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Global Habitus, Local Stratification, and Symbolic Struggles Over Identity

The Case of McDonald's Israel

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Employing Bourdieu's concepts of field and habitus, this article argues that McDonaldization, and by extension globalization, is a social and cultural practice, implemented by actors, with intentions, motivations, and goals. This analytical approach accomplishes two important objectives: first, it moves away from an agentless view of globalization, viewing it instead as a social practice demanding forms of skills and strategies used by actors, and second, this approach helps us understand how forms of global capital enable and are enabled by local forms of social stratification and identity. The research is based on content analysis of newspaper articles on McDonald's in Israel and an in-depth interview with the chief executive officer of McDonald's Israel. It focuses on his social trajectory, asking how his ethnic, class, and political affiliations within the Israeli context endowed him with a global habitus. This global habitus is apparent in the liberal outlook defended by the McDonald's chairman, an outlook that has pitted him against the ultra-orthodox establishment.

Keywords: globalization; McDonaldization; habitus; culture; Israel

Opposition to McDonald's is, if not as widespread as the company itself, at least gaining in global visibility. Many of us are becoming increasingly familiar with the sight of vandalized restaurants, which have become part of the routine of radical, left-wing and antiglobalization demonstrations. In 2002, however, the radical animal rights group that organized a demonstration in Tel Aviv, Israel, to mark Worldwide Anti-McDonald's Day decided to hold their modest demonstration a day earlier than in the rest of the world¹ for two reasons: October 16 was the eve of official commemorations marking the Hebrew calendar date of the seventh anniversary of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination², and it was also the 16th anniversary of the disappearance of Israeli navi-

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gator Lieutenant Colonel Ron Arad,³ which up to this day is ritually evoked in the Israeli media with a mixture of national grief and collective solidarity. The organizers of the demonstration in Tel Aviv spoke of not wanting “to antagonize the public in any way,”⁴ by which they meant that antiglobal protests should not interfere with expressions of collective solidarity and national memory and, in fact, must be contained or even superceded by them. But now add to this the following: the chief executive officer (CEO) of McDonald’s Israel, Dr. Omri Padan, actually shuts down McDonald’s restaurants on the (Gregorian, secular calendar) anniversary of Rabin’s death as a mark of respect, an act that very few, if any, other businesses observe. That antiglobal protesters and McDonald’s CEO wind up making very similar decisions—interrupting their political and economic activities for similar reasons—starts to get us close to the singularity of McDonald’s in Israel, a singularity that in turn may require a fresh theoretical perspective on McDonaldization.

Indeed, we argue that in the Israeli context, McDonald’s is opposed neither to antiglobal (new social) movements nor to old labor forces; rather, the tension between the local and the global played out by McDonald’s is enacted in a symbolic struggle over the definition of nationality and Jewish identity.

PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM

Although the etymological origin of the concept of “McDonaldization” lies in the surname of a modestly entrepreneurial West Coast family, and although it corresponds to a particular management and franchising technique established by Ray Kroc, few concepts in sociology have so unambiguously expressed the anonymous and totalizing power of organizations to spread modes of managing, producing, and selling goods (Boas & Chain, 1976; Kroc & Anderson, 1977). As Ritzer suggests, McDonaldization corresponds to a broad-sweeping, anonymous process that homogenizes various spheres of American society through spreading the basic principles of efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control (Ritzer, 1993, 1998, 2000). But the true power of McDonaldization is that it is not restricted to a national framework. In fact, it embodies the full power of globalization in both its economic and cultural moments. This, in turn, explains why McDonaldization has become a by-word for “Americanization” and “cultural imperialism,” or as Polly Toynbee (2000) rather graphically put it, “sometimes it seems as if a tidal wave of the worst of Western culture is sweeping across the globe like a giant strawberry milkshake . . . tasting the same from Samoa to Siberia to Somalia” (p. 191). The metaphor, which refers not only to the milkshake itself but also to the principles behind its production, marketing, and consumption, is an apt one, because liquids tend to spread in a uniform way, which is one of the major complaints made by those opposed both to the restaurant chain and the social process that bears its name (Smart, 1999; Tomlinson, 1991).

Objections to such views about McDonaldization abound, are in line with current debates on globalization, and come more or less directly from the literature that takes a more critical stance on the claims made concerning the extent of worldwide homogenization (Arnason, 1990; Hannerz, 1992, 1996; Robertson, 1992). Similar to so many other global cultural firms and symbols, it is argued, McDonald's does not annul or overpower particular local traditions but rather transforms them, and is transformed through them, via a process of mutual accommodation (Garcia Canclini, 1995; Nderveen Pieterse, 1995). In this vein, some have argued that the McDonaldization thesis is overstated, offering in its place a vision of cultural hybridization, in which each McDonald's outlet, for example, adapts itself, chameleon-like, to its surroundings (Azaryahu, 1999, 2000; Diamond, 2000; Smart, 1999; Watson, 1997). In a somewhat similar vein, Samuel Huntington (1996) has argued that the goods and symbols produced in America can neither override nor undermine the deeper cultural core of local cultures, whose strength is made of enduring and resilient traditions, values, and moral commitments. Huntington suggests that Coca Cola or McDonald's work at a cultural level that is too superficial for it to transform local cultures in any significant way. In short, the debates over the McDonaldization thesis almost perfectly overlap broader debates concerning globalization, namely, those between the "hybridization" or "glocalization" theses and proponents of the "homogenization" theses, and to that extent, have led to an impasse, because both sides have strong theoretical arguments and compelling evidence to support their positions.

In conformity with the "homogenization" thesis, we show that the operation of McDonald's Israel does indeed conflict with numerous political and cultural forces indigenous to Israel in a way that impels Israel to align itself with other Western liberal polities. But we differ significantly from the literature on homogenization in that we suggest that the abstract, uniform, and universal rhetoric invoked by McDonald's in the Israeli public discourse draws as much on political liberalism (defending human rights and the neutrality of the state) as it draws on free-market capitalism and the ideology of consumption. Moreover, contrary to many proponents of the "hybridization" thesis, which celebrate the "local" and the "particular" as forms of resistance against the foreign threat of global capitalism, we argue that, curiously enough, in the Israeli context, it is McDonald's that, through its local franchise owner, has adopted a "resistance" strategy against the ethnic and religious particularism of the Jewish state. The most interesting aspect of McDonald's Israel is that it is an active participant in local struggles over the definition of Israeliness, thus largely confirming the view that globalization generates ruptures and tensions, the nature of which remains to be specified (Appadurai, 1990, 1996).

Cultural approaches to globalization tend to view culture either as a "deep" core, to which are added some superficial layers of extraneous meanings (Bourdieu, 1990; Parsons, 1968), or as a mosaic or patchwork of meanings loosely fitted together in a process of ongoing bricolage (Swidler, 2001). The

case of McDonald's Israel compels us to move away from both of these approaches and to view culture as a battlefield in which actors struggle to control the answers to such key questions as "How Jewish should the Jewish state be?" Through this shift, we are in a better position to understand how McDonald's operates simultaneously as an opponent of Jewish particularism (homogenization thesis) and as a defender of an archetypal Israeliness (hybridization thesis).⁵ To that extent, we reject Anthony Smith's (1990) characterization of "today's emerging global culture [as] tied to no place or period [, as] context-less" (p. 177): The crux of our argument is that "global culture" is deployed as a part of contextualized struggles that are particular to each locality.

In this study, therefore, we would like to slightly tilt the axis of the McDonaldization debates: Rather than focusing on the homogenization-hybridization debate, we propose instead to focus on the struggles, ruptures, and tensions that accompany and in fact make possible the process of globalization (see Appadurai's *Modernity at Large*, 1996, for a similar approach). McDonald's Israel offers a powerful example of the ways in which global capitalism is organized in the economic, political, and cultural realms by setting in motion and continuously activating local fields of struggle, and more specifically, fields of struggle that pit secular and global elites against the religious establishment, which has increasingly taken hold of key positions in the state apparatus. In fact, Anthony Smith (1990) suggests such a view when he argues that "vernacular mobilization; the politicization of cultures; the role of intelligentsia and other strata; and the intensification of cultural wars" (p. 185) are characteristic of religious and ethnic opposition to globalization the world over.

Our study of McDonald's in Israel reveals that the operation of this large corporation takes place in social and political fields of struggle, in which McDonald's operates as a significant and active force pushing for the implementation of a liberal conception of the state and civil society, conceived as a neutral space devoid of particular ethnic or religious content (Shafir & Peled, 2002). We further argue that such liberal conceptions of the state correspond to the habitus of the ruling economic and political elites of Israel, which are increasingly challenged by incoming religious groups that have entered the political field and seek to seize the economic and symbolic resources afforded by that field (Sharkansky, 2000). In this article, then, we want to identify the ways in which McDonald's Israel has positioned itself in the triangular relationship between the market, the state, and civil society. Such positioning has been accompanied by struggles that in turn lean on and activate the ethnic and cultural stratification of Israeli society.

Such an approach to McDonaldization is made possible by the method and theory we employ in examining globalization processes, namely, Bourdieu's theory of social fields (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984, 1989, 1993; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Curiously enough, Bourdieu's theory is infrequently explicitly referred to in globalization theory, although its presence is often felt. Beyond the scope of McDonald's, we hope this article illustrates how Bourdieu's theory of fields and

habitus can be a useful addition to the large output of studies on globalization. More specifically, the example of McDonald's Israel presents us with an interesting case through which to understand how "the global" is played out as a cultural strategy by actors endowed with a form of habitus that remains to be specified and how it is deployed by economic actors to assert one of several competing definitions of citizenship.⁶

The following analysis is based on an exhaustive analysis of all newspaper articles published on McDonald's and its CEO ($n = 141$) from 1994 to 2002; a rare in-depth interview of 2 hours with McDonald's Israel CEO Dr. Omri Padan;⁷ an analysis of McDonald's annual report, as well as of its official Web site; and finally, an analysis of some of the legal battles waged by or against McDonald's Israel.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE MCDONALD'S FIELD

Our approach to McDonaldization is partly informed by "genetic structuralism." Commenting on Bourdieu's work, Randal Johnson defines genetic structuralism as the combination of the "analysis of objective structures with an analysis of the genesis, within particular individuals, of the socially constituted mental structures which generate practice" (Johnson, cited in Bourdieu, 1993, p. 4). In the context of studies on globalization, genetic structuralism enables us to incorporate an understanding of the social fields in which McDonald's has penetrated with an analysis of the social habitus of the main architect of the McDonaldization of Israel, namely, McDonald's franchise owner. This analytical strategy will help us accomplish two important objectives: first, to move away from an "agentless" view of McDonaldization and to view it as a social practice demanding forms of "skills" and "strategies" used by actors to enter the global field; and second, this strategy will help us understand how forms of global capital activate and are made possible by local forms of social stratification.

A field is

simultaneously a space of conflict and competition, the analogy here being with a battlefield, in which participants vie to establish monopoly over the species of capital effective in it—cultural authority in the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, sacerdotal authority in the religious field, and so forth—and the power to decree the hierarchy and "conversion rates" between all forms of authority in the field of power. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 17-18)

Neil Fligstein's use of the concept of "field," although not exactly in line with Bourdieu's, helps us make a useful addition: to claim that an organization operates in a field is not equivalent to claiming that it operates in an environment. Whereas the latter is objectively given, the former is actively shaped and continuously constructed by the organization itself (Fligstein, 1991).

To analyze a field, one needs to proceed in three steps: the first is to understand the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power: How powerful, for example, is the economic field vis-à-vis the political? The second step consists in trying to account for the objective positions occupied by the agents (or institutions) that compete for what is at stake in a field (e.g., the authority to pronounce a food as “kosher,” “refined,” or “edible”) (Ferguson, 1998). In our case, we want to identify the ways in which McDonald’s competes with other social agents over the definition of the food and its mode of production that is acceptable to a Jewish state (for a similar approach in the French context, see Fantasia, 1995). Finally, the habitus of agents acting in this field also must be analyzed, that is, the different dispositions they have acquired and the kinds of capital they have accumulated, as well as the ways in which they play with these different forms of capital. For example, in our case, we need to identify the habitus of the actor(s) who has made McDonald’s a player in economic and cultural fields of struggle.

One may retort, however, that the theory of McDonaldization is not easily compatible with Bourdieu’s theory of fields because of the latter’s emphasis that the field is a structure of probabilities, something that always “implies a measure of indeterminacy” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). How actors play in the field in which they struggle, the argument continues, can never be mechanically deduced from their position in the field. This is in contrast to the idea of McDonaldization, which describes a form of control, predictability, and instrumentalization of work and consumption processes, which, by definition, leaves hardly any room for “indeterminacy.” In our approach to McDonaldization, we would like to account for precisely this mixture of indeterminacy (exemplified by the social identity and management style of the McDonald’s Israel CEO) and rationalization of the production process. In this way, we suggest that “globalization” is also a cultural practice that must be accounted for in our analysis of the struggles between the “local” and the “global.” By moving away from the view of McDonaldization as a broad-scale and agentless process, we would like to understand McDonaldization as a cultural practice that was introduced in Israel by agents with a specific form of capital and habitus. As a social and cultural practice, McDonaldization is implemented by actors, with intentions, motivations, and goals. However, even when they compete with others in the economic field, these actors do not use perfect (or bounded) rationality to make decisions but rather interpret their social world and act in it by strategically and creatively using their habitus. As Fligstein put it, because (economic and organizational) environments are “murky . . . actors have to provide interpretations of them” (Fligstein, 1991, p. 315). Fligstein does not probe into the process of interpretation but rather takes it as a self-evident category. We argue here that the interpretation of the social world by a global actor—the franchise owner of McDonald’s Israel—must be explicated.

THE ECONOMIC FIELD IN ISRAEL

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Israeli economy is that, until relatively recently, the economic and political fields were virtually indistinguishable, such as the state's control over the economy. Indeed, it might be argued that they did not constitute separate fields at all.⁸ Both fields shared a dominant discourse—that of nation-building and the primacy of the collective—and there was an almost formal connection between economic and political power, with the state making politically motivated appointments to business positions and funneling massive funds into various industries and agricultural and workers' cooperatives, which in turn were steady suppliers of employment (Shapiro, 1976).

This state of affairs came about in the early 20th century, when the leaders of the new waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine realized that their labor conflicts with the local Arab population would best be run in a centralized fashion, which conflicts it was essential to win if they were to keep new Jewish immigrants from leaving Palestine for want of employment (Shafir, 1989).⁹ In addition, the various tasks of nation-building, it was paternalistically felt, were too weighty for anything other than stringent state control, and this included running the economy. With regard to foreign trade, over the years, a system of government-issued manufacturing, import, and export licenses developed, with preference for large state- or *Histadrut*-owned enterprises and their politically nominated managers.¹⁰ The economic field, then, was subjugated to the political one. This was supported culturally by widespread opposition to conspicuous consumption, fostered by a "waste not, want not" attitude found as a result of rationing and scarcity. What was seen as fit to produce or fit to consume was defined by the state, whose power stretched deep into the economic field (Ben-Porat, 1992; Kimmerling, 1982).

In addition, private enterprises, for the first three or four decades of the state's existence, could not hope to raise private capital. "No autonomous business sector could emerge, and business decisions were made in response to or as part of political decisions" (Shafir & Peled, 2000b, p. 246). Various sources of capital income were received directly by the state or one of its arms.¹¹ The government also completely controlled the capital market and placed severe restrictions on holding foreign currency. Writing in 1991, an Israeli economist could confidently say that "the intervention of the government in every aspect of economic life in Israel is greater than in any noncommunist country in the world" (Aharoni, 1991, p. 332). Thus, by controlling private capital, the state could ensure that a free market economy would not arise: The political field was not allowing autonomy to the economic one.

However, important changes began to take place during the 1980s, following a period of three-digit annual inflation, which was brought to a rapid end with the 1985 Emergency Stabilization Plan. Market influence on the economy

started to be more seriously felt, and the economic field started separating itself from the political one. The government ceased to bail out failing factories and businesses and relaxed restrictions on capital investment and foreign currency transactions. A program of privatization, albeit a limited one, was undertaken. The industry's focus shifted to exports and hi-tech (Shalev, 1999). In particular, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange became a more and more important institution, reducing the government's control of the capital market and enabling private enterprises to raise funds on their own. Meanwhile, the United States pressured Israel to lock itself into the global market, meaning that many Israeli firms found themselves uncompetitive.¹² Amir Ben-Porat argues that "ever since statehood, Israel has been undergoing a process of becoming capitalist society" (Ben-Porat, 1993, p. x) and claims that by the end of the 1980s, the process was "openly supported and legitimized by the political regime and its ideology" (p. 28). By the end of the 1990s, Israel was held up "as a model of economic liberalization and successful adaptation to globalization and technological change" (Shalev, 2000, p. 129).¹³

Simultaneous with these changes in the economic field, opponents of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip started to make a case for reconciliation with the Palestinians by invoking economic arguments (Ram, 2000; Shafir & Peled, 2000a). Not only would Israel reap a peace dividend by cutting defense costs and establishing trade relations with a Palestinian state but the troublesome Arab boycott of Israel would come to an end, expanding Israel's trade possibilities greatly. In this way, the growth and emergence of a separate field of private economy with real power vis-à-vis the state is relatively new in Israel and has always been intimately connected with political processes, most importantly the conflict with the Palestinian population.

As a result of the above-mentioned changes in Israel's political economy, and the emergence of the private economy as a field relatively autonomous from state control, when McDonald's opened its first restaurant in Israel in 1993, large changes had taken place concerning attitudes to consumption. This is borne out by the fact that a large number of well-known American outlets had already appeared on the consumer scene, including Pizza Hut, Ace hardware stores, and Ben and Jerry's ice cream. In the early 1990s, processes of globalization, which may be readily identified with the processes of liberalization begun in the 1980s, were in full swing. During that period, there was a positive glut of American brands, including Burger King, KFC, Domino's Pizza, Office Depot, Toys R Us, and others. The state's considerations of nation building were not nearly as influential as they had once been; by now, "the market" decided which businesses would succeed or fail. 1993 also was the year in which Actcom, Israel's oldest Internet Service Provider, started offering its services to the public, thus linking regular Israelis to the emerging World Wide Web. During the same year, CheckPoint, Israel's biggest, global hi-tech company was founded, to be floated in 1996 for \$450 million, eventually reaching a market value of \$30 billion. Another measurement of Israel's increasing globalization was a rise in

air travel: More than 1.5 as many Israelis went on trips abroad in 1993 than had done so in 1990 (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics).¹⁴

Thus, in Israel, the relationship between the market, the state, and civil society differs significantly from its American counterpart in at least one important respect: The Israeli state has historically played a dominant role in regulating the market and has filled much of the space that in the United States has been occupied by civil society.¹⁵ Whereas the public philosophy of the American state is primarily defined by liberalism, that is, by the view that the state ought to be ethnically and religiously neutral and to represent abstract citizens, the Israeli state is a self-proclaimed Jewish state, containing numerous laws that represent and defend the exclusive point of view of the Jews (Kimmerling, 1999b, 2001, esp. Chap. 6; Schweid, 1999; Urian & Karsh, 1999).¹⁶ Although in the United States the universalism of the state often reinforces, and even serves, the blind universalism of the market, in Israel, the two fields have had a more uneasy relationship because the state has acted toward the preservation of ethnic and religious particularism, often disregarding economic considerations. The Israeli market was not guided, as its American counterpart, by an ideology of rationality and efficiency but rather by nationalist and ethno-religious considerations. An example of such orientation of the economy can be found in the fact that during the formative decades of the country, the use of Jewish labor was enforced, thus forbidding the use of the much cheaper and economically efficient Arab labor.¹⁷ Contrary to economies supported by a liberal model of the polity, in Israel, the economic field was guided and often even superceded by ethnic and religious definitions of the polity.

In addition to the economic transformations briefly touched on above, we suggest that the entry of McDonald's into Israel is also due to the increasing dominance of a new cultural discourse, which delegitimized the national-ethnic definition of the state and instead advocated more universal and inclusive definitions of citizenship, best represented by liberal views of the state and of citizenship (Ram, 1999b; Shafir & Peled, 2002). We propose to view liberalism as a cultural outlook constitutive of the habitus of global groups, that is, those groups that are most likely to participate in and benefit from globalization. Bourdieu's concept of habitus designates the principle that generates social practices, both as practices that can be objectively evaluated and as practices that, in turn, evaluate the social world, thus reproducing it. One of the strengths of the notion of habitus is that it designates both the distinctive trait of a class (e.g., "the asceticism of the university professors," to use one of Bourdieu's own examples) and the ensemble of practices of a single agent.¹⁸ The notion of habitus thus allows us to single out a single agent—inasmuch as she or he is representative of a social group—and to interrogate the strategies she or he deploys in a social field. In the present case, we would like to analyze the ways in which the field of McDonald's was constituted through what we suggest calling a global cultural habitus, that is, a disposition to act and to think in a local context by using global resources and global forms of knowledge and technology.

The exclusive owner of the McDonald's franchise offers a very good illustration of the deployment of such a global habitus. By examining "habitus," we can gain a better understanding of globalization as a cultural strategy deployed by actors, as well as an understanding of the ways in which this habitus conflicts, competes, or clashes with other forms of social and cultural capital. As appears from our analysis, the habitus of the CEO of McDonald's Israel incorporates forms of social and cultural capital that could be played out in the local context of the Israeli market precisely because they leaned simultaneously on Israeli stratification and on the global field.

MCDONALD'S AND GLOBAL HABITUS

Although symbolic struggles are structured by social fields, they are also indeterminate. What makes these struggles indeterminate is the fact that they are waged by actors whose moves and countermoves are simultaneously "improvisations" and activations of preexisting social and cultural structures. The enlargement or contraction of the boundaries of a field depends on the ways in which actors enter and "play" within that field, in turn shaped by their habitus, which is the master code guiding one's choices, evaluation of social objects, and ways of apprehending and approaching others. In our case, this is best exemplified by a study of the habitus of the McDonald's CEO.¹⁹

A habitus is a system of dispositions acquired during the socialization process, which shapes the ways in which actors strategize and play with the constraints of the field within which they operate. Agents are bearers of capital; depending on their trajectory, on the volume and structure of their capital, they will work toward preserving the distribution of capital or toward its subversion.

What, then, was Padan's social trajectory, and how can it explain how he joined what was, in Israel, the still incipient "transnational capitalist class" (Sklair, 2001)? Padan does not come from Israel's upper economic echelons; in economic terms, his background is rather middle class and his family was far from being wealthy. However, Padan came from the upper echelons of the ethnic hierarchy of Israeli society and, as appears from our analysis, became McDonald's Israel CEO thanks to the ways in which he played with his cultural and social, rather than economic, capital.

Padan was born to a secular family of Western European origins with high cultural capital, a fact that, in the context of Israeli social structure of the 1960s, placed him within one of the country's most privileged groups (Kimmerling, 2001). Indeed, in the decades following the formation of the state, following policies of immigration and settlement, Israeli society was divided along geographical and ethnic lines. The result was that ethnic and cultural hierarchies were more determinant for one's status and social position than economic ones. More exactly, the mechanism of social stratification was such that one's *social* capital—which in turn depended on one's cultural and ethnic membership—largely

determined one's access to economic resources.²⁰ It is most relevant, then, that Padan attended one of the best secondary schools in the country and, perhaps most important, completed a doctoral degree in economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which in the Israeli context, afforded him high levels of cultural capital.

That cultural capital is central to our understanding of how Padan acquired what we call a "global habitus." First, although it may seem insignificant, we believe it is worthy of notice that Padan's mother was an academic.²¹ In the 1960s and 1970s—the years during which Padan was growing up—Israel was largely disconnected from the rest of the world. At that time, academics were probably the only global class in Israel because their connection to the world was almost an intrinsic attribute of their work: Israeli academics were more often than not trained in foreign universities, frequently attended international conferences, used American- and European-based bodies of knowledge, spoke multiple languages, wrote almost exclusively in English, developed transnational networks of professional connections, and regularly spent sabbatical years abroad. Although we do not have data to confirm this, we suggest that because Padan grew up in an academic environment, he is likely to have acquired, through his mother's professional membership, global "dispositions," a cognitive and emotional disposition to move easily and smoothly from one national context to another, to quickly adapt and adopt different cultural outlooks, and to think of himself as an agent operating in the world as a single unit. Moreover, by studying economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Padan exposed himself to a group of scholars who were to have a great impact on the Israeli economy in that they were the chief architects of American-based views of the market in Israel. In the Department of Economics at the Hebrew University, most faculty members had been trained in American universities and were spreading American models of market deregulation and competition, with special inspiration coming from the Chicago school of economics. At the end of his PhD, Padan was offered a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard University; he turned the fellowship down but did spend a few months at Stanford University.

Leslie Sklair has coined the term "transnational capitalist class" to refer to members of elite business groups who think in global rather than local perspectives and who operate internationally as part of their normal work routine (Sklair, 1996, 1997, 2001). Sklair is primarily interested in those groups of people who make economic and financial decisions and for that reason did not include academics in his typology of the transnational capitalist class. However, in the Israeli context, academics, and especially economists, used to be chief representatives of the transnational class and have played a significant role in propagating the ideology of the market and deregulation, particularly among policy makers. As Padan's trajectory suggests, in Israel, the "revolving door" is as likely to link the government and academia or the army as it is to link government and business.

Global dispositions can only be realized in a specific national context through the accumulation of local forms of capital. In Israel, membership to cultural enclaves can be converted into tangible social benefits because cultural hierarchies overlap closely with ethnic and economic stratification. Through his compulsory army service, which in Israel lasts 3 years, Padan joined an elite unit in which he accumulated important social capital. Up until recently, the army was a privileged career path for the Israeli elites, leading its most distinguished members into business or meteorical political careers (Ben-Eliezer, 1998a; Lomsky-Feder & Ben-Ari, 1999).²² Thus, during his army service, for example, Padan met two future heads of state (Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak) and acquired many male friendships, who subsequently joined him in the management of his enterprise. Although Padan is a member of the transnational capitalist class, he also manages his enterprise as a quasi-family business. His wife—a former dental surgeon—is also the personnel manager and his closest associate. Most of the high-ranking jobs in the firm are occupied by long-standing friends. This is congruent with the close intertwining of social and economic capitals that characterizes the Israeli economic field.

From the beginning of his business career, Padan operated as an importer of American brands in Israel (such as Levi Strauss, Espray, Jockey, Fruit of the Loom). Padan himself explains that “after having imported these brands, it was natural for me to continue and work with a strong brand. McDonald’s was an American brand with which I was already connected.” According to Padan himself, it is precisely the fact that he had been such a major importer of American brands in Israel that gave him a competitive advantage in obtaining the McDonald’s franchise. Thus, from the start, Padan was characterized by what we may call a “global business habitus,” an orientation to the world economy that helped him ride the wave of the import of American-based corporate brands.

The story of the way in which he “snatched” the franchise is also telling: McDonald’s advertised that it was looking for someone with capital of \$1.5 million to operate a single McDonald’s restaurant. Padan was far from owning that sum of money yet he initiated a meeting with the franchise manager in Chicago and explained to him why their (i.e., the American) conception of multiple franchise owners would not work in Israel. He argued that given the cultural complexity and heterogeneity of a country such as Israel, McDonald’s headquarters in America would be forced into making all sorts of awkward political decisions. This meeting was fateful for Padan: He gained the management’s professional trust, with the latter adopting his views about concentrating the franchises in Israel in one exclusive franchise holder. This meeting is a striking example of what Randall Collins calls an “interaction ritual chain”; through his accumulated past cultural capital (decontextualized knowledge of economics, ability to think of the world in global terms, his past experience as an importer of American brands, etc.), Padan was able to build a powerful global and local coalition, through which he in turn seized property and authority in the Israeli context (see Collins, 1981).

But there is yet a third source for understanding Padan's global habitus, namely, his exposure to and abundant use of the liberal discourse of rights, which makes him an example of the ways in which liberalism has spread and has become, along with McDonald's itself, one of the most potent symbols of cultural globalization. What makes Padan most interesting with regard to the question at hand is the fact that in the late 1970s, when he was a student, Padan was a prominent member of the Israeli left. Padan was one of the founders of the Peace Now movement and quickly became one of its most vocal and visible members.²³ In April 1978, Padan organized a mass rally and addressed the 40,000-strong crowd. In 1980, one of the Israel's best-known commentators declared that "Omri Padan is the authentic Peace Now" (Lori, 1999).²⁴

To an American reader, the previous account may look like an erratic or eclectic social trajectory, or perhaps as an echo of the ways in which 1960s hippies converted themselves into the market gurus and yuppies of the 1980s (Brooks, 2000). However, such a perception does not hold in the Israeli case, precisely because of the volume and form of social capital. Indeed, if we have spent some time describing the social trajectory of the McDonald's CEO, it is because Padan is highly representative of the ways in which the global is being played against the local in the Israeli context. Being a Peace Now activist and moving to become McDonald's CEO is, in the Israeli context, part and parcel of a single and coherent social strategy and social identity, and this is because in Israeli society both activities are led by the same socioeconomic groups. Further examples are not hard to find but a particularly striking one is that of Dov Lautman, chairman of Delta-Galil Industries, suppliers of garments to companies such as Marks and Spencer and Gap. He too quickly took advantage of the new business climate associated with globalization in general, and moves toward peace in the Middle East in particular, by transferring factories to Jordan and Egypt, where labor costs are considerably cheaper than in Israel and where he has been accused by activists of running sweatshops. Yet, similarly to Padan, alongside his membership in the transnational capitalist class, Lautman is also a keen peace activist and was awarded a prestigious award for contributing to coexistence between Jewish and Arab Israelis.

We argue that we find the same groups in the rank and file of the Israeli left as well as actively participating in the production and consumption of goods due to their ideological outlook, mostly shaped by the values of secular economic and political liberalism. The Israeli left—defined by its view that the state should be neutral in promoting freedom and formal equality between its citizens and those of the Occupied Territories—is largely composed of the wealthiest and most educated members of Israeli society. This social class is also the most likely to favor a peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict: Because they stand to benefit most from peace, and because their outlook tends to be cosmopolitan, a-religious, and universalistic, they also oppose an ethnic or religious definition of the state. This is partly because of the "profound multi-step process which recast the Israeli economy from its protectionist and state-centered origins into a

more internationally-oriented, neo-liberal economy” (Shafir & Peled, 2000a, Chap. 1) that took place during the 1980s and that helped give birth to the peace process with the Palestinians. The Israeli left is populated, although not exclusively, by the descendents of the state’s founding fathers, who came to wish themselves free of collectivism and to improve their personal capabilities and who were well positioned to lead and exploit changes in Israel’s political economy, as well as a growing new middle class possessing an ideology-free rational expertise. It also includes business leaders who shared Shimon Peres’s vision of a New Middle East and who reaped the aforementioned peace dividend after the Oslo Accords were signed, bringing a huge wave of foreign investment into Israel (Ram, 1999a).

We would like to suggest, therefore, perhaps counterintuitively, that in becoming the CEO of a large textile company, and later vying (and succeeding) to become the franchise owner of McDonald’s, Omri Padan was acting in a way that is most compatible with a more general habitus and is inscribed within a coherent social strategy, that of secular Jews of European origin with high cultural capital and most likely to be members of the Israeli left and to promote a liberal vision of the state. It is their particular ideological liberal outlook that we analyze in the following section.

MCDONALD’S AND ITS VISION OF A LIBERAL STATE

In the past 25 years or so, opposition to McDonald’s has been a feature of its arrival and expansion almost everywhere it has stepped foot. This opposition showed a globally organized face in 1985, when the first Worldwide Anti-McDonald’s Day was held. However, opposition to McDonald’s stepped up a gear in the mid-1990s around the McLibel trial.²⁵ By the millennium, there were reports of anti-McDonald’s activities in countries such as Croatia, Australia, the Philippines, Korea, Malta, as well as in North America and Western Europe as a whole (see www.mcspotlight.org).

In the same way that McDonald’s expresses certain cultural attributes of its local context, so have the protests against McDonald’s. For instance, in San Diego, three animal rights protestors were arrested in September 1998; in Moscow in 1999, there were protests around some workers’ attempts to unionize; Koreans protested about the impact of McDonald’s on their local food culture;²⁶ environmentalists in Australia opposed the opening of a restaurant in the Blue Mountains; in May 2001, enraged Hindu Indians protested that McDonald’s had used beef-based flavorings in their French fries despite previously having given assurances that they were suitable for vegetarians; in the Philippines, protests in 2001 focused on the issue of hunger; whereas in 1986, Italian designer Valentino objected to the opening of a restaurant in central Rome because of “noise and disgusting odors.” The protests have tended to have a very local feel—residents

of various towns and neighborhoods have organized to block the opening of restaurants that, they claim, would lead to traffic, pollution, and garbage problems or would alter the atmosphere of an old town, endanger historical sites, and so on. Indeed, this type of protest was waged by inhabitants of the well-to-do Ramat Aviv neighborhood (in which Padan himself lives) after hearing of plans to open a restaurant in their vicinity (Ha'aretz, 1994).

In the Israeli context, the main lines of opposition to McDonald's were not primarily economic but, rather, cultural. For example, when Padan acquired the McDonald's franchise, he decided to import potatoes, a decision that demanded that the heavy machinery of the government be put into motion. McDonald's needed a decision to be made in the cabinet to approve the import of 300 tons of potatoes until arrangements could be made in Israel for the provision of potatoes that would suit McDonald's criteria (Israeli potatoes were deemed to be of a lesser quality). The agricultural lobby, which wields significant power in Israeli society and economy, opposed Padan's request to import potatoes. However, Padan made a commitment that he himself would later produce his own potatoes in Israel, arguing that the monopoly was detrimental to the Israeli customer. It is interesting to note that the cabinet meeting that approved the Oslo agreement was the same one that approved the import of potatoes for McDonald's.²⁷ According to Padan, this was not sheer coincidence, because the architects of the Oslo agreements were motivated by the same spirit of liberal (political *and* economic) openness and were far more receptive than earlier Israeli leaders to arguments about "breaking monopolies" and favoring competitiveness. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that agriculture has held a central place in the Zionist ideology and mythology of "returning to the land." In practical terms, this expressed itself in large subsidies to agriculturalists, protective tariffs against cheaper imports, extremely large water quotas, and a place close to the seat of power. In requesting to import potatoes (albeit on a one-off basis), McDonald's was threatening to break one of the many agricultural monopolies. The agricultural lobby was thus facing one of the first challenges to its local power from a member of the transnational capitalist class.

As already mentioned, the major source of opposition to McDonald's in Israel has come from the religious establishment in ways unheard of elsewhere in the world. In response, McDonald's itself has taken on the role of social activist in ways that have, to the best of our knowledge, no equivalent anywhere else.

To understand this, and surprising as it may seem to an external observer, one must first appreciate that the ethnic stratification of Israel—in which Jews of European descent are at the top of the socioeconomic hierarchy with Jews from Arab countries and the Arabs themselves at its bottom—has been accompanied by a profound cultural clash between secularity and religiosity. This came about after Mizrahi immigrants (Jews from Arab countries) in the 1950s developed an awareness of their socioeconomic and ethnic positioning in the new Israeli state (Smootha, 1978). Having experienced attempts by the Ashkenazi old-timers to "modernize" them, including downplaying their particular religious

traditions and customs, it was not surprising that an appeal to religion should form a central part of a new-found Mizrahi cultural identity and that the secular elite's lack of religiosity should be cited as a cause for its alleged moral bankruptcy.²⁸ The class and cultural conflict between Jews from European and Arab countries overlapped with a conflict between religiosity and secularity, a conflict that is in turn played out in the arena of the state.

Even if it had not wanted to, McDonald's Israel would have found itself in the crossfire between these two opposing factions. However, Omri Padan made certain business decisions that made him a full-fledged player in struggles to define the cultural field in Israel, and these decisions should be seen as fully consistent with his habitus, his cultural and social capital, and his vision of the cultural field.

First, Padan decided that McDonald's in Israel would not be kosher in that milk and meat products are served together (in a cheeseburger, for instance).²⁹ The cheeseburger thus marked the penetration of foreign, non-Jewish habits of eating in ways that regular Israelis were not used to seeing. Second, he also decided to open his restaurants on Saturdays, when observant Jews are forbidden to engage in any productive activity or to consume any product through monetary transactions. Third, he announced that he would not open branches of McDonald's in the territories conquered by Israel in the 1967 war. In fact, Padan sided with the extreme left-wing political group Gush Shalom to launch an economic boycott on the Occupied Territories. As he himself said in an interview, "As a franchisee, I am not ready to open [McDonald's] outlets in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip. As far as I am concerned, there should be a Palestinian franchise owner chosen by McDonald's." These positions are all the more interesting in that they affect a sizable number of potential customers—the Ultra-Orthodox and the settlers and Palestinians living in the West Bank. This in turn clearly suggests that Padan made economic decisions that were guided by his own liberal and secular views.

The religious political establishment controls, or at least exerts pressure on, two main domains that are crucial to the operation of McDonald's, both of which it uses in the ongoing *Kulturkampf*: meat production and labor laws pertaining to work on Saturdays, Israel's official day of rest. Jewish religious dietary laws carefully divide pure from impure foods (e.g., pork is forbidden), prescribes how foods can be combined (e.g., milk and meat cannot be mixed), and how animals are to be slaughtered (ritually by an authorized slaughterer, i.e., one who has been certified and appointed by the religious establishment). Therefore, the single most potent symbol of McDonald's—the cheeseburger—is unambiguously against Jewish law.

Of more importance, though, is an obscure and little-enforced law dating from 1953, which prohibits youths of all religious denominations from working on their respective days of rest and that was reactivated by an ultra-Orthodox minister with the specific intention of forcing McDonald's restaurants to close on the Jewish Sabbath. In a display of muscle flexing, the minister for Labor and

Social Affairs—traditionally held by a representative of a religious party—fined McDonald's for employing Jewish staff on the Sabbath instead of either shutting down their restaurants altogether or employing non-Jewish (most often Arab) personnel. Both McDonald's and Padan himself were fined more than \$20,000. As a consequence, McDonald's Israel called publicly for an "end to religious coercion" and even ran a half-page advertisement in the largest daily newspaper reading, "Stop capitulating to [the ultra-Orthodox] Shas [a religious fundamentalist party] or Israel will turn into Iran." The advertisement called for secular parties to exert pressure on the then-prime minister Ehud Barak to amend the law and allow Jewish youth to work on the Sabbath. In an interview, Padan declared that his decision to lock horns with religious officials was motivated by "ideological principles," which he was willing to uphold despite the possible economic losses: "I am a very tolerant person and I want to sell people what they want without being forced by anybody to close and open my restaurants at any given time" (Haaretz, 1999). During our interview, he declared his full commitment to "the principle of the freedom of occupation and the separation of religion from state." It is noteworthy that these ideas are still hotly debated in Israel and are far from being enshrined in law (Ravitzky, 1997; Sharkansky, 1999).

In another incident that illustrates the close entanglement of the political and ethnic with the global financial operation of McDonald's, and the power of religion in the economic field, McDonald's and the Jerusalem Religious Council battled over the right of McDonald's to operate in the city. In 2001, McDonald's wanted to open a new outlet in the busy central bus station of Jerusalem and planned for it to be kosher.³⁰ However, the local Rabbinical authorities announced that they would condition the granting of a license on McDonald's making its other restaurants in the city kosher as well, a condition to which Padan did not agree.³¹ The restaurant, then, would not be declared kosher by the authorities competent to certify it as such. However, illustrating the power the religious wield, the national bus company Egged declared it would not run its buses through the station if a non-kosher restaurant were to be operating there. In December 2001, a court found in favor of McDonald's, forcing the bus station to let a non-kosher restaurant operate within its walls.

Is this symbolic struggle an example of the local and the global struggling with each other? The answer is not simple. On one hand, it is clear that, as Padan himself declared in his interview, local food industry giants (such as Osem or Strauss) have not been able to challenge the power of the religious because they depend on certificates of kashrut to sell their food to the widest possible number of customers. In that respect, McDonald's global character represents a direct challenge to traditional religious power and authority and offers an example of the ways in which the global can bypass and undermine the power of the state. However, the extent to which the oppositional religious establishment represents a local power base is unclear.

Ironically enough, the increasing power of the religious is not foreign to processes of globalization. Indeed, Jonathan Friedman describes cultural particularism

and capitalist homogenization as “two constitutive trends of global reality” (Friedman, 1990, p. 311). In fact, we would argue that the strengthening of religious power inside Israel is also an example of the ways in which the accumulation of global power helps undercut the power of the state. First, many religions have strengthened through the creation of transnational networks, technologies, and international capital, enabling the worldwide distribution of religious ideas and practices (Casanova, 2001). This is undoubtedly true of the Jewish religion, which, through its connections to the religious communities of the world, has accumulated a great deal of power, thus increasingly bypassing the state with the paradoxical result that religious communities can in turn claim and seize a greater amount of resources from the state. Moreover, at the same time that religions use the new opportunities offered by global technologies, they also have been able to better articulate their own antimodernist ideologies, characterized by vehement attacks on consumption and sexual freedom, by a call to revert to tradition, and religious definitions of identity (Juergensmeyer, 2001).³²

The 1980s, and even more so the 1990s, saw a sharp upturn in levels of religious-secular tension in Israel, which is directly connected to changes in the economic and cultural fields in which McDonald’s is also a major player. Most significant in the Israeli case, perhaps, is the simultaneous decline of the long-standing, left-leaning secular hegemony, held by the political predecessors of today’s Israeli Labor Party (Kimmerling, 1999a), and the increased overlap between cleavages over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the religious-secular one, which have the effect of strengthening each conflict (Cohen, 2000). The (perceived and real) increased Westernization of Israel has riled the more religious elements of society, whereas the (perceived and real) growing power of the religious—due both to simple demographics and the increased involvement of non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox parties in Israeli politics—has struck fear in secular hearts (Cohen, 2000). Rather than the religious and secular living parallel but separate lives, their conflict has become a battle for the very definition of “Israeliness,” in which neither side seems prepared to compromise.³³

These struggles reinforce a widespread view of the nation-state in an era of globalization, namely, that it is not withering away but rather undergoing certain transformations within the context of “transnational reintegration at a higher level, [and] an accompanying reinvigoration of ethnicity” at a sub-national level and that it is still a relevant actor (Kilminster, 1997, p. 276). This would seem to be true in the context of McDonald’s arguments with the religious establishment. On one hand, both parties appeal to supra-national ideals and concepts, be they secular or religious: for instance, a certain conception of freedom or individual liberty or the law of God. Both rely on networks of ideological and financial support that are transnational, and both represent, or at least claim to represent, subsections of the nation in a way that is relatively new in Israeli society and is a result of the aforementioned decline in the Labor movement’s hegemonic standing and its increasing globalization. However, their struggles are local and are conducted entirely within the borders of the nation-state.

Furthermore, both sides can be repeatedly seen taking recourse to state-level "tools," such as the statute book and courts of law, whereas their struggle is, to a large extent, over the definition of the way in which the state is to be Jewish. The importance of a Jewish nation-state is unquestioned by both sides: what is at stake is the religious texture of that state in an age of globalization. Therefore, although the religious establishment may see "the nation-state [as providing] a democratic barrier to the unaccountable globalization processes" (Bowker, 1997, p. 252), the agent of globalization, McDonald's, is itself also in favor of a strong secular nation-state that will protect its business and ideological interests.

These findings are in keeping with Israeli sociological thought on class, ethnicity, and normative standpoints, as eloquently argued in Shafir and Peled's (2002) most recent offering *Being Israeli*. Their thesis is that the republican "citizenship discourse," that was dominant, not to say hegemonic, for as long as the Labor Party enjoyed dominance, is on the wane. The republican discourse is a duty-based one and links individuals' desserts to their contribution to the collective (for instance, service in the armed forces). As a result of its decline, two alternative discourses of citizenship are now fighting for political and ideological superiority, namely, a liberal discourse of citizenship, which focuses on individual rights and freedoms to be fulfilled within civil society, including human rights, and an ethno-nationalist one, which emphasizes a particularistic identity to be fully expressed in a nation-state.

The alignment of McDonald's and the religious establishment within this framework is clear. Padan represents the free market and the individualism that accompanies that, but in a context in which other groups are making real and deep demands on identity, this individualism has a certain local flavor and it is something that must be struggled for and not taken for granted as in societies such as the United States. Yet similarly to advanced capitalist countries, the liberal discourse in Israel also demands a reduced role for the state, with all its attendant consequences for issues of welfare and social inequality. The competing citizenship discourse is an ethno-nationalist one, which strives to strengthen the Jewish identity of the state and its citizens and promotes legislation that furthers that aim. Even leaving aside religious disputes, it is easy to understand how ethno-nationalists find McDonald's an anathema, representing as it does the Western world of consumerism, hedonism, and individualist free choice. Anti-globalization activists whole-heartedly share those criticisms, too; however, where the debate rages over the religiosity of the polity, calls for internationalism are somewhat irrelevant, especially when one side of the debate is pressing for legislation that would give a more religious hue to more areas of the Lifeworld.

Within this framework, the strength of our theoretical perspective can be clearly perceived, because it allows us to account for alternative alignments in other fields of struggle. For instance, pornography was removed from Israeli television screens via a coalition of left-wing parties using familiar liberal arguments and ultra-Orthodox parties who consider pornography an abhorrence to

the Jewish state.³⁴ However, with McDonald's the alignment is different because different values are at stake. And here, notwithstanding a minority secular voice arguing that businesses should close on Saturdays for the benefit of the workers,³⁵ McDonald's finds itself on the same side of the camp as liberals arguing for a more individualistic, global, and peaceful Israeli society.

MCDONALDIZATION OF ISRAEL?

Let us now go back to the beginning of this article. We hope that by now it has become clear why, in the Israeli context, Padan and his opponents from the anti-globalization camp have, at least concerning certain issues, more in common than either of them do with the ultra-Orthodox, and particularly ultra-Orthodox politicians. Because Padan and antiglobalization activists are likely to share similar views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a liberal view of the role of the state, and a similar discourse of human rights, they have far more commonalities than differences.

McDonald's appeared in Israel when civil society, under the impetus of economic growth and frustration with party politics, had been showing signs of blossoming. Indeed, in the early 1990s,

the public sphere was flooded with themes such as individual rights, freedom of expression, democratization of social relations, discrimination in employment, police violence, children's rights, sexual harassment, women's equality, animal rights, and air pollution together with a host of other ecological problems. (Ben-Eliezer, 1998b, p. 387; see also Yishai, 1998)

Moreover, at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, then Prime Minister, effected a sea-change in government spending priorities, funneling money into infrastructure and the Arab population of Israel and away from the Occupied Territories, thus suggesting that peace was close at hand. At the same time, as noted above, the economy was being deregulated and foreign investors were showing great interest in Israel. Hence, although in most parts of the world, McDonald's, as a symbol of American corporate power, came to be associated with inequality and repression, in Israel it appeared at a time when the state seemed to be moving toward "normalization." It was increasingly normalizing its relations with the Palestinians and Israel was enjoying unprecedented popularity on the world stage. At this early stage, then, opposition to McDonald's came from those with primordial conceptions of Israeli identity and who saw "Americanization" as a threat to this identity and from the religious, for whom the cheeseburger was a sacrilege. It is thus interesting that Padan used the very name of McDonald's to justify his opposition to opening outlets in the territories. As he said, "As the [McDonald's] franchisee, I am not willing to open outlets in the West and the Gaza Strip, precisely as the Israeli franchisee [of McDonald's]." Padan uses here

an interesting amalgam: He uses the name of McDonald's to justify his condemnation of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, thus suggesting that McDonald's name is perceived as a name that ought to represent "fairness" and "justice."

Moreover, Padan's commitment to liberalism may be found in the adoption of an informal affirmative action policy inside the corporation, although Israeli law has no ruling to that effect. In addition, Israeli organizational culture is by and large highly biased toward Jews, thus making Padan's policy of affirmative action somewhat unusual. Thus, in our interview, Padan explicitly condemns the labor discrimination of which Arabs are the object:

The adult Arab population makes up . . . 13% of the general population. And yet, if you look at government offices only 3% to 4% of workers are Arabs. It is the same situation as it was for the American Black people, until the government decided to implement affirmative action. It is the same with women. . . . In our organization, 20% of the workers, including the managers, are Arabs.

Clearly, Padan's model for his organization is inspired by American legislation.

A final example of the ways in which Padan acts within the interstices of civil society is to be found in the fact that Padan explicitly "joined the feminist camp" when, in March 2000, he launched a campaign, along with two other businessmen, to fight violence against women and raise funds for shelters for battered women. It should by now come as little surprise to learn that Leon Koffler, one of the campaign's cofounders and CEO of Superpharm, Israel's largest pharmacy chain, is also on the board of the Peres Center for Peace (Jerusalem Post, 2000).

It is now obvious that Padan's way of positioning his corporation in the Israeli public sphere reflects his commitment to liberal ideology. Because liberalism is far more likely to be the ideology held by the secular, educated, and wealthy segments of Israeli society, it is not surprising that the Israeli branch of the fast-food chain is far more oriented toward a middle-class market than its American counterpart.

In this sense, Padan's ideological strategy is matched by his economic strategy: both primarily address middle-class people who have a secular orientation.³⁶ In fact, McDonald's Israel marketing strategy confirms our analysis, because it seems that it is addressed to more affluent sectors of Israeli society. McDonald's Israel is more focused on middle-class customers than its American counterpart. This is manifest in the fact that McDonald's Israel offers the largest hamburger in the world. In an interview, Padan reckoned that only the top half of Israeli society—and in fact even less—can afford to eat in McDonald's, whereas in America, up to 90% of the population can do so, meaning that the expense of dining in McDonald's is more of a factor in Israel than in the United States.³⁷ As a result, the Israeli consumer wants to leave McDonald's with a feeling of having eaten a meal rather than just a snack. For this reason, relates Padan, McDonald's Israel developed a larger burger. In another related difference from

the conventional McDonald's view as a fast food outlet in which the optimal time spent is about 15 minutes, the time spent by Israeli customers in the restaurant is longer, and this is a result of McDonald's policy itself. For example, in July 2001, McDonald's, in conjunction with Microsoft, introduced computers connected to the Internet in an outlet in an upper-middle-class suburban town, with the explicit intent of lengthening the stay of its customers. According to Padan, the Israeli customer stays in an outlet an average of half an hour but that the intent of the company is to extend the length of this stay by introducing Internet technology inside the outlet (Haaretz, 2001).

CONCLUSION

McDonald's Israel is undoubtedly run according to the principles of McDonaldization, namely, calculability, control, efficiency, and predictability. The restaurants are run like the thousands of others around the world, with the same equipment, employer training, back-lit menus, furniture, décor, and so on. As in other countries around the world, McDonald's Israel also donates to charitable causes for sick children. In addition, there is no doubt that the principles of McDonaldization have struck root in Israel in the last decade in more and more spheres of life. For instance, as in other countries, the entrance of McDonald's into the local market has led other participants in the fast-food industry to change their ways with regard to cleanliness and hygiene (Bak, 1997; Yan, 1997). Ram, for instance, describes how falafel joints have tried to sharpen up their appearance because they have reacted to the customer's increased awareness of issues of hygiene. In addition, in the last few years, the first falafel chain has opened,³⁸ replete with automated falafel makers and the rest (Ram, in press).

In this sense, then, the McDonaldization of Israeli society is unremarkable and, thus, has not formed the focus of this article. Rather, we have concentrated on what is remarkable about McDonald's in Israel, namely, its political positioning. However, this is not to say that McDonald's Israel, under the firm leadership of Dr. Omri Padan, is an irrational enterprise but rather that the meaning of being rational varies from context to context.

McDonald's in Israel can be seen to be taking an extremely active (not to say, activist) role in local struggles. This role is consistent with Omri Padan's habitus as a secular, educated, left-wing Israeli. It is also consistent with McDonald's place in Israeli society in the 1990s: With the Labor Party's hegemony long on the decline, representatives of competing conceptions of citizenship started fighting over the pickings (Shafir & Peled, 2002). By tying a model of capitalist success to his sympathies for certain aspects of civil society, Padan has perhaps mitigated much of the anti-McDonald's protest that other McDonald's franchisees around the world regularly have to deal with. Instead, he has locked horns with an extremely vocal minority over the definition of Israeli culture and the

place of Orthodox Judaism in it. It looks like “religious activists are powerful enough to put their demands on the agenda but not strong enough to dictate their outcomes” (Sharkansky, 1996, p. 2), and so we expect the Golden Arches to glow from more and more junctions, shopping centers, and high streets largely undeterred by the unceasing efforts of those who fear for the soul of their state.

This inquiry hopes to make three contributions to the literature on globalization: (a) It is commonplace to view consumerism as the main ideological and cultural outlook of global capitalism, drawing in and aligning ordinary cultural practices with economic production (see Sklair, Appadurai, etc.). We suggest that the ideology of consumption could not exert its powerful global grip unless it was underpinned by a more fundamental and pervasive discourse of rights and liberalism; (b) we would further argue that although not able to compete with pre-modern face-to-face communities (Bellah, 1985), it is not immediately obvious, at least in the Israeli case, that “McDonald’s and Coca Cola . . . offer few meaningful or enduring attachments” to regular Israelis (Holton, 1998). Although we might be exaggerating were we to argue that McDonald’s in Israel provides “meaningful attachments” to its customers, McDonald’s Israel offers a striking example of the ways in which a large corporation has been enlisted in local meaningful struggles, most noticeably for political liberalism, formal equality of chances in the workplace, and peace; and (c) finally, and perhaps most important, we hope to have illustrated that we cannot ignore the study of the concrete actors who carry forward the process of globalization. To that end, we have mobilized the concept of habitus and call for a more detailed analysis of the cultural structures that make some actors more likely than others to enter the global field.

NOTES

1. Worldwide Anti-McDonald’s Day is held on October 16, the same day as the United Nations World Food Day.

2. Yitzhak Rabin was shot by a right-wing religious extremist on November 4, 1995.

3. Ron Arad bailed out of his plane over Lebanon in 1986 and was captured. To date, nothing is known of his whereabouts. Over the years, Ron Arad has come to symbolize Israeli soldiers who have gone missing in action.

4. This quote was from a conversation with the organizers of the demonstration in Tel Aviv.

5. For the record, McDonald’s Israel currently serves the biggest hamburger in any of the chain’s restaurants. As Padan explained to us in an interview, the Israeli consumer does not see McDonald’s as a place to snack but as a place to eat a meal. The Big Mac left him wanting more so McDonald’s developed a bigger burger. In addition, hamburgers in Israel are char-grilled: Because the meat is kosher, the usual McDonald’s preparation methods led to a slightly different flavor, according to Padan.

6. As a secondary aim, by focusing on what we call “a global habitus” we hope to show there is a far greater affinity between the chief executive officer (CEO) of McDonald’s Israel and Israel’s anti-globalization activists than between McDonald’s CEO and numerous members of the political establishment, something one would not expect to see in the American or European environment.

7. Our interview with Padan is rare in two senses: first, he himself does not give many interviews, and second, it is rare that a study of McDonald's bases parts of its findings on an interview with the local CEO.

8. For a discussion of the conditions for the formation of a field, see Ferguson (1998).

9. By centrally controlling labor and settlement activities, the early Zionist leaders also could negotiate with bodies such as the World Zionist Organization, whose members, although not necessarily prepared to chance their lives in the malarial swamps of 1920s Palestine, were nonetheless keen to support the enterprise with generous donations.

10. In 1992, the Histadrut was defined as "not only a trade union peak organization, but also an economic instrument and a provider of social services on a massive scale" (Shalev, 1992, p. 23). Ten years on this is less accurate: The Histadrut is more focused on its trade union activities than its role as a social service provider and is less of an "economic instrument" than it used to be.

11. For example, donations from Jewish communities around the world were received by the Jewish Agency; German World War II reparations paid to Israel in the 1950s were received directly by the state, as were American loans and grants throughout Israel's existence.

12. In particular, the Histadrut suffered greatly. Too used to government subsidies to cope in the new market reality, many of its enterprises closed down or were sold off.

13. The extent to which Israel's development into a full-fledged capitalist society is similar to processes undergone by Southeast Asian countries is quite remarkable, especially in terms of the centrality of the state, the speed of industrialization, the rapid growth of an educated middle class, and so on (see, e.g., Levi-Faur, 1998; Robison, 1996).

14. It is, however, important to point out that the Israeli economy of the early 1990s was not the model of open liberalism (Shalev, 1999). Many monopolies had been broken, to be replaced by a small number of large business concerns that were well placed to reap the fruits of both privatization (by buying up what was on offer) and globalization (by exploiting new overseas markets). The state also had a virtually unchallenged say in issues concerning immigration and defense expenditure, meaning that the economy was still rather more political than in other Western countries (Aharoni, 1998).

15. We are aware that a comparison with European states would look slightly different, because they also have been more strongly characterized by state involvement in the economy than the United States.

16. For instance, the State of Israel's Declaration of Independence contains the following: "We hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state . . . [which] will be open for Jewish immigration . . ." Despite claiming that "it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture," the state has always shown clear preference to its Jewish inhabitants.

17. See the chapter "The Model of Pioneering Economy" (in Kimmerling, 1983) for a discussion of the differences between the Zionist economy and Weber's model of rationalization in capitalism with reference to the Protestant ethic.

18. ". . . l'ensemble des pratiques d'un agent (ou de l'ensemble des agents qui sont le produit de conditions semblables) sont a la fois systematiques en tant qu'elles sont le produit de l'application de schemes identiques... et systematiquement distinctes des pratiques constitutives d'un autre style de vie" (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 190, emphasis added, cited in Bourdieu, 1984). [The totality of practices of a single agent (or of all the agents who are the product of the application of similar conditions) are systematic—in that they are the product of similar schemes—and systematically distinct from the practices of another lifestyle.]

19. The academic and popular literature on leadership in business also justifies this approach, namely, a focus on a single man. For instance, in a series of anecdotes, Peters and Austin (1985) attribute much of the early success of McDonald's to the quite unique personality of Ray Kroc (also see Bass & Stogdill, 1990; Peters & Waterman, 1982).

20. The elite ethnic group was composed of Ashkenazi Jews—Jews from European countries; lower down the ethnic hierarchy were the Mizrahim—Jews from North African and Asian

countries—perceived by the Ashkenazim as “backward” and in need of “modernizing” and “civilizing”; the Palestinians were obviously at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy.

21. She served as chair of the Department of Sociology at Ben Gurion University.

22. Even today, at the time of writing, a man who only 4 months ago was Chief of Staff has just been appointed Defense Minister, and another former army man whose political experience extends as far as the post of Mayor in an Israeli city now heads the Labor Party (replacing, of course, another former career soldier).

23. Peace Now played a significant role in altering Israeli public opinion in favor of a compromised settlement with Palestinians and organized mass demonstrations to protest such events as the Sabra and Chatila massacre in Lebanon. Padan was also one of the signatories of the famous “officers’ letter” when he was a doctoral student at Hebrew University in 1978. That letter made history when a large number of officers and soldiers wrote a protest letter to the government demanding that it take serious measures to start a peace process.

24. Padan ended his political activities in 1981 when he left Peace Now in protest against two of its members who had violated a rule not to meet with Palestinian leaders.

25. In 1990, McDonald’s sued two English Greenpeace activists over the contents of a leaflet they were distributing, titled “What’s Wrong With McDonald’s,” leading the way to the longest-ever trial in British legal history, which ran from June 1994 to June 1997. The fact that a postman and a gardener were taking on McDonald’s caught the public’s imagination and served as a springboard for further anti-McDonald’s activities (see www.mcspotlight.org).

26. One entrepreneur even opened a chain called McDog and was promptly requested to change the name by McDonald’s.

27. The fact that McDonald’s won that particular battle points to some of the profound cultural and political differences with France, where Jose Bove, famously claiming to represent the economically threatened farmers, was able to single-handedly create a social movement against McDonald’s.

28. Indeed, this is the basis of the success of the ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi party, Shas.

29. To date, 8 to 10 of the nearly 100 restaurants are kosher.

30. This would not have involved too much of an ideological sacrifice for Padan because the bus station is closed on Saturdays in any case.

31. The first branch McDonald’s opened in Jerusalem in 1995 was not kosher. More nonkosher restaurants have since been opened. Demanding that all of a branch’s restaurants in a certain city be kosher as a condition for granting a kashrut license to one them is a common practice.

32. The sense in which the modern and antimodern, or global and antiglobal, go hand in hand has been termed glocalization by Robertson (1992) and has been vividly portrayed by Benjamin Barber (1995) as “Jihad vs. McWorld.”

33. In the first decades of the state’s existence, the religious and secular lived according to a “status quo,” in which each sector was, by and large, culturally independent.

34. This, of course, is very similar to the feminist/moral right coalition in the United States.

35. Those who work on Saturdays are mostly shop assistants and the like, who are receiving the minimum wage for their efforts.

36. Of course, we would be entirely naïve if we were to think that there was no economic sense in Padan’s ideological decisions. There is no doubt that Padan would have researched the financial cost of opening non-kosher restaurants and discovered that although a very large majority of Israelis fast on Yom Kippur, they are not averse to a cheeseburger in between times.

37. *The Economist’s* Big Mac index has repeatedly confirmed this, showing the Israeli Big Mac to be up to 38% more expensive than in America (Haaretz, 2001). It should be noted that detractors of the Big Mac index say that it does not take into account the costs of importing kosher meat, which help explain the inflated costs.

38. Most fast-food outlets selling falafel and similar fare are family-owned, stand-alone businesses.

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