negative matrix, i.e. being the new negative embodiment of the current stage of sociocultural and economic modernization, namely *globalization*. The abstract and impersonal process of modernization/globalization, which affects all aspects of modern life, is often mistakenly translated into and viewed as the process of 'Americanization'. This anti-modern cultural resignification of social developments allows for identifying an external 'perpetrator' who can be made responsible for all the complex, contradictory trends of the modern world, and especially blamed for all the problems associated with the transformations and often difficult consequences caused by globalization and capitalism. This popular identification corresponds with still widespread nationalist sentiments and generalized anti-globalization attitudes.[72] On the one hand, there is a fair degree of

155

consensus that western types of society, economy and culture resemble each other, and represent a way of life to which many aspire. On the other hand, those dissatisfied with the contemporary world and horrified by its apparent direction currently tend to see the United States as the ultimate threat. For anyone trying to explain what is wrong with the world, the United States is likely to be at the top of the list. By the same token, 'those feeling their beloved way of life is under attack may blame the baleful influence of the United States for their discontent'.[73] Hence the term 'Americanization' often culturally resignifies or identifies contemporary modernity's and post-national democracy's abstract processes and feared 'negative' impacts, from neo-liberalism to post-industrial and globalized modes of cultural production in which all modern democracies take part. However, globalization is an irreversible process that entails multiple overlapping, intertwined interactions across conventional borders, and it includes the construction of post-national forms of governance specifically exemplified in the EU polity.[74] Externalizing the structural ambivalences of globalization, which calls for new effective structures of multilevel governance, by portraying all of its seemingly 'negative' effects as 'Americanization', is an ideological endeavour with little normative coherence or practical durability.

Especially among poorer segments of European populations,[75] the European project is often still viewed as a largely bureaucratic, socially harmful enterprise from above. It is embraced by continental Europe's elites, but often feared by her populations which still only show relatively low levels of identification. In this context, the use of anti-Americanism may surely be tempting because it corresponds to widespread social resentments that may distract from Eurosceptic attitudes. However, neither the paradoxes of the search for a European identity,[76] which does not exist as such but only in the form of a fairly new *process* and *open mode of integration*, nor Europe's internal problems with rapid social change, get resolved by splitting off globalization as 'Americanization' (or, in turn, by fully endorsing it) without developing effective and normatively self-reflexive *political alternatives*. It can be argued that only such practical alternatives may provide for both a consolidated political identity and adequate responses to the challenges of globalization. By blaming Americanization, however, the burning issues are simply temporarily delegated. The underlying issues of concern may, then, eventually be deepened on a new level because this delegation nurtures the *politics of avoidance*, or, as Arendt put it, an illusionary 'escape route' leading away from political action. Delegating the eminent challenges of globalization and modernization onto 'Americanization' is not only a counterfactual approach that uses ideological means. It also feeds the illusion that Europe may avoid the current challenges that the – inevitably transnational – process of globalization produces by separating herself from America. But as pointed out, post-industrial, globalized modernity is Europe's *own* problem and future, to use Arendt's phrase. European post-industrial modernity is deeply embedded in globalization, a process rather exported from than imported to Europe; Europe is intrinsically part of globaliza-

156

tion, if not one of its actual driving forces. To view it as an external challenge, hence, simply evades the challenge of developing specific, European normative and political responses, frameworks and designs for coping with an increasingly complex and difficult environment which sociocultural, economic and political globalization creates for democratic governance and distributive justice. Neither an externalization nor a self-deceptive anti-globalization approach is actually a feasible option. Illusions about the process of globalization, which are promoted by portraying it as an identifiable external threat beyond one's own sphere of action, and the corresponding politics of avoidance, however, are also not likely to increase the still low level of identification with the European project and with 'European identity'. As other cases of an illusionary politics of avoidance indicate, such as, for example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's famous counterfactual promise of 'flourishing landscapes' which he used when describing the economic prospects of East Germany in 1990, they rather tend to foster political disenchantment with the entire democratic system in the long run – instead of bridging the gap between elites and population, or reconciling the new relevant cleavages between cosmopolitanism/pro-globalization, on one hand, and nationalism/anti-globalisation, on the other hand.[77]

C) Thirdly, it is striking that the apparently inappropriate equation of totalitarianism with 'America' is also currently revived in contemporary European debates.[78] America is frequently portrayed (and misperceived), though often in more coded terminology, as a lawless, 'Orwellian society'.[79] At any rate, it is not helpful for a critique, or critical conceptualization, of the 'new reality' of present-day America and of American foreign policy to make far-fetched references to (European) totalitarianism, as allegedly illustrated by the Guantanamo camp. Arendt already points to a possible function of drawing such comparisons, i.e. exonerating Europe's criminal past, a history of national conflicts, war and colonialism, culminating in the horrible terror systems of the 20th century. (In turn, there is no basis for claiming American superiority over European democracies or connecting current European policies with the catastrophes of the past.) In addition, the present domestic European fears in relation to the threat of neo-totalitarian global terrorism, which has spread over the last decade and today knocks at the doors of both America and Europe, may also play a role in drawing such comparisons between present-day America and totalitarianism. By viewing terrorism as an American problem directly caused by US policies or originating in 'American (cultural) imperialism', if not 'totalitarianism', this problem may also be externalized onto the US and thus converted into a more manageable, 'rational' threat. The different interpretations within the transatlantic context in relation to the perils and nature of terrorism[80] are therefore reflected in different debates on what is the major 'totalitarian' threat today: while European debates rather focus on a presumably silently rising 'totalitarianism' taking hold in the world's remaining superpower, American debates tend to see Islamist terrorism as the new totalitarian threat of the 21st century. Be that as it may, the widespread

European perception of a new American totalitarianism blurs the empirical and normative distinctions between liberal democracy and dictatorship, and thus may undermine the normative principle among liberal democracies that liberal-democratic states should have closer ties with each other than with dictatorships. At any rate, blurring systemic differences may have negative side effects for a transatlantic community of values, and also for the coherence and credibility of liberal-democratic self-understandings in Europe.

From Pan-Nationalism Back to the Politics of Post-Nationalist Community-Building: Implications for the EU's Still Nascent Search for Political Identity in a Globalized World

Taking Arendt's warnings seriously leads us to consider the following arguments. These regard normative presuppositions, the legitimacy and prospects of the European project and, in particular, the perils of grounding it in the opposition Americanism/anti-Americanism. Rather than providing any political solution to actual problems of the 'democratic deficit' of the EU and to collective identity problems, then, I consider a possible revival of *anti-American Europeanism*, which mobilizes outdated models of pan-nationalism, as politically regressive and ineffective. Indeed, it may simply *reflect and foster* the problem of an ongoing ambivalence, if not hostility, of many European societies toward the EU, globalization and modernization[81] in the long run. Ideologies of Americanism, on one side, and anti-American Europeanism or European pan-nationalism, on the other side of the Atlantic, may temporarily distract from present (in many ways unprecedented) political problems which post-national democracies face in the age of globalization, and from finding or further developing innovative, cooperative and post-conventional political modes of coping with the issues at stake. However, every attempt to homogenize the cultural plurality of Europe, according to outdated models of nation-building on a new level, is doomed to fail; at the same time, ironically, nor will those attempts reflect the still relevant cultural identity claims and affiliations of Europe's populations.

Arendtian Notions of Politics and the Logic of European Post-Nationalism

In turn, I suggest that Arendt's critical analysis of pan-national Europeanism and her insights into the nature of politics point to a potential, truly *post-national* and *post-conventional* political way forward for the European Union when dealing with the challenge of developing a specific political identity and finding coherent responses to globalization; a way forward which is rooted in, and seeks to utilize, the unique strengths of the European integration process itself. In light of

158

Arendt's privileging of political institutions over cultural ideologies and incorporating Arendt's notion of politics, it will now be argued that such a privileging of a cooperative democratic practice and deliberative institution-building, enabling the foundation of an unprecedented transnational and post-national political community without suppressing national allegiances, is the very potential the EU needs to defend and unfold as the future-oriented and distinctive basis of her identity, which is post-conventional, pluralistic and cosmopolitan in nature. Since its inception, the EU, as a successful political formation and continuous integration process, has generated a new, continuously transformative, essentially *open mode* of post-national institution- and identity-formation which escapes, or subverts, the exclusivist, conventional politics of nationalism or European cultural pan-nationalism. Pan-nationalism, which uses America, Americanization and globalization as illusionary counter-images in order to rapidly *force* homogenized, unified collective identity constructs onto the EU, may be popular lately among elites, suggesting an immediate solution to the current collective identity crises by providing for a new narrative of cultural closure. But pan-nationalistic homogenizations nevertheless ignore the ongoing factual prevalence of *national/cultural* affiliations; in addition, they undermine the very qualities and home-made political resources the EU has developed and offers in order to deal with the transformations of politics, identity and social integration within the horizon of a globalized world. These qualities, which can be conceptualized as a specific, non-exclusivist post-nationalism, correspond with but also go beyond Arendt's conception of politics and her vision of a 'new Europe'. Because this *European post-nationalism* uses the EU's inherent strengths and avoids escapism from the new challenges, it may offer a more realistic, normatively coherent and effective vehicle for European integration than ideological dichotomies utilizing America as an external other and notions of Europe as America's 'opposing pole'. Consequently, I suggest with Arendt that the EU does not need a revival of pan-nationalism. Rather, it needs to develop further its unique post-national character and political potential and, hence, not less but *more* post-nationalism.

As indicated, Arendt conceives politics in a post-conventional and post-ideological way, i.e. as a cooperative, publicly communicated and process-oriented *mode of action* (or rather a mode of *acting together* in political communities) which, according to the grammar of action, demands a plurality of human agents and identities. For Arendt, then, power is the only human attribute 'which applies solely to the worldly in-between space by which men are mutually related, combine in the act of foundation by virtue of the making and the keeping of promises, which, in the realm of politics, may well be the highest human faculty'.[82] Her understanding of power and politics as a cooperative, communicative and transformative mode of action based on the human faculty of acting together (which involves the free act of foundation, the *constitutio libertatis*, by virtue of making mutually binding promises) corresponds with Habermas's concept of deliberative politics rooted in the discourse ethics of communicative action and its

159

implicit recognition claims.[83] Diametrically opposed to the Schmittian notion of politics as friend–foe relations, her concept also moves beyond 'realistic', interest-centred understandings of the political, which view politics solely as a power struggle between predefined national or social self-interests. In this sense, Arendt's approach is post-conventional and even post-national because it relies neither on given self-interests nor on 'national identities' as the framework for political action. The approach also moves beyond ideology-centred conceptions, in which politics represents the various conflicts between diverging, ideologically bound and preconceived world-views or fixed self-conceptions. In this sense, Arendt's approach is implicitly 'post-modern', or post-ideological. In fact, together with well-perceived economic interests and incentives, it is this Arendtian conception of politics, which is cooperative, action- and process-oriented and which brings together a plurality of individual and collective identities in free and deliberate acts of community-building, that has been of fundamental importance for creating and generating the EU polity.

This polity can be conceptualized as a novel, indeed post-national and *genuinely political*, body that is intertwined with the transformative processes and social realities of post-nationalisation. The specifically institutional and societal features of multiple-level cooperation, mediation and coexistence constitute the logic of European post-national democratization already embodied in the present-day EU. In many ways, the EU hereby resembles the federalist American polity, but is also distinct from it; it can be argued, though, that the EU system is closer to the US than to any single member state.[84] Like the US, from the outset the foundation and institutionalization of this new political body has not been based on a common cultural matrix. Rather, the process of creating the EU in response to the crises of the European nation states represents genuinely political acts of foundation and cooperation, which include new binding promises within *and* beyond old political and territorial boundaries. The political body of the EU polity upholds democratic sovereignty *and* it is principally open in nature; it operates without predefined limitations and boundaries. At the same time, the EU's constitutive political and social logic of *European post-nationalism* recognizes national or regional differences as relevant political allegiances, as well as different levels of transnational cooperation. This European post-nationalism neither signifies an opposing pole to or fully fledged substitute for the nation state, nor does it rely on the oppositional pole of external others or agents. Contrary to concepts of pan- or supra-nationalism, the still nascent European post-nationalism is breaking with the conventional either–or logic of politics, identity or state-formation by transforming political sovereignty and conventional binary coordinates between 'we' and 'the others'.[85] Its modalities – in part deliberately – thus supplement and reach beyond the constructed but fixed limitations ingrained in conventional conceptions of national 'self-interest', nationalism and pan-nationalism. Accordingly, its political sovereignty shifts from absolute to complex forms.[86] They cannot be reduced to conventional *power over* territory, demos and

force; while a loss of national formal authority and democratic legitimacy is compensated for by complex sovereignty benefits and non-formalized legitimacy deriving from international institutions and new cosmopolitan discourses, there is no clear-cut trade-off from the national to a supra-national level of sovereignty. We rather find *new forms* of non-statist sovereignty, enhanced by the *power to* act within politically contingent boundaries, marked by processes of political limitation and delimitation.

In institutional respects, the EU so far is a decentralized, heterogeneous, territorially differentiated polity, as well as a transnational system of negotiation and cooperation that includes both existing nation states and new supra-national institutions. The EU has to be understood and realistically accepted as 'a flexible and pragmatic set of arrangements and understandings which allow the member states to operate as a distinct entity both in their internal affairs and in the world of global economics and politics'.[87] While it resembles the federalist system of American democracy in many respects, including its diffusion of decision-making power, subsystems of policy-making and multiple modalities of representation linked to a systemic need to guarantee an anti-hierarchical and anti-hegemonic nature of power, the EU is an exceptional 'polity without any precedent, in the modalities of both its formation and its functioning, in the history of the democratic world'.[88] It embodies a new, multilevel system of democratic governance (as opposed to 'government') which is based on formal *and* informal networks of public and private actors. It generates decision-making on procedural principles of formal *and* deliberative democracy as well as extensive consultation. Thus, there is a distinct set of post-national networks and political institutions, some very non-Westphalian, that characterizes Europe today.[89] It is unlikely – and from a post-nationalist point of view not desirable – that the EU polity will march forward to a fully integrated federal supra-national state. Nor will Europe return to a loose association of autonomous states. Its institutional character will remain *in-between*.

In general, the EU and post-nationalism as its underlying logic embody liberal-democratic cosmopolitan values and, in particular, the 'post-statist condition of contemporary politics' sui generis, as Sergio Fabbrini argues.[84] Hereby conventional, national patterns of decision-making, politics and collective identity are not substituted by but *coexist* with post-conventional, post-national and transformative patterns, contributing noticeably to an alteration (but not full-fledged substitution) of the traditional political boundaries and modes of politics. The conditions for appropriate forms of political participation and representation are consistently renegotiated;[90] the same even applies to its political and territorial boundaries. The EU's asymmetric, multilevel political order and system of negotiation provides for new vertical and horizontal institutional checks and balances while being rooted in national and transnational public deliberation, *cooperative* political action by heterogeneous political actors and a *plurality* of institutions, identities and actors sharing decision-making power.[91] In functioning this way,

the EU did not just develop a complex but consensus-oriented architecture of governance, generating new forms of cooperation, international conflict mediation and transnational compromising. Renouncing nationalist ambitions or pan-nationalist substitutes and oriented towards a community of values, its very logic of political and institutional community-building and continuous enlargement has also contributed to 'complex cultural dialogues';[92] facilitating new, dynamic and open forms of political identity-formation *supplementing* while, contrary to the logic of pan-nationalism, not necessarily suppressing old ones. The EU hereby adequately reflects a still transforming territorial structure and culturally diverse community of currently 25 member states.

In sum, the EU integration process already represents the effective political mode and the *potential ability* to build bridges over political and cultural differences beyond an either–or logic. Political post-nationalism, as specifically exemplified by the European integration process on an institutional and informal level, allows for and *promotes* multiple (hyphenated) identities and allegiances without suppressing national affiliations. Different from unrealistic as well as normatively particularistic pan-nationalist, anti-American aspirations, which simply try to imitate and substitute nationalism and conventional state-formation on an enlarged level, the post-national mode of politics implies building a political identity based on a community of (procedural and substantial) norms and values, i.e. a specific form of constitutional patriotism. It is political value- and rights-based in nature, and it simultaneously recognizes different identities and even, to some extent, diverging political systems. It certainly cannot deny diverging interests and substantial political conflicts but seeks to mediate different interests and identity claims under an umbrella of constitutional tolerance.

Renouncing blurred counter-images such as anti-Americanism; promoting political integration based on transnationally communicated shared values and rational procedures of deliberation; and strengthening the acceptance of ambivalence, cooperation and coexistence inherent to the logic of post-nationalism: these are approaches based on existing EU realities which are more likely to develop and effectively solidify a nascent European identity. They respect the relevant national affiliations of the European populations without overstretching or misconceiving the idea of Europe as a fixed, predefined unity. And they deliberately avoid 'strong' pan-European cultural narratives based on founding myths (which in the European case have not been and are not likely to be too successful in the long run anyway). Instead, they follow 'pluralised cosmopolitan European identity' models which already lie at the heart of the Union.[93] However, the EU and European post-nationalism represent post-conventional modes of integration and politics that effectively transcend binary concepts of political orders, linking multiple identities in a novel and dynamic way. But in search for a political identity and democratic legitimacy which overcomes still widespread Euroscepticism, the EU polity will also need to facilitate the debate on the Union's shared political values and best practices in face of current global challenges.

Open Questions and Prospects for a Post-National Political Identity of the EU Polity

Arendt could hardly anticipate the EU's specific mode of political integration in its present form and in its truly post-national character. But it does reflect Arendt's powerful notion of politics and her (still diffuse) vision for a new European political community. A self-reflexive, realistic understanding of the logic of European post-nationalism, uncovers the visionary potential for generating a shared European political identity based on new political modes which neither harm national identities because they do not imitate the model of nation-state formation on a new level, nor remobilize cultural difference or political enemy constructs. As pointed out, the reluctance shown towards any forced pan-national homogenization does not mean that the EU, understood as a *political project* in Arendt's sense, should avoid deliberate spatial references to socially embedded, shared or critically acquired 'European' values – as long as they are generated by self-reflexive, open communication processes based on a liberal-democratic political culture that is 'open' to perspectives of 'others'[94] and recognizes multiple, overlapping as well as diverging identity narratives. By now pluralism, liberty and democracy have become a matter of heartfelt conviction all over Europe, and from a normative perspective it is this political value foundation on which the EU should be built, rather than an identity framework based upon new cultural homogenizations.

But the question remains what European post-national democracy may further entail in the future, and how democratic accountability will be further reshaped and ensured. Which additional *shared political values* could be distinctive substantial norms signifying the nascent process of European political identity-formation? This, of course, should itself be the subject of a grand debate and open deliberation in the European public spheres; it would contradict the EU's very own principles to fully predefine the outcome of this European will-formation. At any rate, the democratic legitimacy and political identity of the EU project will also depend on the EU's ability to conduct effective policies in response to the new challenges of a globalized world; policies which may express and generate broadly shared visions of a community of values or distinct notions of a post-national European collective good.

In this context, the first central question that needs to be answered is how the European project will eventually position itself towards the dilemmas of socio-economic globalization, which is, again, certainly no 'external threat'. This dilemma includes the end of the welfare state and the expansion of neo-liberal market capitalism often misconceived as an 'Americanization' or portrayed as an 'American import'. The normatively and empirically relevant fact is that the European project is today very much part of and actively engaged in neo-liberal economics, as stated in Article III-69 of the failed European constitution: 'The activity of the member states and the Union includes the introduction of an eco-

163

nomic policy which is indebted to the principle of an open market society with free competition'. A primary goal of the Union is to create 'an inner market with free and genuine competition' (Article I-3). Thus the European project itself, as Anthony McGrew points out, 'to date has tended to embrace the logic of liberal globalisation rather than constructing a robust or coherent alternative to it'.[95] The widespread popular pressure for more effective and socially balanced European governance may call for institutions and actors willing and able to conduct macro-economic policy with or, if necessary, without the US.[96] Yet today such a potentially distinct European emphasis on 'social values' is an essential part neither of the EU constitutional treaty nor of EU policy. The same is true for the still undefined 'social question' of transnational (im)migration of so-called 'third country nationals'; how open, accessible and distinctly post-national will European citizenship be in the future?[97]

A second major challenge for the EU's political identity is the sphere of international relations that reach beyond the EU polity. First and foremost, this puts the issue of relaunching close transatlantic cooperation back on the agenda. In the long run, the EU leadership will have to replace the rhetoric of moral superiority towards the US with specific best practices that incorporate the EU's unique political resources, i.e. cooperative modes of politics, international dialogue and public reason. While self-reflexively recognizing that, for most current challenges, neither the EU nor the US offer convincing political solutions yet both rely on a process of communication and cooperation, the EU still has to publicly discuss, define and practically implement common standards and values that may be its specific contribution to coping with new international conflicts. Is there going to be a realistic, credible and specifically post-national and cosmopolitan EU profile and response when the international community is confronted with failing states, authoritarian dictatorships or excessive human rights violations and new genocides (e.g. Rwanda, Darfur)? Is the EU able to open new spaces for cooperation and post-national mediation of conflicts? In which cases, in turn, are interventions necessary to add credibility to universal human rights principles?

Finally, there is the interrelated problem of transnational terrorism and asymmetric warfare in the post-9/11, post-Madrid era. Islamist terrorism now hits home and forces the EU to develop innovative, rational and effective international (and especially transatlantic) security architectures which use cooperative strategies incorporating post-national political modes and 'complex cultural dialogues' (Benhabib) where possible, and use force against terrorist subunities where necessary. However, it will not suffice to conceive transnational terrorism, which threatens all liberal western democracies, as a response to US policies.

Conclusion

Arendt's political framework inspires a theoretically rooted analysis that avoids, if not subverts, both Europeanism and Americanism as 'isms' based on devaluing

'others' in order to stabilize one's own collective identity. And she suggests alternatives based on new political institutions, cooperative political action and the use of public reason, which, in fact, point to the heart of European post-nationalization and the already existing political pillars of Europe's identity. Arendt's critique of those European images of America which generate 'thick' cultural identity narratives and delegate domestic problems with modernization and globalization onto the New World corresponds with her critical analysis of homogenizing, conformist ideologies of 'Americanism' abroad. Her approach shows us that, without ignoring different political, economic and social interests, diverging political-cultural traditions, and actual conflicts over policies, binary views such as Europeanism or Americanism need to be subverted in critical political and discursive practice faced with transnational challenges. Arendt aims to display and challenge such binary interpretations of history and politics that underscore claims to moral or political superiority and which tend to imprison politics in reified culturalized identity narratives. In our case, 'anti-American Europeanistic' and corresponding 'anti-European Americanistic' narratives, both depending on blurred counter-images of the referential other, recently resignified and remobilized the largely imaginary dichotomy between Europe and America on both sides of the Atlantic. This induces a process with, as Arendt reminds us, problematic implications for the project of liberal democracy here and abroad which is doomed to fail to deal with the problems contemporary societies face in an increasingly interdependent world: 'Americanism on one side and Europeanism on the other side of the Atlantic, two ideologies facing, fighting and, above all, resembling each other as all seemingly opposed ideologies do – this may be one of the dangers we face.'[98]

With reference to both phenomena, Arendt illuminates the seductive dangers of the politics of avoidance, dedifferentiation and cultural homogenization – which does not imply that there are no distinct American and European political-cultural traditions, conflicts over policies or structural imbalances in the international system that need to be recognized (and, if necessary, politically criticized). From the perspective of an Arendtian European political theory, then, it is in the EU's best interest to avoid Europeanistic anti-Americanism as much as a submissive Americanism. Without further developing the idea, Arendt already points to the eminently political task of positively resignifying the EU as a new, truly post-national project of political community-building in its own right.

Moving beyond state-centric ideas of nationalism and pan-nationalism (and beyond what Arendt could envision), the EU has de facto already developed and implemented political *post-nationalism* as a specific *new mode* and *open process* of liberal-democratic integration, transnational cooperation and multilevel governance below and above the nation-state. A self-reflexive process of European identity construction therefore invokes both deconstruction of the conventional cultural matrix of constitutive 'others', which include 'America' and 'Turkey', and reconstruction of post-conventional identities based on political modes and

values. Far beyond what Arendt could expect, the institutionalization of the EU created unprecedented spheres and modes of post-conventional and post-national politics. The EU's reality and the process of post-nationalization points to an open but truly political identity-creation based on cooperative democratic practice, flexible institutional arrangements and transnational public deliberation, while they do not suppress but supplement national identity claims. Using this potential may work best to creatively confront the challenges of globalization because it best reflects – and avoids ignoring – the political complexities, multiple identities and transnational allegiances of today. It defends the normative principles of liberal democracy and universalism in new settings while it subverts those conventional 'escape routes' that employ constructs of constitutive others. In addition, the scope of today's problems indicates that only transnational and international cooperation (especially between Europe and America), hence a *political* approach, exemplified by the post-conventional mode of European post-nationalism, may provide adequate answers to global risks, while conventional nationalist or pan-nationalist ideologies do not. The current task for further developing the nascent post-national political identity of the EU, however, is to facilitate a rational debate in which specific values, norms and policies may represent a broadly supported, possibly distinct, at any rate cooperative political contribution in response to the challenges of the 21st century.

Taking a road beyond revived political-cultural dichotomies which envision America and Europe as fundamental counter-models (an approach put forward by several political theorists in Europe and abroad), Arendt emphasizes the complex multitude of interrelations, interests and interwoven transformations that take place between modern Europe and the US, and especially the enormous challenges with which western modernity is still faced today. These processes do not allow for simply identifying Europe and America as the mere embodiment of different, if not antagonistic principles and 'cultures': instead, with Arendt, both political realms can be seen as contingent spaces confronted by the often paradoxical, ambivalent, increasingly difficult project of building, integrating and sustaining political communities and democracy in modernity's new stage, namely the age of post-industrial globalization. It implies the continuous search for effective, legal and legitimate post-national and post-conventional democratic politics, identities and orders, hence the search for new 'best' political practices and institutional designs; something to which the European project has a lot to offer.

Notes

1. Albrecht Wellmer (2001) 'Hannah Arendt on Revolution', in Steven Aschheim (ed.) *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*, pp. 33–46, p. 46. Berkeley: University of California Press.
2. Walter Laqueur (2001) 'The Arendt Cult: Hannah Arendt as Political Commentator', in Steven Aschheim (ed.) *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*, pp. 47–64. Berkeley: University of California Press.

3. James W. Ceasar (2004) 'A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism', *Public Interest* 152: 3–18. Volker Heins (2002) 'Germany's New War: 11 September and its Aftermath in German Quality Newspapers', *German Politics* 11: 128–45. Godfrey Hodgson (2004) 'Anti-Americanism and American Exceptionalism', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 2: 27–38. Ivan Krastev (2004) 'The Anti-American Century?', *Journal of Democracy* 15: 5–16. Dimitry Shlapentokh (2002) 'The New Anti-Americanism: America as an Orwellian Society', *Partisan Review* 69: 263–72.

4. See Ceasar (n. 3).

5. Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin (2004) 'Anti-Americanism Re-examined', *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 11: 17–24, 18.

6. Arendt's lecture resulted in three essays which were first published in the periodical *Commonweal*. The underlying interpretations are inspired by Arendt's simultaneous work on different political and revolutionary traditions in America and Europe, finally published in Arendt (1990) *On Revolution*. London: Penguin. This material was originally designed to become a part of a book on Marxism.

7. Hannah Arendt (1994) 'Dream and Nightmare', in Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954*, pp. 409–17, pp. 416–17. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

8. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (2004) *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

9. Thomas Friedman (2003) 'France and the US are at War', *New York Times* (19 Sept.). See also Irwin Wall (2004) 'The French–American War over Iraq', *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 10: 123–39.

10. Arendt (n. 7), p. 410.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. p. 411. Arendt finds an example of this in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*: Europe, he was sure, if not the whole world would eventually become Americanized. Tocqueville, however, viewed Americans as an old and enlightened people. He saw America as the outcome of an old history and civilization, not as a community of superficial individuals without culture or tradition.

13. Arendt (n. 7), p. 412.

14. Andrei S. Markovits (2003) *European Anti-Americanism (and Anti-Semitism): Ever Present though Always Denied*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Minda de Gunzberg Center for European Studies Working Paper Series.

15. Arendt (n. 7), p. 415.

16. Hannah Arendt (1994) 'The Threat of Conformism', in Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954*, pp. 423–7, p. 427. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. None the less, Arendt sees the USA as a very pluralistic political community that is deeply rooted in republican traditions and that is, overall, quite resistant to the diagnosed political conformism; see Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott (2004) 'Alien Nation: Hannah Arendt, the German Emigrés and America', *European Journal of Political Theory* 3: 167–76.

17. Hannah Arendt (1994) 'Approaching the German Question', in Arendt *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954*, pp. 97–126, p. 108. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

18. Arendt perceives the European crisis largely as a crisis of the *European* nation-state system. She therefore strongly endorses positions of the European resistance that aim at the creation of a new European political order: 'A good peace is not conceivable unless the States surrender parts of their economic and political sovereignty to a higher European authority: we leave open the question whether a European Council, or Federation, a United States of Europe or whatever type of unit will be formed.' See Arendt (n. 17), p. 113.

19. Seyla Benhabib (1996) *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.

20. Hannah Arendt (1966) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. San Diego: Harcourt.

21. Agnes Heller (2001) 'Hannah Arendt on Traditions and New Beginnings', in Steven Aschheim (ed.) *Hannah Arendt in Jersualem*, pp. 19–32, p. 31. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

22. Arendt (n. 6).

23. Arendt (n. 17), pp. 111–12.

24. For Arendt, there has always been an inner contradiction within the nation state, namely between the national sovereign, bound by no universal law, and the simultaneous *Declaration of the Universal Rights of Man*:

> The practical outcome of this contradiction was that from then on human rights were protected and enforced only as national rights and that the very institution of a state, whose superior task was to protect and guarantee man his rights as man, as citizen, and as national lost its legal rational appearance.

See Arendt (n. 20), pp. 230–1. However, while native citizens of nation states always used to look down upon naturalized citizens in Europe, previous nationalisms were confined by law and territory. This is fundamentally different from the lawless ethnic pan-ideologies that aim beyond borders and persecute their constructed imaginary 'racial enemies' without geographical, territorial or legal limits.

25. Arendt (n. 20), pp. 222–66.

26. Hannah Arendt (1945) 'The Seeds of a Fascist International', *Jewish Frontier* (June): 12–16.

27. Arendt argues that this collapse or transformation has various reasons, including the collapse of political and social class systems and the rise of modern bureaucracy; see Arendt (nn. 18, 21).

28. Hannah Arendt (1994) 'The Aftermath of Nazi Rule: Report from Germany', in Arendt, *Essays in Understanding*, pp. 248–69, pp. 250–2. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

29. Arendt (n. 7), p. 412.

30. Ibid. pp. 416–17.

31. Ibid.

32. Arendt (n. 16), p. 427.

33. Arendt (n. 7), p. 413.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid. p. 414.

36. Ibid. p. 415.

37. A position which is today, I may add, especially expressed by Europe's New Right; for a critical analysis see Pierre-André Taguieff (2000) *La Force du préjugé*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte.

38. Arendt (n. 7), p. 416.

39. Ibid.

40. See also Winfried Thaa and Lothar Probst (eds) (2003) *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit: Amerika im Denken Hannah Arendts*. Berlin: Philo.

41. Sergio Fabbrini (2002) 'The Domestic Sources of European Anti-Americanism', *Government and Opposition* 37: 3–14, 6.

42. Hannah Arendt (1994) 'Europe and the Atom Bomb', in Arendt, *Essays in Understanding 1930–1954*, pp. 418–22, p. 418. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

43. Ibid. p. 419.

44. Ibid. p. 420.

45. Immanuel Kant (1991) 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Kant, *Political Writings*, pp. 93–130, p. 96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

46. Arendt (n. 42), p. 422.

47. Ibid.

48. Arendt (n. 16), p. 423.
49. Ibid. p. 424.
50. Ibid. p. 426.
51. Ibid. p. 427.
52. Hannah Arendt (1958) *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
53. Jürgen Habermas (1999) *The Postnational Constellation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
54. Jean-Francois Revel (2003) *Anti-Americanism*. New York: Encounter Books.
55. Gerritt-Jan Berendse (2002) 'German Anti-Americanism in Context', *Journal of European Studies* 33: 333–61. Valerio Castronovo (2004) *L'avventura dell'unità europea: Una sfida con la storia e il futuro*. Turin: Einaudi. Ceasar (n. 3); Hodgson (n. 3); Shlapentokh (n. 3).
56. Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (2003) 'Unsere Erneuerung. Nach dem Krieg: Die Wiedergeburt Europas', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (31 May). Clemens Verenkotte (2003) *Die Herren der Welt: Das amerikanische Imperium*. Munich: Knaur.
57. See Ceasar (n. 3).
58. Emmanuel Todd (2004) *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order*. New York: Columbia University Press.
59. Domenico Losurdo (2004) 'Preemptive War, Americanism, and Anti-Americanism', *Metaphilosophy* 35: 365–85. Anti-Americanism as ideology or world-view, at any rate, can also be shared by Americans and is surely not an exclusively European phenomenon.
60. Wilhelm Dietl (2004) *Schwarzbuch Weißes Haus: Außenpolitik mit dem Sturmgewehr*. Erfstadt: Area.
61. Jean Baudrillard (2001) 'L'Esprit du terrorisme', *Le Monde* (3 Nov.).
62. Fabbrini (n. 41), p. 5.
63. Rubin and Rubin (n. 5), p. 19.
64. PEW Research Center for the People and the Press (2004) *Global Attitudes Project: A Year after Iraq. Mistrust of America in Europe ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists*. Washington: PEW Reserch Center for the People and the Press. www.people-press.org/reports. Russell A. Berman (2004) *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem*, pp. 25ff. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. The cultural and political opposition to 'America' is most drastically manifest in France. In a representative poll conducted in Feb. 2003, a huge majority of the French say that the French should *not* be inspired by American culture (77%), American lifestyle (84%), or US foreign policy (80%). Only 13% are inspired by American culture, and only 10% by American lifestyles. See Brule Ville Associés for the New York Times (2003) *New York Times* (13 Nov. 2003): A14.
65. Lars Rensmann (2003) 'The New Politics of Prejudice: Comparative Perspectives on Extreme Right Parties in European Democracies', *German Politics and Society* 21: 93–123.
66. On the New Right discourse see Taguieff (n. 37).
67. Homi K. Bhabha (1994) *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.
68. Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner (2002) 'The Nascent Political Philosophy of the European Polity', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 10: 342–64, 356.
69. For a systematic critique of an exclusionary European pan-nationalism as the basis for European integration see Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (2004) *Das kosmopolitische Europa*, pp. 45–6. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
70. Ibid. p. 327.
71. Ibid. p. 46.
72. Stephen Shulman (2002) 'Nationalist Sentiments and Globalisation Preferences in Five Great Powers', *Global Society* 16: 47–68.
73. Rubin and Rubin (n. 5), p. 23.
74. Richard Pells (1997) *Not like us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*. New York: Basic Books.

75. Robert Alvarez (2002) 'Attitudes toward the European Union: The Role of Social Class, Social Stratification, and Political Orientation', *International Journal of Sociology* 32: 58–76.

76. Klaus Eder (2001) 'Integration through Culture? The Paradox of the Search for a European Identity', in K. Eder and B. Giesen (eds) *European Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

77. The new divide 'between cosmopolitanism and nationalism can be interpreted as a contest for the post-nation state political order – between those who favour a new diversity of trans-national, national, and local forms of sovereignty and those who want to build fractional territorial fiefdoms'. See Mary Kaldor (1997) 'Cosmopolitanism versus Nationalism: The New Divide?', in Richard Caplan and John Feffer (eds) *Europe's New Nationalism: States and Minorities in Conflict*, pp. 42–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

78. See Markovits (n. 14). Elliot Neaman (2002) 'The War that Took Place in Germany: Intellectuals and September 11', *German Politics and Society* 20: 56–78.

79. See Shlapentokh (n. 3).

80. Amitai Etzioni (2003) 'Implications of the American Anti-Terrorism Coalition for Global Architectures', *European Journal of Political Theory* 1: 9–30.

81. Anthony McGrew (2002) 'Between Two Worlds: Europe in a Globalizing Era', *Government and Opposition* 37: 343–58, 358.

82. Arendt (n. 6), p. 175.

83. On deliberative politics see Jürgen Habermas (1998) 'Three Normative Models of Democracy', in Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, pp. 239–52. Cambridge: Polity. On convergences between Arendt's and Habermas's understanding of politics, or of political action in the public sphere and deliberative democracy, see Seyla Benhabib (1992) 'Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition and Jürgen Habermas', in Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, pp. 89–120. New York: Routledge.

84. See Sergio Fabbrini (2005) 'Is the EU Exceptional? The EU and the US in Comparative Perspective', in Fabbrini, *Democracy and Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Exploring Post-National Governance*, pp. 3–24, 14–15. New York: Routledge.

85. Beck and Grande (n. 69), p. 51. Beck and Grande prefer the term 'Europeanisation' while signifying the same matter.

86. Edgar Grande and Louis W. Pauly (eds) (2004) *Reconstituting Political Authority: Complex Sovereignty and the Foundations of Global Governance*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

87. Roger Morgan (2000) 'What Kind of Europe? The Need for a "Grand Debate"', *Government and Opposition* 35: 547–58, 558.

88. Fabbrini (n. 84), p. 6.

89. James A. Caporaso (2005) 'The Emergence of the EU Supranational Polity and its Implications for Democracy', in Fabbrini (n. 84), pp. 57–75, p. 73.

90. See Hans-Jörg Trenz and Klaus Eder (2004) 'The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism', *European Journal of Social Theory* 7: 5–25.

91. See Fabbrini (n. 84), pp. 4–5.

92. Benhabib (2002) *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

93. Erika Harris (2003) 'New Forms of Identity in Contemporary Europe', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 4: 14–33.

94. Bo Strath (ed.) (2000) *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*. Brussels: Peter Lang.

95. McGrew (n. 81), p. 357.

96. Mark Gilbert (2005) 'European Federalism: Past Resilience, Present Problems', in Fabbrini (n. 84), pp. 27–43, p. 33.

97. Benhabib (n. 92), pp. 147ff.

98. Arendt (n. 7), p. 417.