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Intelligence-Led Policing
As a Framework for Responding
to Terrorism

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Leading police associations in the United States and the United Kingdom have advocated that law enforcement adopt an intelligence-led policing model (ILP). Much like the situation with community policing, there does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of ILP nor of the practical implications for police agencies’ mission, structure, and processes. This article presents a model of ILP that builds on community policing, problem solving, and continuous improvement business models that have been adopted by police departments. Examples of these practices are reviewed as a method of illustrating the promise of an ILP approach. A broad conceptualization of ILP is presented under the belief that ILP will be most likely integrated into law enforcement and will have the greatest impact if it is adopted from an “all crimes” perspective. The article concludes with illustrations of the utility of ILP for addressing threats of domestic and international terrorism.

Keywords: intelligence-led policing; community policing; problem solving; terrorism

The terrorist attacks of September 11th affected society in dramatic ways. Although scholars caution that the impact of such “focusing events” may be overstated and their overall impact is best assessed only after significant time has elapsed (Birkland, 2004; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), it appears that these attacks dramatically influenced society. For example, the 9/11 attacks led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security as well as numerous attempts to reform the FBI. There have also been increased demands on law enforcement to build global partnerships (that lead to the sharing of intelligence and data about terrorism and other crime issues) and work more closely with other agencies at home (i.e., public health agencies, private agencies, fire services, etc). Many states have developed or are in the process of developing

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fusion centers to increase the exchange of information and data across government sectors to “improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism” (see, e.g., the 9/11 commission report, Fusion Center Guidelines, 2005, p. 3).

Pressure to change is not new to law enforcement; indeed, it could be argued that no other public bureaucracy has changed as dramatically as law enforcement has since the early 1960s. Law enforcement organizations are constantly responding to external demands, implementing and evaluating new initiatives, and adopting strategies to ensure public safety. Recent years have witnessed calls for law enforcement to move toward an intelligence-led model of policing (ILP). Of particular importance are the positions of highly influential commissions in the United Kingdom and in the United States. In the United Kingdom, the National Criminal Intelligence Service developed the national intelligence model (NIM), which advocates for intelligence-led policing. The NIM has been endorsed by the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Home Office, and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (Hale, Heaton, & Uglow, 2004; Tilley, 2003). Similarly, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), a product of the Global Intelligence Working Group, calls for all U.S. law enforcement agencies to develop an ILP model and has been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and every key professional law enforcement association in the United States (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a, 2005b; Carter, 2004). Clearly there is momentum to move toward an ILP framework. Yet like community policing two decades ago, there is a lack of clarity about what is meant by ILP; its mission, goals, and objectives; how such a model should be implemented; and importantly, how this model could be used strategically to combat terrorism.

This article seeks to add to our understanding of ILP and its application to terrorism. We briefly consider the origins of ILP and provide a few examples of police practices that highlight the promise of the ILP model. We argue that the best practices identified in responding to gang violence, drug trafficking, and organized crime could be successfully used in the struggle against domestic and international terrorism. Traditionally, ILP has been viewed as a specialized police function targeted primarily at terrorism and homeland security. We argue, in contrast, for a broad conceptualization of ILP that embraces community policing, problem-solving policing, a continuous improvement managerial philosophy, and an “all crimes” focus. Paradoxically, we argue, the greatest potential for responding to terrorism using this model lies in this very broad conceptualization.

Origins of Intelligence-Led Policing

Although the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973, 1976) recommended that all law enforcement in the United States develop an intelligence capacity, and that agencies with more than 75 personnel
should have a full-time intelligence capacity, the concept of intelligence-led policing is a more recent development. The term ILP can be traced to the United Kingdom and the Kent and Northumbria Constabularies in particular (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a; Hale et al., 2004). The Kent Constabulary, for example, formalized a model of problem solving to focus on burglary and motor vehicle theft. Moving beyond reactive responses to specific incidents, officers engaged in systematic analysis of these offenses and found patterns of small numbers of chronic offenders responsible for large numbers of incidents as well as patterns of repeat victims and target locations. Utilizing this intelligence, a variety of strategic interventions were implemented, and the area experienced a significant decline in crime. Similarly, Northumbria reported consistent annual drops in crime following its implementation of an ILP model focused on identifying chronic high-rate offenders (Anderson, 1997; Hale et al., 2004; but see Ratcliffe, 2002, pp. 61-62).1

As evident in the U.K. experience, the adoption of ILP did not arise solely from the concern with terrorism but rather builds on major developments in law enforcement that emerged in the past two decades of the 20th century. These include community policing, problem-solving policing, and continuous improvement business models. In the next section we briefly discuss the evolution of law enforcement and examine how these models serve as an important foundation of ILP. We then look at examples of several “promising practices” of these models that appear to hold promise for the application of ILP to terrorism.

**Community Policing**

The community policing movement that has influenced law enforcement practice globally—though with varying levels of meaning, commitment, and implementation—sought to reform the professional model of policing, which had relied heavily on technology and motorized patrol, by reestablishing connections between the police and community members. Carter (2004) articulated the platform provided by community-oriented policing (COP) for ILP along a series of key dimensions. First, both COP and ILP are dependent on two-way communications with the public. Indeed, a key community policing strategy in the era of homeland security is to provide the public with information about activities and signs to be aware of and to explain what to do with information related to potential threats. Second, both COP and ILP are dependent on analysis of information and the transformation of information to actionable intelligence. This is true whether the analysis involves a patrol officer analyzing a series of break-ins or intelligence analysts in a fusion center conducting link analysis to assess terrorist funding. Third, absent ethical decision making and a commitment to individual rights, both COP and ILP are likely to repeat mistakes that have resulted in significant setbacks for law enforcement.
Problem Solving

As Nick Tilley (2003) and Marilyn Peterson (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a) noted, ILP also builds on developments associated with problem-oriented policing (POP). Based on the pioneering work of Herman Goldstein (1990), the POP model seeks to use analysis of recurring problems the police must manage to proactively craft interventions to address the problem. POP also draws on concepts generated by routine activities theory (Felson, 1986, 1987), opportunity theory, and situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1997). Crime problems are analyzed according to the crime triangle with the idea that interventions be designed to minimize the likely confluence of motivated offenders, suitable victims, or targets in the absence of effective guardianship. Implementation of POP has often followed the problem-solving model that consists of scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA), very similar to the intelligence process advocated by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a, 2005b; Carter, 2004).

Greater infusion of the ILP philosophy within policing could be an important step in strengthening the analytic component of POP. One development that has emerged through the problem-solving movement has been a number of police-research partnerships to promote both the analysis and assessment components of POP. An additional foundation for ILP is the attempt to apply cutting-edge business practices to public-sector policing. Within the United States, the most well-known application of this business model is the New York Police Department’s Compstat program developed during the Giuliani and Bratton administration (Silverman, 1999).

During the early 1990s, the New York Police Department gained the attention of police leaders and scholars through the implementation of a crime analysis and managerial accountability crime prevention program known as Compstat (“compare statistics”; Silverman, 1999). Regular meetings of the police command staff, area commanders, special units, and prosecutors were convened to review current crime trends, to deploy officers and develop responses to effectively manage crime problems, and to hold commanders accountable for the level and trend in crime in their precincts. Other key elements of the success of Compstat include the reliance of information from line-level personnel, flexibility to adapt to the nature of the crime problem, and constant feedback that assessed the successes and failures of any strategic responses. The dramatic and unexpected decline in crime in New York City that occurred during this period generated significant interest and the widespread national adoption of Compstat (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003).

Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)

Two major initiatives to respond to gun crime illustrate the potential of problem-solving and intelligence-led policing for terrorism. The PSN model calls for multi-agency task forces to employ a strategic problem-solving model whereby local gun
crime patterns are analyzed, strategies are crafted to respond to these patterns, and ongoing assessment and refinement occurs. PSN built on the crime-analysis and resource-deployment approach embodied in Compstat as well as the problem-solving model that was part of Boston’s Ceasefire program and later part of the DOJ’s Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (McGarrell, 2005; U.S. DOJ, 2004).

**Boston Ceasefire**

Boston’s Ceasefire program, also referred to as the Boston Gun Project, was a strategic problem-solving initiative intended to reduce the high level of youth gun violence in the city. Ceasefire was initiated by a multiagency working group involving the U.S. Attorney’s Office, local prosecutors, the Boston Police Department, probation officers, youth service workers, and a team of researchers from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. The problem analysis revealed that youth violence was driven by a relatively small number of chronic offenders involved in networks of known offenders. The strategy that emerged was a deterrence-based model whereby the threat of federal prosecution was directly communicated to these groups of known offenders. Following crackdowns on several of the most violent groups and ongoing communication through meetings with probationers and parolees connected to these offending networks, youth violence declined dramatically (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 2001).

The Boston project was characterized by several distinctive features. First, a small working group was convened from multiple agencies and linked to a research team that conducted systematic analysis of the firearms crime problem. Second, the deterrence threat was coupled with attempts to link potential offenders to legitimate services offered by youth service workers, traditional service providers (e.g., jobs, education, drug treatment), and nontraditional providers, including the faith community. Third, several distinctive strategies emerged to communicate the deterrence message to potential offenders. These included offender notification meetings and police-probation teams conducting visits to high-risk offenders (Operation Nightlife). Fourth, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Boston Police Department developed supply-side strategies to disrupt illegal gun markets (Braga, Cook, Kennedy, & Moore, 2002; Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996). Finally, like in Project Exile, the U.S. Attorney’s Office played a key leadership role by convening local, state, and federal resources and by bringing the threat of federal prosecution to the issue of illegal gun possession and use.

**Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI)**

Building on the Boston project, the DOJ developed SACSI in the late 1990s (Coleman, Holton, Olson, Robinson, & Stewart, 1999; Dalton, 2003; Roehl et al.,
SACSI demonstrated the utility of using strategic problem solving to tailor a federal initiative to local contexts that varied considerably across the 10 SACSI sites. It also provided the opportunity for further testing of problem-solving approaches and strategies initially developed in Boston’s Ceasefire. Thus, for example, a number of SACSI jurisdictions found value in using systematic crime incident reviews of homicide incidents and gun assaults to dig deeper into crime data to uncover patterns of offenders, victims, locations, and network connections that could then suggest intervention strategies. Many of the SACSI sites implemented offender notification meetings to communicate the deterrence message and offer the opportunity for linkage to legitimate services. The offender notification meetings were coupled with Richmond-style billboards, bus posters, and public service advertisements warning against illegal gun possession and use.

**Using Intelligence-Led Policing to Respond to Terrorism**

Although the ILP examples addressed above focused only on traditional street crime and gun crime in particular, we believe there is great potential in using the ILP model to respond to terrorism. The arrests following the London subway and the Madrid train bombings, for instance, suggest that intelligence gathered from multiple sources, including surveillance cameras, community informants, and prison officials, was instrumental in postevent investigations. Recent arrests of suspected terrorists in the United States (Florida), Canada, and Britain suggest that intelligence may be able to identify terrorist groups and allow for intervention prior to an attack. This is consistent with reports from countries, such as Israel, with long experience in combating terrorism.

Unfortunately, there is little empirical research that assesses the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies generally and specific strategies involving law enforcement organizations. Statistical analysis is rarely used in terrorism research (Merari, 1991), and Silke’s (2001) review indicates that only 3% of articles in terrorism journals used inferential analysis, compared to 86% in forensic psychology and 60% in criminology. Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley’s (2006) recent Campbell systematic review of terrorism articles published between 1971 and 2003 similarly found that only 3% were empirical (p. 8) and only “seven . . . contained moderately rigorous evaluations of counterterrorism programs” (p. 4). Lum et al. note that little has been written about the effectiveness of law enforcement strategies in responding to terrorist events. Next, we provide examples of how the best practices identified above may be useful in responding to domestic and international terrorism.

**Terrorism and Far Right Extremists**

Many law enforcement officials, academics, and watch groups claim that the domestic far right poses a significant threat to national security. The movement has
been linked to many crimes that range from acts of domestic terrorism and violent hate crimes to gun charges. Some of these crimes (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) meet most definitions of terrorism. But other crimes (e.g., nonviolent tax refusal cases) do not. It is important to note that it has been empirically demonstrated that within the United States, domestic terrorism attacks generally outnumber international ones 7 to 1, and among domestic groups, far-right-wing groups are especially dangerous (LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, & Scott, 2006). There is also evidence that the number of attacks committed by the far right has increased with time, and some scholars conclude that far-right extremists, especially groups motivated by religious ideology, are strong candidates to commit future acts using weapons of mass destruction (Gurr & Cole, 2002; Tucker, 2000). It is not surprising that local and state law enforcement agencies have concluded that the domestic far right poses a major threat to public safety (Carlson 1995; FBI, 1999; Riley, Treverton, Wilson, & Davis, 2005).

Despite clear evidence of a threat, there is little empirical study of the far right, and most of the research that has been conducted does not rely on data. Instead, this body of research makes sweeping generalizations and conclusions with no empirical support, and the most frequently cited works have been produced by journalists. The empirical research that has been published, however, shows the value of systematically understanding the activities of these groups and the potential, then, of law enforcement agencies’ use of the analytic elements of the ILP to respond to terrorism.

One of the most important domestic terrorism data collection efforts is the work by Brent Smith and his colleagues for the American Terrorism Study (ATS; Smith, 1994; Smith & Damphousse, 1996, 1998; Smith, Damphousse, Jackson, & Sellers 2002; Smith & Morgan, 1994; Smith & Orvis, 1993). The data collection effort, conducted in cooperation with the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, includes persons indicted federally as a result of an investigation under the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program. These researchers were provided lists (1980 to 1989; 1990 to 1996; 1997 to 2002) of persons indicted, and then they traveled to federal courthouses to collect data from trial transcripts and docket information. The data have been used by the principal investigators to answer important questions, including regarding the prosecution and punishment of international and domestic terrorists (Smith et al., 2002), the effects of political motive on sentencing outcomes (Smith & Damphousse, 1996), the testing of competing theoretical models of sentencing outcomes (Smith & Damphousse, 1998), empirical validation of the growth of leaderless resistance tactics (Damphousse & Smith, 2004), the profiling of American terrorists (Smith & Morgan, 1994), and prosecutorial strategies in terrorism cases (Smith & Orvis 1993).

These researchers have also made their database available for additional analysis to the scholarly community, and their efforts are starting to bear fruit. For example, Mark Hamm (2005) recently completed a project that examined international and domestic terrorist involvement in a wide variety of crimes. An important element of
this study was using the ATS database to compare international jihad groups and domestic right-wing groups. Although he found some differences comparing the groups (international jihad groups were more likely to commit aircraft and motor vehicle crimes, use explosive materials, and commit firearms violations, and right-wing groups were more likely to commit robbery, mail fraud, and some types of firearm violations, such as with machine guns), he concluded with the following:

Best practices of investigators should be directed to crimes that facilitate the operation of complex organizations. A clear pattern of precursor activity across diverse terrorist organizations is discovered. The study shows that all terrorist organizations require money, material, transportation, identity documents, communication systems, and safe havens to accomplish their aims. Crimes to finance these operations should be the top priority for investigators. (p. vi)

Recently, Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts (2006) published a study examining preincident indicators of terrorist incidents. This analysis was based on 45 cases from the ATS and 20 additional cases selected by subject matter experts. The study provides support for the conclusion that law enforcement agencies can prevent a terrorist attack if able to access the right types of data and intelligence in timely manner. There are many valuable insights provided in the final report, but two are particularly relevant to the ILP model. First, planning a terrorist incident does not occur spontaneously—there is a period of time between when the planning process begins to when the incident is completed. On average, approximately 2 to 3 months elapse between planning and commission. Second, terrorism is a very local event. They find that nearly one half of all terrorists lived within 30 miles of the target and that their preparatory behaviors all occurred within this geographic range. It is likely that the individuals and/or groups that are most likely to commit an incident are “known, chronic offenders,” and thus it is logical to conclude that local law enforcement has vital information about the groups that are most likely to commit terrorist acts in its jurisdiction. The challenge for law enforcement is in the systematic analysis and application of problem-solving principles to identify such threats before an incident occurs.

It is important to note that the ATS database focuses only on individuals indicted federally for domestic security and terrorism crimes and excludes other incidents, even if they are ideologically motivated. Thus, nonviolent incidents, such as those involving far rightists who refuse to pay taxes because of their ideological belief system or crimes falling under state jurisdiction, are excluded from the ATS. The extant research, however, indicates that there would be great value in examining this broader range of cases. Freilich, Chermak, and Gamarra (2006) reviewed more than 250 studies on far-right-wing extremism and political crimes in the fields of criminology, political science, sociology, and terrorism and concluded that far-right extremists have been investigated by both federal and state authorities and that they are involved in a variety of criminal acts, including (a) tax refusal; (b) gun charges; (c) land use violations;
(d) violations of motor vehicle regulations requiring license plates and driving licenses and other similar regulations; (e) false liens and financial schemes, (f) abortion-related crimes; (g) hate crimes against non-Whites, gays, foreigners, and Jewish, Islamic, and other non-Christian faiths; (h) antipornography attacks; (i) antigovernment strikes; (j) antiglobal attacks; (k) attacks against leftists and other ideological enemies; (l) attacks against opponents within the movement (i.e., crimes committed because of intramovement strife); (m) possession and planned use of chemical and biological weapons; (n) preparatory crimes, such as bank robberies, counterfeiting, credit card theft, weapons procurement and the manufacture of illegal firearms, drug dealing, cybercrime, and identity theft; (o) other crimes that further the movement’s survival or ideology; and (p) nonideological “routine” crimes.

Some intriguing anecdotal evidence suggests that ideologically motivated tax refusal, for example, may act as a “trigger” or “gateway” to subsequent, more serious criminal behavior. This thesis is consistent with part of the hate-crimes literature that argues that bias-crime perpetrators escalate from less to more violent hate crimes (Shively 2005). Gordon Kahl (who murdered three law enforcement officials before being killed himself in 1983), Robert Matthews (the leader of the notorious terrorist group the Order, responsible for 5 murders, in the 1980s), Richard Snell (who murdered an African American law enforcement officer and a pawn broker in the 1990s), and Frank Nelson (the leader of the Minnesota Patriots Council and one of first to be convicted under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act in 1995) were all involved in antitax actions before their later, more serious crimes (Corcoran, 1990; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989/1995; Hamm, 2005; Tucker & Pate, 2000).

Thus, a problem-solving evaluation of the full range of crimes committed by the far right would help inform law enforcement practice by systematically documenting the types of crime committed by far rightists, how frequently these crimes occur, whether these ideologically motivated offenders specialize (i.e., land use violators usually do not commit other crimes) or are generalists, whether a small number of perpetrators are chronic ideological offenders responsible for large numbers of incidents, what groups commit which crimes, and regional variations in incidents. This might include variations in what different groups have committed each type of offense as well as similarities and differences between groups. Such comparisons would give law enforcement additional knowledge to better assess threats and prioritize ideologies and groups. It would also provide additional information about the spatial and temporal patterns of these perpetrators and events to supplement the preincident indicator study (Smith et al., 2006).

**ILP and International Terrorism**

In the following section, we consider the lessons provided by a specific investigation by the Turkish National Police (TNP) of a series of bombings in Istanbul.
Components of the case have reaffirmed TNP’s commitment to intelligence gathering and analysis as a key step in prevention and suggest that terrorist operations are vulnerable to an ILP approach.

In November 2003, a series of coordinated suicide bombings were carried out by al-Qaeda in Istanbul. The targets represented Israel and the West, including two synagogues, an HSBC bank, and the British consulate. The attacks resulted in 68 deaths and more than 700 injured. The investigation and arrests that ensued revealed that the network involved in the bombings had trained in Afghanistan. Of particular interest was the interpersonal web that grew from the four suicide bombers as well as the range of materials confiscated in the investigation. Specifically, nearly 300 people were identified who had some knowledge of the planned attack. Of these, 48 were viewed as hard-core committed terrorists, leaving approximately 250 community members who were not ideologically committed to al-Qaeda’s goals and who had some information that potentially could have been used in preventive action. Similarly, the materials confiscated included items such as 800 pounds of hexamethylene tetramine, 150 pounds of pentaerythritol-M, and 150 pounds of sodium carbonate, all ingredients used for the explosives. Additional items included sticks of dynamite, AK-47 rifles and shotguns, 22 hand radios, forged passports and drivers’ licenses, and 89 large detergent barrels. The point was that given all these materials, as well as the number of people in the community with some knowledge or suspicions, the opportunity existed to acquire intelligence that could be used in a predictive intelligence fashion aimed at prevention.

These findings were reinforced through interviews conducted by TNP officers with detained terrorists. The results suggested that the majority of terrorist members became involved with terrorist organizations through family and friendship networks and were not ideologically committed. Many expressed the desire to leave the terrorist network but feared retribution. Only approximately one third of those interviewed were assessed to be ideologically committed to extremist views. Consistent with the findings from the investigation, the interviews suggested to the TNP that establishing connections to the community could result in informants and intelligence that could form the basis for predictive intelligence.

**Challenges and Key Components**

Perhaps the greatest challenge to implementing ILP is conceptual. The model of ILP presented herein is based on a broad conceptualization that views ILP as an overarching framework that builds on community policing, problem solving, and partnerships and takes an all-crimes approach. Alternative conceptualizations may include viewing ILP as focused solely on homeland security and terrorism or following the U.K. model of ILP as involving the identification and targeting of high-rate, chronic offenders. Applying the model only to terrorism would be unfortunate because of terrorists’ involvement in such a wide variety of routine and preparatory
crimes. Scholars studying ILP in the United Kingdom have noted the movement toward conceptual integration of ILP, community policing, problem solving, and partnerships but have also noted some of the inherent tensions of the styles of policing (Hale et al., 2004; Tilley, 2003). For example, community policing calls for decentralized, geographic-based structure, but ILP is likely to include a centralized intelligence function. The danger, given the challenges of organizational change, is that integration of ILP, COP, POP, and partnerships results in a watered-down model whereby little meaningful change actually occurs (Hale et al., 2004).

Despite these challenges and obstacles, there do appear to be identifiable components of what needs to occur for an integrated model of ILP to be implemented in a meaningful fashion. Zimmermann’s (2006) research, a series of case studies of high-performing PSN task forces (PSN case study cites) as well as organizational research (Morash & Ford, 2002) suggest several critical components for the implementation of ILP. Foremost is leadership. As noted above, organizational change is difficult and is unlikely absent commitment by the organizational leaders at the highest levels as well as those in key positions throughout the organization. ILP must be seen as a top priority and as something that is not going away. Such leadership is also essential to any hope of restructuring the organization in a way that allows for the integration of intelligence throughout the organization (Carter, 2004).

A second key ingredient is a multiunit, multiagency structure. Within the law enforcement agency, ILP cannot be seen as the sole province of an intelligence or crime analysis unit. Rather, it must be integrated throughout the organization. This is critical for both input into the intelligence process—as information held by street-level officers; gang, drug, vice, and major crime investigators; community policing officers; and others will form the basis of much intelligence analysis—and serving as key consumers of intelligence products (Riley et al., 2005). Beyond the single agency, a multiagency structure is essential, particularly in the United States, with its decentralized, fragmented law enforcement structure but also through the connections to other criminal justice agencies such as prosecutors, corrections officials (particularly gang and threat assessment units), probation and parole. For example, it was discussed earlier how tax code violations might be a trigger to more serious and violent crimes and that evidence exists that far-right extremists commit a large number of preparatory crimes, such as credit card fraud, gun violations, and identity theft (Corcoran, 1990; Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989/1995; Hamm, 2005; Tucker & Pate, 2000). The ILP policing model would then suggest, if such a pattern were uncovered, that Internal Revenue Service and local tax officials (or Environmental Protection Agency and local zoning officers, if land use violations are found to precede more serious offenses on the individual or regional level) should play an integral role on domestic terrorism task forces.

Similar to the multiunit, multiagency structure are the ties to the community. As the Istanbul investigations revealed, members of the community are likely to have information that can be critical to the prevention of terrorist attacks. A key component of
the community is the business sector. Business officials, and private-sector security officials in particular, may also be key sources of information about emerging threats.

In many respects, at least within the United States, the focus on homeland security represents an unfunded mandate for local law enforcement. The development of an intelligence capacity, whether a full-blown unit or an intelligence liaison officer in small agencies, becomes one additional function for resource-limited agencies (see Riley et al., 2005). This is one reason for an all-crimes approach to ILP as suggested by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005b). The investment in ILP is likely to create economies of scale when applied to all types of crime and terrorist threats. Additionally, the all-crimes approach brings the benefit of increasing the likelihood of identifying links between criminal activity and terrorist threats (e.g., drug trafficking as a fund-raising activity).

Beyond an all-crimes approach, ILP is most likely to be effective when implemented in a way that focuses resources on particular crime types, criminal organizations, and terrorist threats. This is a cornerstone of Goldstein’s (1990) problem-solving model, which argues for breaking crimes into specific problem categories that can be analyzed and subjected to tailored interventions. It also appears to be a key to the success of directed patrol operations aimed at a specific crime (e.g., gun crime) in hot spot locations (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001; Sherman & Rogan, 1995). Similarly, the promise of the deterrence-based approach of Boston Ceasefire, SACSI, and PSN appears to relate to the focused deterrence model that seeks direct communication with those at high risk for being involved in gun violence (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy et al., 2001; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006; Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2005).

Within the intelligence community, different definitions of different forms of intelligence are utilized. For example, within the United Kingdom, agents working in Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE) distinguish between operational, tactical, and strategic intelligence, whereas the U.K. National Crime Squad distinguishes between tactical and strategic intelligence (Sheptycki, 2004). Carter (2004, p. 83) and Cope (2004, p. 188) also make the distinction between tactical or operational and strategic intelligence. In a slight variation, Peterson (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a) refers to crime analysis, investigative (evidential) analysis, and strategic analysis. The key point is the need for both broad levels of analysis of current and emerging threats (strategic intelligence) and more case-specific intelligence on individuals and groups believed to be actively involved in criminal activity (tactical intelligence). Thus, for example, strategic understanding of the role of gangs, drugs, and hot spot patterns in gun violence is critical to developing strategic plans for reducing gun violence. Timely knowledge of specific gangs, drug markets, and hot spots is the type of tactical intelligence produced in Compstat and Chicago’s Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation (VISE) and Deployment Operations Center (DOC) meetings that can result in strategic interventions intended to reduce the
likelihood of crime. Similarly, TNP’s discovery that many in the community had suspicions about a group of suicide bombers, as well as its discovery that a substantial portion of those involved in terrorist networks were not ideologically committed to the terrorist cause, was highly useful strategic intelligence. To use this in a predictive strategy required tactical intelligence on who posed a threat and who within these groups could be pulled away from the network and/or recruited as informants.

The 9/11 commission criticized the intelligence community for an overreliance on technology (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Clearly, technology is not a sufficient condition for effective ILP. On the other hand, it is likely a necessary condition. As Zimmermann’s (2006) research indicated, an adequate technological infrastructure was essential for the integration of analysis and problem solving in PSN.

As noted at the outset, ILP may be at a stage in 2006 similar to community-oriented policing 15 to 20 years ago. The concept is being endorsed by all the key law enforcement professional organizations and there are reports of promising practices such those reviewed herein, but it remains a fairly nebulous concept and most agencies are just toying with implementation. For the field of policing, an essential step is evaluation of ILP so that its foundation is truly evidence based (Ratcliffe, 2002). For specific agencies, the most important step is likely to be to actually experiment with ILP. Police officials should select the most important crime problem or threat facing the community (e.g., gangs, meth labs, gun crime, drug markets, domestic terrorist groups, international terrorist financing, human trafficking). A multiunit, multiagency task force could be established that meets regularly and is held accountable. The task force would work through the intelligence process (see Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005a, 2005b; Carter, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2002; Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2006) and employ the Compstat philosophy of continuous assessment, timely deployment of resources, and accountability. It is likely through practice, hopefully informed by research partnerships, that ILP will move to the point of evidence-based best practice that improves the effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement and the safety of communities and nations.

Notes

1. Researchers at both sites (see Hale, Heaton, & Uglow, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2002) linked the emergence of intelligence-led policing (ILP) at Kent and Northumbria to two influential commission reports within the United Kingdom. The first, issued by the Audit Commission and titled “Helping With Enquiries—Tackling Crime Effectively,” called for using analysis as a tool for more effective and efficient policing (Audit Commission, 1993). The second, issued by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC; 1997), endorsed ILP and called for information collection and intelligence analysis as key components of modern policing. Hale et al. (2004) note the importance of a subsequent HMIC report in 1998 linking ILP, problem solving, and partnerships as keys to crime reduction.

2. Tilley (2003) provides a very thoughtful discussion of the similarities and points of departure between ILP and problem-oriented policing.
3. Although writing for the broad intelligence community, Kamarck (2005) has developed a thoughtful statement on the application of business principles to the collection and management of information. 

4. These sections are adapted from McGarrell (2005). 

5. Project Exile is also an important foundation of Project Safe Neighborhoods. Established in the Northern District of Virginia to address problems of homicide in Richmond, the program involved a commitment to significantly increased federal prosecution of gun crime offenders coupled with a media campaign to communicate a deterrent message to potential offenders. A recent evaluation concludes that Project Exile significantly reduced homicide (Rosenfeld, Forango, & Baumer, 2005; in contrast, see Raphael & Ludwig, 2003).

6. The author is thankful to the leadership of the Turkish National Police who have provided briefings from the intelligence and antiterrorism divisions. Particular thanks to Dr. Ahmet Yayla and Majors Samih Teymur and Bilal Sevinc, who are pursuing PhD study at North Texas State University and Michigan State University and who provided the data presented herein.

7. Riley, Treverton, Wilson, and Davis (2005) also note that decentralized multiagency structures can create problems in counterterrorism intelligence sharing because of security clearance issues.

8. Meaningful fashion is obviously a loosely defined term but would suggest changes in vision and values, organizational structure, and street-level operations.

9. Within the United States, given restrictions on local, state, and tribal law enforcement’s involvement in national intelligence activity, the involvement of local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies in national intelligence is typically through involvement in joint terrorism task forces operated by the FBI (Riley et al., 2005). This inherently involves multiagency collaboration and information sharing.

10. Multiagency collaboration is also a key component of the national intelligence model in the United Kingdom (Sheptycki, 2004).

11. Riley et al. (2005) report that most of the U.S. law enforcement agencies they studied included both criminal intelligence and counterterrorism intelligence within the same unit.

12. Hale et al.’s (2004, p. 297) review of annual audits of the police in England and Wales provides examples of symbolic implementation of ILP, where senior managers mention ILP but where the information technology was not adequate to support ILP.

13. In the same review of audits (see note 12), Hale et al. (2004) report on findings of organizational resistance and the challenge of organizational change in moving to a community-based and problem-oriented style of policing, similar to that found within the United States (Greene & Mastrofski, 1988).

14. Many of the problem-solving best practices reviewed in this article were supported through action research partnerships between university researchers and law enforcement agencies working in a collaborative fashion.

References


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