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Human Rights Rogues in Interstate Disputes, 1980–2001*

MARY CAPRIOLI
Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Duluth

PETER F. TRUMBORE
Department of Political Science, Oakland University

Rogue states have typically been characterized as those states that consistently violate accepted international norms of behavior. While US foreign policymakers and policy analysts have identified rogue states as those violating a narrow set of international norms of external conduct, specifically terrorism sponsorship and illicit pursuit of banned weapons, this article proposes an alternative understanding of rogue state status that harks back to earlier notions of international pariah states, isolated from the rest of international society, owing to their egregious treatment of their own citizens. Building on Galtung’s concept of structural violence and feminist insights concerning the interconnectedness of violence at all levels of human society, the authors develop a rogue state index to identify human rights rogues, based on ethnic and gender discrimination and the violation of personal integrity rights. An important part of the rogue state formula developed by policymakers over the recent decades is the expectation that such states represent dangers to international peace and stability. Focusing on the recognized international human rights norms of non-discrimination and security of person, and informed by the causal mechanisms inherent in the normative explanation for the democratic peace, this article tests whether human rights rogues are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate conflicts and violent interstate conflicts. The results of the analysis show that human rights rogues are more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes in general, and violent interstate disputes specifically, than other states during the period 1980–2001, suggesting that policymakers must keep a close watch on serial human rights abusers, while seeking to identify future threats to international security.

Introduction

Are there such things as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ states, and, if so, what makes them so? Are certain types of states, with objectively identifiable characteristics, more prone to aggression and international violence than others? The concept of the rogue state, which became popular with US national security policy-makers with the end of the Cold War, is based upon the premise that states that consistently violate important international norms of behavior represent particular dangers to international peace and stability. For US policymakers, the norms that matter are the international prohibitions against supporting terrorism and illicitly developing weapons of mass destruction. In short, states that do these things are rogues, dangerous actors ever threatening the stability and security of the international system.

* The data for this article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets or obtained directly from the authors: mcapriol@d.umn.edu; ptrumbor@oakland.edu.
But separate from, and predating, this particular policy focus on problematic states has been academic inquiry into these very same questions: are certain types of states more violent than others, and why? The initial empirical research that would ultimately result in the democratic peace thesis was driven by such questions. Significantly, however, it was the failure of early research to produce the expected answer that drove our current understanding of the relationship between regime characteristics and international conflict. As Benoit (1996) points out, international conflict researchers moved away from the idea of democratic pacifism — that democratic regimes are in general more peaceful than other types of regimes — when their research failed to produce statistically significant results. Instead, the field turned its attention to the less problematic finding that democracies tend not to fight wars against each other. And so the initial question has remained largely unanswered.

Perhaps the key to predicting the international behavior of states will be found not by trying to identify those internal characteristics driving states toward peace, as the investigators of democratic pacifism attempted to do (Rummel, 1968; Small & Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984), but rather in identifying the internal characteristics driving them toward conflict. In a fundamental way, we agree with the central premise of the rogue state concept, that there are states whose violation of recognized international norms of behavior are indicators of their aggressive character. Unlike US policymakers, however, we contend that the norms that matter are those of the international human rights regime governing states' treatment of their own citizens. Indeed, our own prior research (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005) has shown that, as a group, traditional rogue states (i.e. those supporting terrorism or seeking to develop banned weapons) do not evidence any difference in international conflict behavior than other states.

However, we have elsewhere (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003b) shown that states with specific domestic patterns of systematic discrimination on the basis of gender and ethnicity and general repressiveness — states we label human rights rogues — are more likely to engage in violence when involved in international disputes, specifically by using force and doing so first. If human rights rogues are also more likely to become involved in international disputes than other states, then this finding takes on added significance. In this article, we construct a composite indicator of state observance of accepted international human rights norms and examine whether states that violate these norms are more likely to become involved in interstate conflicts in general and violent interstate conflicts in particular.

Societal Determinants of Interstate Conflict Behavior

States become involved in militarized interstate disputes for a variety of reasons, some of which are rooted in structural issues of realpolitik, and others in societal-level factors. A focus on societal-level variables is particularly appealing in that such factors have direct policy implications. In short, they are amenable to change through the effective application of appropriate domestic policies. Current research concerning international conflict demonstrates a significant shift in emphasis from structural to societal-level concerns, partly as a response to a decline of the systemic imperatives of the bipolar era (Levy, 2000). Perhaps this emerging pattern is most obvious within the democratic peace literature, particularly within the normative explanation (Brown, Lynn-Jones & Miller, 1996; Ray, 1995; Russett, 1993; Maoz & Russett, 1993;
Dixon, 1994), which recognizes the role of social relations in explaining state behavior. It is important to note, however, that scholars of the democratic peace have been criticized for treating the normative and institutional accounts of the democratic peace as separate and competing explanations (Owen, 1997), even as they argue that such democratic norms as respect for individual liberties, competition, and abhorrence of violence lead to the creation of institutions that serve to constrain decisionmakers from pursuing violent foreign policies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999).

While the causal logic we will develop stresses the manifestation in the international arena of the same norms and values that govern domestic social and political interaction, we recognize that societal norms and the institutions that spring from and reflect them cannot be easily separated. Yet, as mentioned above, we must also recognize that the traditional approach of relying on regime type to model this interconnection between norms and institutions has consistently failed to produce evidence that different types of regimes have different propensities for international conflict. As Weede (1984: 649) concedes, ‘Whether a nation enjoys democratic rule or suffers from dictatorship, the risk of getting involved in war is the same.’ We should thus be circumspect about assuming that regime type, as it is typically employed in such studies, actually captures the relevant norms affecting interstate conflict behavior.

The idea of democratic pacifism, and the democratic peace thesis that flows from it, is based on the premise that states duplicate patterns of domestic politics in the international arena and apply the same norms of peaceful conflict resolution in both domestic and international settings. Research on some two dozen so-called peaceful societies from the field of anthropology confirms this expectation, demonstrating that the same norms that govern the resolution of these societies’ internal conflicts are likewise applied to conflicts with outside societies (Bonta, 1996). This emphasis on the pacifying effect of benign norms has led one prominent advocate of the democratic peace thesis to call for the remaking of the international system from the bottom up, ‘that is, norms and rules of behavior internationally can become extensions of the norms and rules of domestic political behavior’ (Russett, 1996: 114).

Yet, the dyadic nature of the democratic peace phenomenon means that the pacifying impact of these benign norms and rules of behavior is observed only when they are shared between both sides in an international dispute. Interestingly, the dyadic explanation for the pacifying impact of democratic norms begins with a monadic understanding of the way in which norms affect international as well as domestic behavior. Proponents of the normative explanation make essentially the following argument: Democratic states will normally seek to resolve their international disputes peacefully in keeping with their overarching norms and values. When the opponent is another democracy, sharing similar norms and values, this is generally unproblematic. If the opponent is not democratic, however, the peaceful resolution of conflict becomes far more difficult, because the anarchic nature of the international system requires the democratic state to play by the rules of its non-democratic opponent. ‘[W]hen a democratic state confronts a nondemocratic one, it may be forced to adapt to the norms of international conflict of the latter lest it be exploited or eliminated by the nondemocratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderation of democracies’ (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 625).

This seems to imply two related expectations: first, that systemic characteristics,
specifically anarchy, impede the expression of pacific norms at the international level; and, second, that this same condition facilitates the expression of violent norms internationally. Therefore, given the anarchic nature of the international system, states characterized by violent value systems should consistently manifest those norms and values in more violent international conduct. Thus ‘different norms of domestic political conduct will be expressed in terms of different patterns of international behavior’ (Maoz & Russett, 1993: 625). Therefore, states with violent norms should behave differently internationally, in short more violently, than states whose norms and values are pacific in nature. Given this, Russett’s call to socially construct international society in the image of domestic society may, in fact, be a double-edged sword.

If norms drive state behavior internationally, violent norms should propel the states that evidence them to reject peaceful dispute resolution in favor of militarized conflict. That studies using regime type as a proxy for social norms and values have failed to produce consistent evidence of this expected effect does not necessarily invalidate the causal logic of the argument. We look beyond regime type in an effort to more directly assess the nature of violent norms and values. In this, we are guided by Galtung’s (1969) concept of structural violence and feminist critiques of traditional state-centered conceptions of security.

For Galtung, violence must be understood as a process that transcends the relationship of actor to subject, perpetrator to victim. Rather than conceiving of violence as a purely physical and intentional act of harm connecting one individual to another, Galtung calls to our attention the lowered life expectancy that results as the sometimes unintentional side-effect of unequal social and economic structures. ‘There may not be any person who directly harms another in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chance’ (Galtung, 1969: 171). Thus, social injustice itself represents a form of violence.

Building on Galtung’s foundation, feminist scholars propose a more inclusive understanding of security than the state-centric model that dominates the traditional field of international relations. This alternative conception of security begins not with the state, but with individuals and groups, asserting that violence, both physical and structural, at all levels of human society is interrelated, a dynamic that purely state-centric analyses overlook (Tickner, 1992, 2001). A large body of literature confirms that norms of violence are inherent to hierarchical social structures (Bunch & Carrillo, 1998; Caprioli, 2003, 2005; Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003a; Elshtain, 1987; Stiehm, 1984; Yack, 1999). Although the state has the power to undermine structural hierarchies by minimizing domestic inequalities, discrimination, and repression, some states choose to exacerbate these inequalities and power hierarchies formally, through state policies of exclusion or repression, and/or informally, by failing to recognize and address the violence inherent in their domestic social structures.

To summarize, our approach adopts the causal mechanism inherent in the normative explanation for the democratic peace, that the same norms influence both domestic and international behavior, but with a critical difference. Guided by Galtung, feminist critiques of traditional conceptions of security, and their insights concerning the interrelated nature of violence, we look beyond regime type to identify the violent norms and values that affect states’ international behavior.

**Which Norms Matter? Human Rights Rogues**

In adopting the label ‘human rights rogues’ to characterize states with the violent norms
at the center of our research, we are reclaiming the rogue state concept from the field of US national security policy. Whereas the policy community has, since the 1990s, conceived of rogue states as those which support terrorism or pursue banned weapons, we return to the earlier academic conception of rogue or pariah states rooted in the liberal tradition of political thought and enshrined in what has been referred to as the ‘Universal Declaration model’ of international human rights (Donnelly, 1989, 1998, 2001; Nickel, 1987).¹ In this conception, rogue state status derives not from the violation of international norms of non-proliferation or support for terrorism, but rather from a regime’s domestic behavior, how it treats its own citizens. In short, we contend that human rights rogues are those that place themselves beyond the recognized boundaries of international society through their egregious treatment of their own populations.

Earlier definitions of rogue or pariah states made general reference to states that were considered guilty of brutal internal conduct (Litwak, 2000: 49–51). For much of the 1970s, the label of ‘international pariah’ was applied by academics and policy analysts to states whose regimes’ egregious domestic conduct had led them to be diplomatically isolated from much of the rest of the international community (Dunn, 1977; Freedman, 1978). For example, among those so described were the white-minority governments of South Africa and Rhodesia (Gregory, 1980; Grundy, 1976; Guelke, 1980; Väyrynen, 1979), Chile under Pinochet (Milenky, 1977), Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge (Donnell, 1980; Simon, 1979; van der Kroef, 1980), and Israel (Dowty, 1978). In contrast to these rather general criteria by which states were labeled pariahs, we offer a more specific definition based on those recognized international norms of human rights that have been described by Frost (1996) as among the ‘settled norms’ of contemporary international society.

The element of Frost’s account central to our argument is his linkage between sovereignty, legitimacy, and the worldwide development of human rights culture (Sutch, 2000). In particular, Frost (1996: 93–159) challenges the notion of a dichotomy between sovereignty and respect for human rights. Along these same lines, others have argued that the duty correlative of sovereignty for the state is the protection of the rights of the individual against both itself and society. Noting that the principle of state sovereignty developed in parallel with the development of human rights in the West, Inoue (1999) argues that individual rights served both as role model and positive justification for sovereignty. As the modern sovereign state emerged to replace the medieval system of power dispersed among various institutions, such as church, city, and guild, the state itself became responsible for supplying the protective shield these institutions had previously extended over the individual (Inoue, 1999: 32). Thus, the state emerged not only as a potential violator of individual rights, but as a powerful protector as well. Stemming from this idea is the notion that the state has an important responsibility to act as the defender of the individual’s human rights against social oppression (Higuchi, 1994), and that it is only within the state that individuality can be realized (Frost, 1996: 142).

The argument that sovereign states have a duty to protect the human rights of their citizens is echoed in the contention that the domestic legitimacy of the state derives from its moral authority to govern (Copp, 1999), and that the legitimacy of the state in international society is dependent upon its adherence to the settled norms of international human rights:

¹ Donnelly (2001: 1) defines the Universal Declaration model as having four central elements: the focus on rights; the restriction to individual rights; the balance between civil and political rights and social, economic, and cultural rights; and national responsibility for implementing internationally recognized human rights.
Traditionally, a government was considered legitimate if it exercised authority over its territory and accepted international legal obligations that it and its predecessors had contracted. What it did at home was irrelevant. Today, human rights provide a standard of moral legitimacy that has been... incorporated into the rules of the international society of states. (Donnelly, 1998: 28)

While Donnelly recognizes that this incorporation is far from complete, in that violations of human rights remain a persistent problem, and the question of what to do about those violations remains largely unanswered, he and others note that whatever the disputes over the details and politics of the implementation of human rights norms, virtually all states accept as authoritative the standards laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international human rights covenants (Forsythe, 1991, 2000; Howard & Donnelly, 1997). The Universal Declaration has been endorsed, regularly and repeatedly, by virtually all states. For the purposes of international action, “human rights” means roughly “what is in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Donnelly, 2003: 22).

To summarize, we argue that human rights rogues are those states whose behavior runs afoul of these accepted standards. In keeping with the Universal Declaration model’s emphasis on the rights of individuals to equal concern and respect, and the responsibility of states for implementing those rights (Donnelly, 2001: 1), we propose that human rights rogues are any states that systematically allow domestic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and violate personal integrity rights.

**Identifying Human Rights Rogues: The ‘Rogue State Index’**

In this section, we briefly lay out the conceptual foundation for our development of a Rogue State Index (RSI) to identify states we classify as human rights rogues. Specific operationalization of the index is discussed in the following section.

The RSI is a composite measure capturing a state’s domestic patterns of political and economic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and gender, and violent repression of political opponents. While we will later show that all three components of the RSI have independent impacts on interstate conflict behavior, our fundamental interest is in understanding the cumulative effect of systematic discrimination and repression rather than weighing the relative impact of differing forms of discrimination and repression. This is consistent, first, with the causal logic of our argument, which holds that underlying violent norms contribute to the expression of the human rights practices our index captures, and, second, with the understanding that within the Universal Declaration Model, internationally recognized human rights are ‘treated as an interdependent and indivisible whole, rather than as a menu from which one may freely select (or choose not to select)’ (Donnelly, 2003: 23).

The ethnic and gender discrimination components of the RSI reflect the norms of the right of individuals to equal concern and respect as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. By contrast, the political repression component of the RSI measures a somewhat narrower set of violations of the individual right to personal integrity. These rights, reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, include rights to life, liberty, and security of person, and protection against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. It is important to note that we identify states as rogues on the basis of their actual behavior rather than on the basis of their formal acceptance of international human rights agreements, including the Universal Declaration and the international covenants. Prior research has shown that there is an incongruity between formal acceptance of these agreements and actual state
performance on matters of human rights (Keith, 1999). While it is argued that the near-universal acceptance of these agreements represents an international consensus on human rights norms in principle (Donnelly, 1998; Forsythe, 2000; Frost, 1996; Howard & Donnelly, 1997), actual respect for human rights diverges widely from the normative ideal, even among states that are formal parties to such agreements (Keith, 1999).

We need to emphasize here that the Rogue State Index we develop is not a proxy for regime type. Both democracies and non-democracies alike evidence characteristic consistent with the human rights rogue label. While it is true that democracies are less likely to qualify for rogue status as we conceive it, regime type accounts for only 12% of the variance we see in the RSI (Pearson's Correlation coefficient \( \rho = -0.121, p > 0.0001 \)). We believe this provides further evidence of the need to move beyond the study of regime type when considering the impact of social norms and values on international conflict behavior.

To summarize the argument so far, we contend that human rights rogues can be identified on the basis of domestic characteristics of discrimination and repression, reflecting the impact of violent norms and values on domestic social, political, and economic life. In keeping with the causal logic we outline above, we expect those violent norms will manifest themselves in a state’s greater likelihood to become involved in interstate conflicts generally, and violent interstate conflicts in particular. The expected relationship between human rights rogue status and conflict proneness can be expressed in the following testable hypotheses:

\[ H1: \text{A human rights rogue, defined as a politically repressive state exhibiting systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and gender, will be more likely to become involved in militarized interstate disputes yearly.} \]

\[ H2: \text{A human rights rogue, defined as a politically repressive state exhibiting systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and gender, will be more likely to become involved in violent militarized interstate disputes yearly.} \]

**Research Design and Methodology**

Beyond theoretical inquiry, this project uses statistical analysis to test the above hypotheses, which will be analyzed using a cross-national, longitudinal study of state behavior, coding for rogue state status while controlling for other variables known to predict foreign policy behavior. Our unit of analysis is the country-year, as we are interested in predicting the likelihood of a state becoming involved in militarized interstate disputes and in violent militarized interstate disputes in a given year. We adopt a monadic analysis, as the theoretical foundation for our hypotheses suggests that the same violent norms that manifest themselves in domestic patterns of discrimination and repression will also lead states to behave more violently at the international level, whatever the characteristics of their dispute opponent.

Data for this project come from several sources. Measures of domestic patterns of ethnic discrimination are taken from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset using the MARGene data generation and management software. Measures of gender equality are available from the International Parliamentary Union. Measures of state repression are taken from the Personal Integrity Rights (PIR) dataset (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) and Gibney’s (2004) Political Terror Scale (PTS) data. The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn & Palmer, 2003) provides data on state involvement in interstate conflicts.

Our quantitative analysis spans the 1980–2001 time period, which is limited by the availability of data used in the analysis. Given this limited temporal domain, caution
about the generalizability of any findings is warranted. After creating an index variable from the ethnic discrimination data found in MAR, gender equality data, and personal integrity rights/repression data in PIR/PTS, we combine that index variable with a EUgene (Bennett & Stam, 2004) generated set of all country-years from 1980 to 2001. We add to the analysis controls for other possible influences on state conflict behavior, including capability, contiguity, and prior conflict. All of the variables appearing in the analysis are described in detail below.

The statistical analyses use cross-sectional time-series panel data. We use logistic regression random-effects models as specified for binary outcome cross-sectional time-series data to analyze the impact of human rights rogue status on the likelihood of a state being involved in interstate disputes and in violent interstate disputes. Random effects in supported by the significance of the Breusch–Pagan test for the model testing the impact of rogue status on the likelihood of a state becoming involved in a violent interstate dispute and by the significance of the Hausman test for the model testing the impact of rogue status on the likelihood of a state becoming involved in an interstate dispute (Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). As a further control for our model using binary time-series cross-sectional data, we employ the corrections specified by Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998) to correct for temporal dependence (Beck & Katz, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). We also conclude that multicollinearity is not affecting the models (Gujarati, 2003; Menard, 2002; Mertler & Vannatta, 2001).

2 STATA is used to run the statistical analyses.

3 Although the Hausman test was significant, the data violate some of the assumptions required by the Hausman test, thus leading us to employ the Breusch–Pagan test.

4 The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for the conflict model with the RSI index is 1.24, and 1.23 for the disaggregated model. The mean VIF for the violent conflict model with the RSI index is 1.18, and 1.19 for the disaggregated model.

Dependent Variables
Information on state conflict involvement comes from the MID dataset (Ghosn & Palmer, 2003), which provides a list of all states involved in interstate disputes in which force was used, threatened, displayed, or not used.

Conflict Involvement This is a binary variable indicating whether or not a country had an interstate dispute onset for that year. A score of 1 indicates that the state became involved in at least one militarized interstate dispute onset for that year. A score of 0 indicates that the state did not become involved in a new MID for that year.

Violent Conflict Involvement This is a binary variable indicating whether or not a country was involved in a violent interstate dispute onset for that year. A score of 1 indicates that the state became involved in at least one violent militarized interstate dispute for that year. A score of 0 indicates that the state did not become involved in a new violent MID for that year.

Independent Variables: Components of the RSI
Ethnic Discrimination This component of the RSI index is calculated from the political and economic discrimination variables generated by MARGene. Minorities at risk (MAR) (Gurr, 1993) are ethnopolitical groups that collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discrimination relative to other domestic groups and/or that collectively mobilize in defense or promotion of their self-defined interests. The ethnic discrimination variable is calculated from the lagged \((T – 1)\) political and economic discrimination variables to
minimize the effect of possible endogeneity. States that have minorities at risk that suffer economic or political discrimination relative to other groups in society are coded as 1. All other states are coded as 0.

**Gender Discrimination** Percent women in the legislature (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1995, 2000) captures the gender dimension of the RSI. Gender is used as a litmus test for determining access and power and, ironically, becomes the justification for maintaining inequality (Caprioli, 2005), with gender shaping the dynamics of every site of human interaction, from the household to the international arena’ (Cockburn, 2001: 15). Percent women in the legislature is a strong measure of gender inequality, for ‘absence is not merely a sign of disadvantage and disenfranchisement, but the exclusion of women from positions of power also compounds gender stereotypes and retards the pace of equalization’ (Reynolds, 1999: 549). Furthermore, percent women in the legislature has the potential to capture more than political equality. As Reynolds (1999: 550) argues:

Most politicians, male and female, come from a pool of citizens who are highly educated, have professional jobs, and have access to the resources of public life. When the dominant social culture precludes young women from enjoying a full education and socializes them from birth into roles that are removed from the world of public decision-making, then the pool of likely women politicians is substantially reduced. Furthermore, women find it much more difficult to break into electoral office en masse when they are socio-economically disadvantaged due to the burdens of poor health care, poor child care, and un/underemployment.

The UN Commission on the Status of Women identifies a threshold of 30% in order for women to influence outcome – to influence key decisions and be taken seriously (UNDP, 1995: 108). A country receives a score of 1 if it has fewer than 30% women in the lower house of parliament.

**Repression** This component of the RSI captures violations of personal integrity rights. Specifically, the data measures the prevalence of political imprisonment, torture, killings, or disappearances. While the rights violations included in this component of the RSI are more narrowly focused than the broad social practices and government policies represented by the discrimination components, it has been argued that violations of personal integrity rights are considered the most egregious and severe crimes against humanity and among the most easily avoided (Poe & Tate, 1994).

5 We use the personal integrity rights (PIR) (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999) and Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney, 2004) datasets to capture the extent of personal integrity violations. PIR and PTS offer two measures of political repression, one based on annual human rights reports from the US Department of State, and the other based on Amnesty International annual country reports. While the two measures are highly correlated (two-tailed Pearson correlation coefficient of .866, \( p < .0001 \)), we use the Amnesty-based scores to avoid any potential political bias embedded in the State Department reports. It has been persuasively argued that the coding scheme used in PIR/PTS represents the best approach for measuring overall state repressiveness and respect for personal integrity rights (Keith, 1999: 101–102, note 9). PIR/PTS is coded as follows:

1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extraordinarily rare.

2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.

4 = The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level violence affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

5 = The violence of Level 4 has been extended to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.
the same time, it has been argued that these represent core rights that must be fulfilled in order for the provision of other rights to be meaningful (Keith, 1999).

A state receives a 1 for repressiveness if it scores 3 or higher on the PIR/PTS scale, which represents extensive political imprisonment, execution and other political murders and brutality, and unlimited detention for political views. Scores of 1 and 2 more closely capture aspects of regime stability and type rather than systematic repression, and thus these scores are coded as 0 for no repression. The repression variable is lagged (T − 1) to minimize the effect of possible endogeneity.

Rogue State Index (RSI)  This is a binary composite measure of the repression and discrimination components detailed above. The creation of a rogue index is particularly applicable for this study. Indeed, we do not argue that repression and discrimination in and of themselves cause international conflict, but rather that these measures are indicators of prevailing societal norms of violence that affect both domestic and international behavior. Complex concepts, such as that of social norms and values, cannot adequately be represented by a single indicator. The use of an index variable is also consistent with the conceptual understanding of the inseparability of internationally recognized human rights. Focusing on one or another of these indicators would have the implicit effect of emphasizing the importance of the observance or protection of that particular right over the others, rather than recognizing the interdependent nature of all rights (Donnelly, 2003).

The default option for creating an index is to allow for equal weighting, which is itself an assumption concerning the impact of the variables within the index. With equal weighting, correlations among the indicators may informally assign greater weight to certain aspects of the index. To correct problems associated with a statistical correlation among index variables, the individual weights of the index components are adjusted. In this case, both the ethnic discrimination and repression variables are each assigned half the weight of the gender discrimination component. Furthermore, Tukey’s test for nonadditivity with the weighted components is significant, thus we can reject the hypothesis that an interaction among index components exists, and we can be confident in creating the index.

If a state exhibits behaviors of political repression and both gender and ethnic discrimination in any given year, the state is then coded as 1 for that year. The tolerance or perpetration of such violence is a direct violation of international norms of human rights as delineated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two international covenants on civil/political and economic/social rights. A score of 0 reflects the absence of these human rights violations.

Control Variables

Number of Neighbors  This variable is introduced to control for geographic proximity (up to 400 miles of water), an important determinant of interstate conflict (Bremer, 1992; Vasquez, 1993). States are more likely to become engaged in an international dispute with a contiguous state (Gleditsch, 1995), based on military ease and interaction (Russett, Oneal & Cox, 2000). The data come from the CoW version 3.0 contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al., 2002).

State Capability Score  The capability score is a composite index of national capability (CINC) comprised of demographic, military, and industrial indicators, including military personnel, military expenditure, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban
population, and total population, recorded annually for each country as calculated using EUgene (Bennett & Stam, 2004). There is a substantial body of literature linking state-level capabilities and patterns of conflict onset. In particular, Bremer (1980) and Eberwein (1982) find that nations that rank high on a composite index of national capability (CINC) are involved in more wars than states with lower capability scores.

**Prior Conflict**

This binary variable identifies whether or not the state experienced a MID in the past decade. Previous interstate conflict provides a control for enduring rivalries that increases the frequency and severity of disputes (Diehl & Goertz, 2000; Thompson, 2001) and also controls for ongoing disputes, which may result in higher levels of domestic repression and discrimination particularly related to the repression component of the RSI. A score of 0 represents the absence of militarized interstate disputes in the preceding decade, and 1 represents one or more MIDs in the preceding decade.

**Peace Years**

This variable controls for temporal dependency – spells of peace – in the dependent variable (Beck, Katz & Tucker, 1998). A likelihood ratio test of the models without the temporal controls and those with the temporal controls indicates strong duration dependence, thus warranting the inclusion of the temporal controls.

**Results**

Both hypotheses are confirmed – human rights rogues, those states exhibiting higher levels of domestic gender and ethnic discrimination and state repression, have a greater likelihood of becoming involved in a militarized interstate dispute in any given year, and those disputes are more likely to include the use of violence. In short, human rights rogues, those states that systematically violate the settled norms of the international human rights regime, are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes than states that respect those norms.

**Rogue State Index**

Human rights rogues – those states that are characterized by domestic discrimination and repression – are more likely to be involved in an interstate dispute onset and are more likely to be involved in a violent interstate dispute onset annually than are non-rogues. As our theory focuses on the social norms and values that these components of the RSI reflect rather than on the individual impact of these separate behaviors, we will only note that all three components of the rogue state index show statistical significance in both the models predicting the likelihood of conflict and violent conflict annually.

**Conflict Involvement**

This statistical model reveals that human rights rogues have a greater likelihood of becoming involved in an interstate dispute onset in any given year. Human rights rogues are 50% (1.5) more likely to be involved annually in an international dispute onset than non-rogues.

**Violent Conflict Involvement**

This statistical model reveals that human rights rogues have a greater likelihood of involvement...
becoming involved in a violent interstate dispute onset in any given year. Human rights rogues are more than twice (2.3) as likely to be involved annually in a violent international dispute onset as non-rogues.

**Control Variables**

In keeping with theoretical expectations, the control variables for capability, contiguity, and prior conflict showed statistical significance in both models. Those states with greater military capability, as measured by CINC scores, are far more likely to become involved in a militarized interstate dispute onset and in a violent militarized interstate dispute onset in any given year than are those states with lower capability scores. In addition, states with more neighbors experience greater conflict and violent conflict involvement. Prior conflict is also a solid predictor of future conflict and violent conflict involvement.

Quite interestingly, when either a binary
variable for democracy or a categorized variable for authoritarian, transitionary, and democratic states is included in the model with the Rogue State Index, the regime variables are consistently insignificant while the rogue state index maintains significance. Although this result is in keeping with much of the democratic peace literature, the insignificance of regime type and high significance of our Rogue State Index lend support to our argument that the key to predicting the international behavior of states may not lie in attempting to identify the characteristics of peaceful states but in identifying the characteristics of those states that are most conflict-prone. Likewise, the result lends support to our contention that the use of regime type to model social norms and values actually fails to accurately capture the norms affecting both domestic conduct, here the observance of internationally recognized human rights, and international conflict behavior.

### Table II. The Impact of Rogue State Status on State Violent Conflict Involvement, 1980–2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model(^a)</th>
<th>RSI disaggregated</th>
<th>Rogues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rogue State Index</td>
<td>.832*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender dimension</td>
<td>1.156*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic dimension</td>
<td>.529*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression dimension</td>
<td>.656*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>12.911*</td>
<td>13.274*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>.081*</td>
<td>.081*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior conflict</td>
<td>.627*</td>
<td>.664*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–4.528*</td>
<td>–3.052*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace years</td>
<td>–.195*</td>
<td>–.203*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline(1)(^A)</td>
<td>–.000</td>
<td>–.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline(2)(^A)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spline(3)(^A)</td>
<td>–.003</td>
<td>–.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance</td>
<td>(p &lt; .0001)</td>
<td>(p &lt; .0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>–1,151.256</td>
<td>–1,156.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3,252</td>
<td>3,252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) STATA was used to run the cross-sectional time-series random effects logistic regression. The table includes parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. * meets or exceeds \(p < .05\). \(^A\) Coefficients of Peace Years cubic spline segments.
Conclusions and Implications

We draw several conclusions from the results of this research. First, we believe that those who began looking for a normative explanation for interstate conflict behavior more than 30 years ago had it right all along. But those researchers who have relied on state political structures, that is, regime type, as a proxy for the relevant social norms and values affecting interstate conflict behavior may be like the man who looks for his lost keys under the streetlamp: just because the light's there doesn't mean the keys are as well. The general proposition that continues to inspire this research, that norms drive international behavior, remains a compelling one, but reliance on regime type to model those norms appears to miss the target.

Instead, we take our cues from Galtung, feminist critiques of traditional international security studies, and the proponents of the Universal Declaration model of human rights to highlight the interconnection between violence at the domestic level, both physical (repression) and structural (ethnic and gender discrimination), and violence at the international level. This is consistent with the normative foundation for the democratic peace proposition, that the same norms and values that govern domestic social and political relations also affect state behavior internationally. Our findings confirm the validity of the proposition that social norms and values have a powerful impact on the likelihood of states becoming embroiled in interstate disputes. While there is only limited evidence that democracies are more peaceful in general, we find strong evidence that human rights rogues are more violent in general. As a consequence, we believe there needs to be additional attention paid by the scholarly community to the question of how norms of behavior, and, as importantly, which norms, are manifested at the international level.

Second, our findings demonstrate that rogue states do in fact exist, although not necessarily as characterized by US national security policymakers and analysts. In other research, we have shown that, as a group, states that sponsor terrorism or illicitly develop banned weapons are no more or less likely than other states to become involved in militarized interstate disputes, to initiate militarized action, or to actually use force first when involved in such disputes (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2005). In short, rogue states as traditionally defined in policy circles do not represent the kind of aggressive conventional military threat to international peace and security that policymakers and analysts have long expected. But, there remains value in the rogue concept, in particular in the essential premise that there are states whose consistent violations of important international norms of behavior identify them as significant threats to international peace and stability. As our research shows, however, the norms that matter are those of the international human rights regime constituted in the Universal Declaration model of human rights. What makes a state a rogue is not whether it chooses to defy the international community by pursuing weapons of mass destruction or sponsoring terrorists, but whether it treats its own citizens in a manner that accords with recognized international norms of human rights. Simply put, rogue states are countries that treat their people badly. And not only do they treat their people badly, they behave badly at the international level as well, as the advocates of normative explanations for interstate conflict behavior lead us to expect.

This study shows that human rights rogues, that is, rogue states identified by their consistent failure to observe internationally recognized norms of human rights, are more likely to become involved in a militarized interstate dispute and more likely to become involved in violent militarized interstate
disputes annually than are non-rogues. Although rogue states, those exhibiting all three components of the Rogue State Index we develop, represent about one-third of all states for any given year during the period we study, those rogue states collectively account for 60% of all violent conflicts during that period. Furthermore, our earlier research (Caprioli & Trumbore, 2003b) shows that once involved in a militarized interstate dispute, human rights rogues are more likely to be the first to use force compared to non-rogues. Perhaps policymakers, in their desire to confront rogue states and thus promote international peace and stability, should turn their attention toward the concrete dangers represented by the serial human rights abusers of the world.

References


MARY CAPRIOLI, b. 1968, PhD in Political Science (University of Connecticut, 1999); Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota-Duluth (2005– ). Current main interest: conflict and security studies, including interstate and intrastate violence, specifically in assessing the role of gendered structural inequality in predicting violence. Recent articles in *International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review, and Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

PETER F. TRUMBORE, b. 1964, PhD in Political Science (University of Connecticut, 1999); Assistant Professor, Oakland University, Rochester, MI (2002– ). Current main interests: international conflict and security; rogue states in US foreign policy. Recent articles in *Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, and European Journal of International Relations*.