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Book Reviews

STEPHEN CASTLES AND ALASTAIR DAVIDSON, *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000. 272 pp. with index. ISBN 0-333-64310-0; £15.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-333-64309-7; £47.50 (hbk).

GERARD DELANTY, *Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics – Issues in Society*. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000. 179 pp. with index. ISBN 0-335-20489-9; £15.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-335-20490-2; £50.00 (hbk).

Unusually, for a subject of academic discourse, globalization is front page news, put there more by the protestors of Seattle and Prague than by the efforts of analysts. It excites a range of vastly differing responses whether, as in the somewhat agnostic view of social democratic regimes, an inevitable and irreversible economic trend with which we must all learn to live; in the view of street protestors, the cause of all ills, from the ubiquitous fast food outlets colonizing every high street and souk, to environmental degradation and global warming; or a motor of beneficent economic change bringing hope to 'basket case' economies. What most commentators agree on is the impact of economic globalization on the political power of nation states. Few now believe that nation states will retain significant ability to determine such issues as macroeconomic policy or the parameters of citizenship in isolation from regional or global trends and forces. Increasingly, states are constructing regional and global organizations to protect what – sometimes quite spuriously – are claimed to be important common interests. In doing so, the lines of division *within* societies – the elements of difference and diversity – are brushed to one side in political discourse. And, while capital remains largely as free as ever to move from site to site in search of profit margins subsidized by state support and cheap labour, these regional organizations seek increasingly to regulate the flow of migrant labour, particularly between 'rich' and 'poor' countries.

The national, sub-regional sites of the struggle between capital and labour bring their own tensions and contradictions. The line of crosses on the Mexican side of the barbed wire border with the USA, the 58 Chinese suffocated to death in the back of a lorry smuggling them into the UK, are testament to the increasingly desperate struggle played out at national boundaries, as nations defend the narrower interests of their local economies. At the same time, individual EU states, for example, compete in their preparedness to leave open a wicket gate in the walls of Fortress Europe to admit skilled workers – engineers, doctors, nurses, computer scientists – from almost anywhere (thus undermining their own development aid programmes), to meet key labour market shortfalls. And in the USA, in 1996, while Congress demanded cuts in benefits to those at the bottom of the economic pile, characterized as dole-cheat migrants, it allowed the largest number of immigrants for 80 years into the country, most of whom would find a place at precisely that bottom point of the labour market.

In this increasingly confused global context, marked by huge sub-regional, regional and global diasporas, and in a context where most states with a history of immigration have yet fully to define multiculturalism, what meaning can be attached to the term citizenship, a term traditionally associated with rights of residence and political membership of a defined national entity? This task is addressed by each of these books, both arguing that new accounts are required of citizenship which acknowledge the key elements of identity – indeed the possibility of multiple identity (for example Sylheti, Bangladeshi, Yorkshire, English, British and European) – within an increasingly mobile, competitive world.

Castles and Davidson build on an impressive pedigree of writing shaped by their experience of Australia – one of the world's most multicultural societies – but within the Asia Pacific region more generally (where Australia now locates itself firmly in economic terms) and by detailed explorations of western Europe. They challenge the traditional notion that nation states have been inclusive, arguing that discrimination – by race, gender, ethnicity, religion, class – has always differentiated its subjects, denying some citizenship, offering it to others only on a conditional basis. They review a range of theories from Periclean Athens through to the classic welfare state, following this with an analysis of the greatest period of economic migration (leaving aside the transatlantic slave trade) in recent history. Chapters review what it means to *become* and *be* a citizen – with wide differences remaining in the degree to which resident populations enjoy the same rights, and highlighting the continuing struggle of many, often racialized, minorities for political and social inclusion. The political struggle between majorities, often reluctantly acceding to demands for equal status, and minorities, mobilizing to defend and extend their status, are examined in succeeding chapters, with the Asia Pacific region used as an intriguing case study.

This provides a crucial lens through which to examine the issues of

globalization and citizenship since it contains half the world's population, (and thus, potentially, its production and its markets), in a site containing both ethnically almost homogeneous and enormously diverse nations, and the context for huge intra-regional and international migration. This leads the authors to challenge the traditional European notion of citizenship; states, benefiting from globalization, such as the fast-growing Asian countries, reject what they see as the hypocritical 'democratic' European model of citizenship (which excluded as much as it included).

Delanty also takes as his starting point the argument that citizenship can no longer be defined by traditional notions of nationality and nation state. Like Castles and Davidson, he reviews historical approaches to citizenship, covering in greater detail the stances of liberals, communitarians and radicals. The core of his book, Part Two, introduces his key argument, for 'cosmopolitan citizenship'. This 'goes beyond the borders of the nation state, respecting neither state nor nation' and having four key dimensions: legal, political, cultural and civic. Delanty argues that the 'constitutional state is no longer exclusively a national state' as a result of trends in immigration, identity and in law, an argument underpinned by detailed analysis in succeeding chapters on the meaning of human rights in a global world. He also explores the concept of globalization understood as a transformation of space, an inversion of the meaning of nationalism from being concerned with inclusion to one focused on exclusion; with a specific exploration of the contradictory implications of European integration in which he sees the germ of the notion of citizenship defined by residence rather than by birth.

Both these books deal, in a largely accessible and careful manner, with what each acknowledges is a complex, contested issue, where measured discourse often gives ground to paranoid polemic. Both agree that the discussion is 'work in progress' – but see the need radically to rethink the notion of citizenship, abandoning the hollow excluding models of citizenship adhered to by nation states in past and present in favour of a model which incorporates the key dimensions of (multiple) identity, difference and culture in a way not limited by the boundaries of nation states. Both offer hopeful political visions for challenging the increasingly chauvinistic rhetoric of the political right, Delanty's book is of a 'pluralist world of political communities', Castles and Davidson's book is of a citizenship of collective identities based on common values of tolerance, trust, mildness and love. Too bad neither is likely to be read by those who control the levers of global economic policy. It is their greed and self-interest that gives credence to the view that globalization will mean the death of democracy and a citizenship marked only by people's ability to be exploited.

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IAN GOUGH, *Global Capital, Human Needs and Social Policies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000. 256 pp. with index. ISBN 0-333-92687-0; £16.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-333-080239-X; £45.00 (hbk).

In this book, Ian Gough has sought to examine the relationship between economic development (primarily industrialization) and social policy formation, mainly bringing together a collection of previously published essays from the mid-1990s (some of which were co-authored). The fundamental assumption of the work is that there is a basic contradiction and/or conflict between what is good for unrestricted capital development and human welfare needs.

The work is divided into three primary sections: Capitalism and Welfare; Comparative Social Policies and Welfare Outcomes; and Social Policy, the Economy, and Alternative Futures. He attempts through these sections to bridge the gap within social policy between what he calls the normative and consequentialist arguments of what comprises a successful welfare state. The work is very broad in context and argument addressing many precepts, ideas, and assumptions. Because many of the chapters have previously appeared in some form or other, the book also responds to previous criticisms of their expounded ideas and points.

Some minor, debatable points can be noted. For example; in Chapter 4, he discusses the asymmetrical power of capital systems over labor and trade unions. At least among the developed states of the world (such as the United States, Germany, etc.) this argument would seem to ignore the power of those same unions through vote-marshaling, agenda-setting, massive campaign contributions (in the most recent US presidential election the AFL-CIO through forced member contributions was able to provide over US\$40m to favored candidates' campaigns), etc. Further, in Chapter 8, his comments on fiscal inputs into government argue that there is no convincing evidence that higher taxation rates are harmful to industrial entrepreneurial capability. This seems to ignore the reality of opportunity costs to both the payee and the recipient government.

There are more major points (some negative, some positive) to be made about this work than these minor ones, however. I will address the negative first. The author seems to base his fundamental assumptions of economic-societal relationships on a relatively pure Marxist-socialist set of perceptions-arguments. This is all fine and good, but there are major weaknesses with this approach that he does not address. The first of these weaknesses to be addressed here is the assumption that all societies are composed of warring, rational acting, uniform, monolithic social-economic strata whose sole *raison d'être* is exploitation of the other less powerful strata. For a wide variety of reasons discussed at great length and detail in other works, this is a highly arguable assumption. For example, even if society could be demarcated into these groupings (what precise criteria do you use

to define who belongs where), what we know and can clearly see by even just looking at organized interest group behavior, such as in the United States, completely belies the fact that these groupings behave in anything approaching a monolithic and/or continuous rational manner. The functioning of the US Congress is a case in point. So to argue that there is a world and nation-state level of conflict between clearly defined labor and capitalist classes in which the capitalist class's sole aim is to optimize profit by exploiting the labor class as much as possible, vis-à-vis an unrestricted capitalistic system, belies the true complexity of the relationships between groups within any society.

As ample evidence illustrates, societal interest groups across the entire political spectrum generally are anything but altruistic and monolithic in their actions. For example, organized labor within the United States tends to be strongly anti-free trade when this approach threatens their industry's product markets but is virulently free trade when it seeks more markets for these products. Additionally, their concern for other interest groups and/or members of society takes a backseat to their own self-interest.

This leads to a second major criticism of the Marxist approach and of this author's work in this regard. This is the lack of the approach's regard for non-economically motivated, non-rational behavior. An anecdote will illustrate my point here. After the very revolutionary 1996 US Welfare Reform Act was passed into law, it became the responsibility of most welfare recipients to actively pursue some type of action that would help them to become employed. If they were capable of doing so, and did not, they would lose their welfare payments. The responsibility of running this program was devolved from the Federal Government to the states. A young single mother in one of the major cities was so instructed and asked to report to a state agency to receive training (via a relatively short 2–3 day course) in how to find a job, interview, etc. She did not go to the training until after the third warning of what non-attendance would mean to her monthly welfare check (its elimination) and a subsequent reduction in the amount of the check. Upon attendance, she stayed at the training for a few hours and left. This is arguably non-rational behavior and seems to clearly illustrate how societal cultural factors can, and do, outweigh what may be externally perceived as rational socioeconomic actions. In any discussion of welfare needs (or capitalist behavior for that matter) within any society, to not address these types of culturally driven, emotionally motivated behaviors based on individual perceptions belies the reality behind most human behavior.

This leads to what seems to me to be a second major weakness of this work: this is its failure to examine and/or discuss the transitional costs and implications of the ideas expounded in it. This seems a major weakness because of their profundity. For example, the author argues that the human needs questions can only be addressed at the regional and global level. I

agree, but what does this imply? They are only addressable now, at the nation-state level, by governmental action, which has to be responsive to internal interest groups. This would seem to imply, as a minimum, the strengthening, in this area, of existing multilateral nation-state groupings. This raises a whole plethora of questions the author does not address, such as: what about the nation-state sovereignty question? Who decides participation at this level and to what degree? What about the highly divergent cultural factors? What about non-organized internal nation-state interest groups? How and in what manner are decisions made about what and how basic human needs are defined, and solutions operationalized and carried out within the global state system? And, perhaps the most controversial of all, by whom will these actions be taken and with what authority and in what manner?

Given these two major criticisms, there are also some very positive points to this work. Due to its broad, comprehensive approach and thoroughness in what it does examine, the work is highly recommendable. It definitely addresses most of the major issues involved, albeit in a slightly prejudiced manner. The bibliography also provides an excellent resource for further exploration of the material. The author's three main ideas seem also beyond refutation: (1) 'different forms of capitalism coexist in the modern [world] despite the deepening of capitalist relations across the globe . . .'; (2) 'welfare states can enhance the competitiveness of national [capitalistic growth] . . .'; and (3) 'forms of capitalism and welfare states [can] fuse in a relatively stable pattern of welfare regimes [that are beneficial to all societal segments] . . .'. The biggest caution I would raise in this realm of ideas, however, is the need to address individual human needs (particularly from their cultural-psychological perception); for this has so often been ignored by too many 'all-knowing' groups to the profound tragic cost of humanity as a group of individuals and as a whole. And capitalists are not the only group who have done this.

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UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), *Human Rights and Human Development, Human Development Report 2000*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 290 + xiv pp. (including annex). ISBN 0-19-521678-4; £18.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-19-521679-2; £27.50 (hbk).

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (DFID), *Realising Human Rights for Poor People*, London: DFID, 2000. 33 pp. (including annex). ISBN 1-86192-300-7; free of charge (pbk).

In addition to unsurpassed scientific and technological advances another most significant development of the twentieth century is the reaffirmation of

human values in the study of their kind and the recognition of the universality and in the centrality of human dimensions in the practice of diplomacy, quest for economic development and an understanding of the human centred vision for the future of the world. At the end of the First World War, the International Labour Organization (ILO) was created and for the first time human rights received an institutional backing embodied in Labour Laws. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) placed the onus of maintaining human rights on the global community and together with ILO conventions, created a proactive context for different stakeholders to relate human rights in the mainstream of politics, governance and social philosophy.

During the 1950s and 1960s the world remained relatively isolated in blocs and for the western nations the primary interest focused on blocking the spread of Communism in the periphery. While for the Communist Bloc the task at hand was to safeguard their ideology, consolidate their new states and ostensibly look for sympathizers outside the recognized bloc. This fierce competition for domination characterized the global and regional political and diplomatic agenda in the new bipolar world. However, organizations and movements concerned with human rights continued their efforts and several ILO conventions were put forth before the nation states, new institutions were created to protect human rights, and feminist movements assumed a global reach. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the exposure of human rights violation under apartheid in South Africa and treatment of Palestinians under Israeli occupation; the fall of dictators in Latin America, and the Philippines; and a broad-based understanding about the linkage between democracy and economic development in an increasingly polarized and unequal world.

Growing inequality among nations and persistent and worsening poverty in many regions of world led to serious soul searching and questioning about the hitherto undertaken strategies of development among all international development institutions, including the United Nations System. Conventional knowledge and orthodoxy in pursuing development strategies were becoming too pedantic at best yielding less than satisfactory impacts despite allocation of ever increasing resources. UNDP entrusted an eminent panel led by the late Mahbub-UI-Haq with the task of looking for the cause of this anomaly in the people themselves, and thus came the concept of Human Development. Since 1990, UNDP has been publishing an Annual Human Development Report (card) for countries of the world choosing a new theme every year and refining the methodology for better comparison and new indices to reflect human development. The theme of the year 2000 report was Human Rights and Human Development. After covering pertinent issues like Gender (in 1995), Poverty (in 1997) and Globalization (in 1999), it was highly appropriate to look at the often neglected (and ambiguous) issue of human rights as the focus and theme of the year 2000 Report.

Nobel Laureate Professor Amartya Sen, whose earlier publications on *Famine and Entitlement*, *Inequality and Development as Freedom* created such an overwhelming influence upon the global development thoughts of the 1990s, very appropriately wrote the first chapter of the report establishing the linkage between human rights, freedom and development. Professor Sen examines the interrelationship between human rights and human development and establishes the inevitable link by pointing out that without freedom and choice, human capabilities cannot be harnessed and thus human development cannot be expected. The Report sums up the dimensions of human rights in a unique and hitherto uncharted course by listing seven basic freedoms in an apparently disparate but interrelated cluster of the freedoms that human beings require, from freedom against discrimination to freedom for decent work. The unique contribution of this Report is the persuasive arguments it makes demonstrating how lack of freedom stifles prospects of growth and most importantly cripples human capabilities. However, the Report does not make a blanket statement of linking democracy with freedom – as we now know better from looking around us in many countries where despite democratic practice people remain without freedom and choices and lead an insecure life. It calls for an Inclusive Democracy that allows the minorities, the weak and the dissenters a level playing field; for without accommodating the so-called others democracy and dictatorship, the Report does not look very different. In addition to the standard tables and methodological chapter that all HDRs include, the 2000 Report sets out the basis of ‘Rights Based’ approach to development and fight against poverty and human deprivation.

The second Report under review here, the DFID booklet on Human Rights for the Poor, extends the ‘Rights Based’ arguments further by looking exclusively at the poor and then making some meaning out of poverty reduction strategies in the south. It takes a similar cue as the UNDP Report and more specifically the UNDP Poverty Report (2000) that argues for empowering the poor and supporting the organizations of the poor to fight against poverty. It argues that International Development Targets cannot be seen in isolation of human rights, because it is the poor who are voiceless and most often victims of abuse as the duties and responsibilities of both the poor and the duty bearers are neither clearly defined nor maintained properly. The short report makes a cogent and succinct analysis of three essential parameters, i.e. participation, inclusion and fulfilling obligations, as the cornerstone of defining and maintaining human rights in the context of development and the fight against global poverty. Based on DFID’s long international experience in the field of development the booklet lists a number of very pertinent lessons and explains the difficult road ahead to achieve proper participation of citizenry, by nurturing inclusive democracy and fulfilling obligations of the state as well as the citizens. Maintaining human rights to meet the objectives of International Development Targets

are by no means easy and would require foremost among all, a proper international coordination. It is heartening to see that both these books were published in the same year, a fact that certainly bodes well for the coordination of two major international agencies.

In sum both the books open up new dimensions for understanding poverty and human deprivation in areas that until now had been thought to be the preserve of politicians and a few Human Rights organizations on the margins. A must read for students of development and human relations as well as policy planners and practitioners around the world.

REFERENCE

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ROBERT SYKES, BRUNO PALIER AND PAULINE PRIOR (EDS), *Globalization and European Welfare States: Challenges and Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. 256 pp. ISBN 0-333-79239-4; £15.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-333-790118-7; £47.50 (hbk).

This collective book adds to the challenge of comparative approaches, which are daunting enough on their own, a dynamic dimension, since it assesses the different responses of European welfare states to the historical process of globalization. It is based on a study day of the (British) Social Policy Association, and includes a substantial introduction and conclusion by the editors. Three chapters, by John Clarke, Colin Hay and Bob Deacon, provide a synthetic view and assess the relevant concepts, as well as the different approaches of international institutions. The next five chapters are devoted to an assessment of the changes undergone by the Bismarckian states (Mary Daly), the Southern states (Ana M. Guillen and Santiago Alvarez), Central and Eastern Europe (Zsuzsa Ferge), the Nordic countries (Pekka Kosonen), and Britain and Ireland (Norman Ginsburg).

The cautious questioning of concepts attempts to dispel the confusion between 'globalization', the spreading of the post-fordist, post-industrial mode of production, and neoliberal policies. A highly structured introduction assesses the different views on the impact of globalization on welfare, from the most apocalyptic to the more cautious. The 'informed scepticism' advocated by the editors (p. 195) is shared by most of the contributors. The relationship between globalization and labour market flexibility (Ginsburg, p. 188), as well as neoliberal policies (p. 187), is not taken for granted. Rhetorical confusion probably owes little to chance, since

'globalization' together with 'European integration', shares a particularly useful function, that of 'blame avoidance' (Guillen and Alvarez, p. 125): unpopular policies, chosen by governments on the basis of their perception of national needs, and of their ideological options, are blamed upon external factors. Perhaps the work of the American economist Paul Krugman, one of the most critical analysts of the rhetorical use of 'globalization' could have been mentioned at this point (Krugman, 1977).

One of the most crucial ideas put forward by the editors is that 'policy matters' (pp. 5–197). Change is not the outcome of natural phenomena, but, largely, that of political decisions. Welfare is mostly publicly financed, and its relationship with the economy is only indirect, in terms of consequences as well as funding. Indeed, it shares this characteristic with other state functions, such as defence or education. The link between the economy and welfare is provided by politics and 'discourse', which leaves a significant margin for interpretation, except in those cases where policy options seem to be widely accepted, as in Nordic countries (Kosonen, p. 166). The convergence criteria jointly adopted by EU countries, which had obvious consequences in terms of funding, owe a lot to the shared conceptions of experts and economic elites, and to the attractiveness of their symbolical content.

Globalization has not only different consequences, but also different meanings even within Europe (understood as a geographical entity). For southern Europe, it is seen as undistinguishable from European integration, which is probably exactly the opposite of its meaning for Britain. For eastern and central European countries, it means integration within the western, capitalist world. French readers, for whom European integration is construed as a response to globalization, or possibly a bulwark against it, will be appalled by the irrelevance of the mythical 'social market economy' (Ferge, p. 131) in eastern Europe, and by the dwarfish nature of European Union institutions in international arenas (Deacon, p. 69). The degree of acceptance of globalization at a popular level seems to vary from the most enthusiastic (in the east) to the pragmatic (in Nordic countries) or the cautious (in Bismarckian countries).

The picture that emerges from the different regional analyses is one of considerable fragmentation. The ebbing of the neoliberal tidal wave has left a certain amount of jetsam, and wrecks, but it is hard to tell whether the convergence of policies owes more to the neoliberal legacy, or to the pragmatic, unprincipled smuggling, or import, of policies, recipes and so-called 'good practices' unreflectively borrowed from the neighbours in times of crisis, or peddled within the 'social policy community'. Active labour market policies are now widely introduced because they are deemed efficient and fair, and because we now know about them. They are not forced upon us by the needs of the market. Rich countries have plenty of ways of wasting money, and can afford to do it.

It is hard to identify the 'invisible hand of globalization' in developments

which are sometimes presented as resulting from it, unless one includes within the term of 'globalization' neoliberal politics as well as objective technological and economic developments or changes in human resources management methods which take place simultaneously – in 'real time' – in different places. Narrowly defined, as the increasingly rapid circulation of people, capital and goods across borders and the hardening of international competition, globalization can hardly be related to the criticism of 'Bismarckian' family policy, which seems to be of a purely ideological nature. It is therefore hard to follow Mary Daly when she writes: 'compensating people for their family needs will not only overburden the State but will render people less mobile and adaptable' (p. 86). The transfer of entitlements from one employer to the other does not seem to be an overwhelming difficulty. Retrenchment in family policy is merely a political option. Linking it to globalization amounts to overloading the concept. Likewise, the legal value of social entitlements in Bismarckian countries, which are rightly described, for an English speaking readership, as 'akin to property rights', i.e. sacred, can hardly be seen as contradictory with 'globalization'. On the contrary, the enshrining of social rights within the legal or even constitutional framework reinforces their legitimacy within popular culture, and only breeds the kind of trust and confidence in the future without which risk-taking and 'flexibility' are impossible.

The argument that social cohesion is good for the economy, and for competitiveness, follows the line of thought of the European Union, exemplified by the 1994 White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment. This is not based on naive optimism. On the contrary, as Bob Deacon reminds us (p. 98), neoliberalism still influences a number of international institutions, and the threat of the projected Multilateral Agreement on Investment, preventing national governments from regulating and subsidizing national public services, on the grounds that foreign private providers should not be discriminated against and unfairly kept out of business, was and still is a very serious threat.

However, the book seems to echo the optimistic, idealistic 'Wilsonian' plans (Woodrow, not Harold) of the post-First World War world, a time when the idea of a 'world government' did not seem wildly unrealistic, compared to the horrors of the Verdun trenches. Indeed, even though the thread was cut by the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, the link was repaired at the San Francisco conference: the creation of the UN, and, more modestly, of the Benelux, the Council of Europe, the ECSC, the Common Market and the EU are all part of this historical drive. The systematic and sometimes controversial challenges to the international institutions which global protest now illustrates, from Seattle to Puerto Alegre and Nice, are also part of the secular movement for what the editors call a 'socially responsible globalization' (p. 205). There can be such a thing as a global drive for a welfare system that suits the needs of the modern economy and meets the

tenets of democracy, broadly defined as equality and individual autonomy. The advocacy of labour market flexibility, which seems to be part of the new economic regime, is not only compatible with welfare, it requires welfare, which brings security and creates the conditions in which flexibility can be accepted, and possibly welcomed. Social cohesion is not just nice: it also guarantees safety and peace of mind, enables people to move freely anywhere without fear any time of day or night. It is also the condition for necessary reforms to be worked out and accepted. Active employment policies, coupled with an efficient education system, are not just a way of guaranteeing taxpayers that their money will not be wasted on scroungers. They increase satisfaction, as well as the supply of qualified labour. Finally, even though the global burden of welfare expenditure is one of the key elements of public finance, the shape of welfare seems to be as important as the amount of the resources devoted to it (p. 169). Qualitative reforms offer greater scope than costly ones. The existence of shared expertise, and hopes, which are only a very small consequence of the 'globalization process', must certainly not lead one to overestimate the process. The spreading of ideas never follows rational lines or intellectual logics: as usual, 'politics matter'. At the end of the day, the shape of welfare is a matter for voters.

This extremely challenging and enjoyable book provides its readers with well thought out concepts, as well as specific and synthetic data on each region of Europe. It will no doubt be of good use for a lot of us.

REFERENCE

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Jean-Paul Revauger

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JAN AART SCHOLTE, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. New York: St Martin's Press, 2000. 384 pp. ISBN 0-312-23632-8; US\$19.95 (pbk). ISBN 0-312-23631-X; US\$65.00 (hbk). Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000. ISBN 0-333-660-22-6; £15.99 (pbk). ISBN 0-333-660-21-8; £47.50 (hbk).

It is improbable that there are many books around which treat the theme of globalization as exhaustively as does Jan Aart Scholte in his *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. There seems to be no theory unturned, no definition unexplored, challenged and contested and perhaps no aspect of globalization unquestioned in this book, which is easy to read, comprehensive and user-friendly. For a book which has set itself high ambitions of wanting to do a number of things, such as developing a different and distinct concept of

globalization, which is multidimensional, looking at cause and consequence outside of the practice of examining developments in their immediacy, and to examine continuity and change in diverse contexts, this text does cover a lot of ground rather well.

The book moves slowly onwards from looking at different explanations or definitions in use around the term 'globalization', showing how easily this term is clouded in inconsistency, vagueness and confusion. It is said to mean different things to different people who while communicating with each other, may, in fact, be talking about somewhat (or even radically) different concepts. After all, and depending on their particular disciplines, the use of the term 'globalization' from a wide selection, is conceptualized as: internationalization, liberalization, westernization, even McDonaldization, all of which mean somewhat different things. For Scholte, who considers most definitions of globalization as 'redundant', the distinctive nature of the current phase of globalization is 'supraterritorialisation', in which the world is seen as one where transworld or transborder relations dominate, yet, as Scholte emphasizes, local, national and state-related entities still survive and thrive. Globalization in this context is seen as a question of geography rather than one of universality.

While there are those who have felt that we have always been global, at least for a few centuries, and specifically since the early twentieth century, Scholte prefers to locate his particular concept of supraterritorial globalization, I think correctly, from the 1960s onwards, when transworld relations have greatly expanded, although recognizing that incipient globalization existed at least from 1850. In terms of markets, communications (perhaps the most visible and immediate manifestation of globalization), products and production, money and finance, and even in terms of consciousness and ideology, the last 40 years do represent a qualitative and quantitative surge in the nature and scale of which has been unknown in the past. The first part of this book deals with these issues of definition/concept, the scope and extent of globalization, and its chronology, or different phases of its existence.

The second part examines Change and Continuity, looking at globalization as cause and effect, particularly in light of the social order and how it has transformed the global and local social order. Scholte argues that an important aspect of globalization is to strengthen, invigorate, entrench and expand capitalist relations locally and globally. Indeed, with the growth in markets and the supraterritoriality of production, this is highly visible, as it is in the form of products produced, noticeably those related to information technology. This is probably the least controversial argument in this book, that globalization has been responsible for a 'hypercapitalism'. The more interesting and controversial aspects of globalization relate to issues of the nation state, of culture, and of ideology: are we all rational, democratic and modern now?

Scholte argues that states retain their nationality even under the current phase of globalization, while at the same time sub-regional and sub-national identities are also formed, crystallized and articulated. The first part of this statement may be true, perhaps, more so for developed countries, but one finds it difficult to accept a national sovereignty argument in the case of smaller, less powerful, states. Globalization is a huge and powerful force and one really wonders whether many smaller countries still retain their independence in this phase.

These issues lead on to the third part of the book, trying to answer a rather difficult question: is globalization a good thing or bad thing? Of course, such a question must be followed by another, before this first could be answered: good or bad for *whom*? Not surprisingly, the answer to the first question is mixed. In some cases, as Scholte argues, globalization has increased poverty, unemployment and environmental degradation while perhaps increasing human security, and moved the world towards rationality, and has created awareness about issues and societies moving them towards greater possibilities to fulfil their potentials which were previously denied to them. Yet, despite the power and force of globalization, the results may actually be far from satisfactory. Interestingly, whenever the agenda or task of supraterritorial globalization has been unfinished, Scholte puts the blame on the policies that have been (or not been) adopted, rather than the notion/concept of globalization.

Scholte's book ends with a 30-page bibliography which highlights the diverse and comprehensive nature of the review(s) of the concept of globalization made in this book. Despite having covered so much space in its review and having challenged so many ideas about globalization, one gets the feeling that perhaps far more ought to have been written about the unequal power relations/equation in whatever form of globalization one accepts. Although many of the consequences of an unequal globalization appear in the discussion, with regard to ecology, human security, and social equity, for example, perhaps after having covered so much ground, one would have wished for a far more direct negotiation of the question of power in what goes under any of the notions of globalization. Perhaps because of this gap, it is not difficult to realize that this book is written by a western author and one gets the feeling that this book on globalization explains a western globalization. But then, is that not the same thing?

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