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RESOURCE
FILES Chapter 7
Constructing Difference: Social Deviance
Drug Trade and Global Deviance
As social
life becomes more global, certain forms of deviance begin to take on a more international
flavor. Recent global trends like the growing diversity of populations, higher immigration
rates, realignment of national borders, deteriorating economic conditions, democratization
of governments, and improving computerization and communication technology have all helped
to create major international organized crime networks. Major crime rings from Colombia,
China, Italy, Korea, Jamaica, Russia, Japan, and Southeast Asia do business in the United
States today.1
Except for
military expenditures, the global illegal drug trade is the largest industry in the world.2 International criminal organizations (ICOs) can threaten the
stability of governments, hinder economic development, and even challenge a superpower.3
In the early
1990s, for instance, the Medellin drug cartel launched a full-scale terrorist assault in
Colombia. Public facilities and newspaper offices were bombed. Members of leading families
were kidnapped. A leading candidate for the presidency was assassinated. Hundreds of
police officers were murdered. A national airline flight was blown up in midair. The
cartel's aim was to force the government to share power with the drug traffickers.
ICOs don't
rely on violence alone to influence governments. The fantastic sums of money generated by
illegal activities, especially drug production, give ICOs the ability to employ bribery to
achieve their goals. In 1994 the president of Colombia was accused of accepting $6 million
from drug dealers to help him win the election. He was eventually acquitted of all
charges, but many in Colombia and elsewhere remained highly skeptical of his innocence.
In 1997,
Mexican court files revealed a history of collusion between a prominent drug baron and
high-ranking military officersóincluding four generalsówho had been enlisted by the
Mexican and U.S. governments to lead the fight against drug production and trafficking.4
The global
connections established by ICOs allow them to create whole new drug markets. The
introduction of "crack" in the United States in the mid-1980s revolutionized the
cocaine market here.
International
networks also enable ICOs to adapt quickly to law enforcement efforts. When U.S. agencies
shut off the flow of heroin from Turkey, new sources quickly developed in Southeast and
Southwest Asia. When enforcement efforts were increased in Florida and the Caribbean,
cocaine was simply routed through Central America and Mexico. Mexican organized crime was
enlisted to run the network of local landing strips, safe houses, and corrupt government
officials necessary to sustain the operation. The Colombian cartels have explored similar
contacts with the Sicilian Mafia in hopes of expanding the European drug market.5 ICOs even establish connections with terrorist groups, which
provide armed protection for landing fields, production facilities, and operations in
exchange for cash.
Unlike the
more traditional criminal groups, such as the American Mafia or ethnic street gangs, ICOs
are massive business enterprises, often with transnational political and financial
connections. The Colombian drug cartels, for example, have tens of thousands of
specialized employees and associated businesses worldwide. Although the more traditional
crime organizations may also develop international ties and suppliers, ICOs are organized
for the express purpose of engaging in large-scale criminal activities across
international borders.6
The profits
earned by ICOs dwarf those of traditional crime organizations:
The Colombian cartels
alone probably make more in a week than the American Mafia does in a year. The Colombian
cartels now outperform most Fortune 500 companies. A conservative estimate of illegal drug
sales at the retail, or user, level in the United States alone is $50 billion. [The]
cartels are estimated to make a profit of about $20 billion annually from these revenues.
. . . The combined budgets of the governments of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru is only about
$9 billion annually.7
Furthermore,
although traditional, nationally based criminal organizations may pose a variety of
threats to society, they are in no position to challenge the sovereignty and integrity of
an entire government. But where governments are unable to deliver needed social services
and economies are deteriorating, the appeal of powerful international crime organizations
can overwhelm respect for the law. In some areasólike small villages in the Peruvian
AndesóICOs are the only form of authority many people have ever known. In fact, in
circumstances where government authority is weak, powerful ICOs may see themselves as the
legitimate political authority.
In sum, these
crime organizations are powerful enough to challenge, destabilize, and perhaps someday
completely control small countries. Hence they represent a threat to international
security that no single country can control alone.
1Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995.
"International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29. See also Stephens, G. 1994.
"The global crime wave." The Futurist, 28, 22-28.
2United Nations Research Institute, 1995. States
of disarray: The social effects of globalization. London: UNRISD.
3Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995.
"International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
4Dillon, S., & Pyes, C. 1997. "Court
files say drug baron used Mexican military." New York Times, May 24.
5Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995.
"International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
6Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995.
"International organized crime." Society, 32, 18-29.
7Godson, R., & Olson, W. J. 1995.
"International organized crime." Society, 32, 23.
[home]
David Newman and Rebecca Smith. (Created October 7,
1999). Copyright Pine Forge Press.
http://www.pineforge.com/newman.
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