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The Management of Border Security in NAFTA

Imagery, Nationalism, and the War on Drugs

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As a free trade area, NAFTA requires the relatively unrestricted movement of people, goods, and services across the borders between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Although the proponents of NAFTA emphasize positive economic outcomes for the three partners, the dependence of those outcomes on open borders inevitably brings with it the prospect of greater opportunities for transnational criminal activities, generally, and for narcotrafficking, in particular. Managing the free flow of goods and people while limiting the free flow of illegal substances and criminals is the central dilemma of the war on drugs in NAFTA. Cooperation between the member states differs strikingly, with smooth cooperation along the northern border between the United States and Canada and a troubling lack of cooperation along the U.S.-Mexico border. The different patterns in cooperation among policy makers and law enforcement agencies are largely attributable to mutual perceptions and nationalism in all three countries.

Keywords: *NAFTA; border control; drug policies; nationalism; image theory*

NAFTA is one political response by Canada, Mexico, and the United States to the impacts of globalization—the increasing interconnectedness of states and peoples through technology, commerce, legal and illegal migration, shared cultural symbols, and common transnational security threats—in the Western hemisphere. NAFTA envisions a free trade area that requires the relatively unrestricted movement of people, goods, and services across the internal borders, ultimately leading to increased political, social, and cultural interdependence among the three member states. Although the proponents of NAFTA emphasize positive economic outcomes for the three partners, the dependence of those outcomes on open borders inevitably brings with it the prospect of greater opportunities for transnational criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, possible terrorist infiltration, the smuggling of contraband (e.g., weapons, tobacco, cultural heritage, and automobiles), and illegal transborder crossings. The easy movements of legal capital, services, goods, and workers require less border control. Yet at the same time, to prevent illegal flows of capital, goods, and workers, the border needs to be more fortified. And as internal economic integration strengthens, greater emphasis on controlling the common external NAFTA borders (the land border of Mexico with its Central American neighbors and the coastlines of Mexico and Canada) will become a significant policy issue as well.

Border control is caught in a vice; control must be exercised to prevent illegal transborder acts, but legal commercial and people traffic cannot be brought to a halt. The examination of the responses of the NAFTA partners to this reality at their national borders is the topic of this article. We argue that an appropriate and effective balance between opening and fortifying the borders and enabling and preventing traffic simultaneously will only be achieved through coordinated and cooperative transnational security and law enforcement policies by governments and agencies on both sides of the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders. Specifically, we ask whether law enforcement cooperation at the internal borders of NAFTA will follow similar paths at the Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. borders and will lead to the development of a common external NAFTA border control policy. We argue that the answer is no or not likely to both questions.

We focus on the war on drugs to examine the complexities and different histories and current patterns of border management at the two internal NAFTA borders. We think that the argument we make (that distinctly different patterns of cooperation at the two borders reflect the dynamic intersections of functional needs, perceptual imagery, and nationalistic sentiments) would hold true for other security concerns as well, whether these be illegal immigration (McDonald, 1997), the movement of contraband goods, or fears about terrorists coming into the United States through Canada or Mexico. Specific policies will be different, of course, as will institutional arrangements, yet both will be shaped by imagery and nationalism as much as responses to the problems of drugs have been.

Canada-U.S. and Mexico-U.S. border relations have long but very different histories. The Canada-U.S. border is often proclaimed, by both sides, as the longest undefended peaceful border in the world. In contrast, the Mexico-U.S. border region has experienced a contentious and often violent history. It has been, in Schmidt's (1997) succinct summation, "an ecosystem for violence as a consequence of being removed form direct governmental supervision and a lack of law enforcement by the centers of power" (p. 300). The creation of NAFTA incorporated two bilateral borders that have faced and will face distinctly different problems for police cooperation and created a political, organizational, and perceptual overlay on former bilateral relations that have had a profoundly different character (Zagaris, 1995-1996, 1996).

The conventional explanation for the disparate histories of the borders stresses the differences in objective, functional needs and conditions; the extent of trafficking in controlled goods, massive undocumented immigration, and people smuggling; and security threats to the partners (but mainly the United States), all of which are so fundamental that contrasting patterns of cross-border relations at the strategic or policy level and among security and police agencies at the borders are a normal and natural outcome. The management of border security, the balancing of open and closed borders, under this view, reflects the diverse patterns of economic interests and the need for protection against transborder threats. At the Canada-U.S. border, economic interests have outbalanced threats, at least until and arguably after post–September 11, leading to fairly open borders and cooperative relations, whereas at the Mexico-U.S. border, economic interests (which are large) have been counterbalanced by the greater level of all transborder threats, most importantly drug trafficking and illegal migration, leading to a more fortified border and limited cooperation (Andreas, 2000, 2003; Deflem, 2001). The Mexico-U.S. border requires a wall; the Canada-U.S. border requires more dialogue among security agencies.

This conventional explanation is insufficient because it does not account for the specific nature of the differences in border management in the war on drugs. Although it is true that

more drugs flow into the United States from the southern border and that corruption in Mexico is a significant problem, this alone does not explain the significant variation in the U.S. policies toward Mexico and Canada in the war on drugs or Canada's and Mexico's responses to U.S. initiatives. Taking into account imagery and the force of nationalism, the way the three partners see each other through perceptual and affective lenses, which shape definitions of and responses to problems, we seek a more nuanced explanation of the nature of border management and enforcement operations in the war on drugs.

The dissimilar approach by the United States to transborder threats at the internal NAFTA borders has not been a result of rational responses to divergent functional conditions (threats to the integrity of the borders); rather, the assessment by the United States of both needs and policy goals has been and will continue to be filtered through imagery and stereotypes of itself and others that have hardened into conventional understandings. The capacities of Mexico and Canada to protect the border and to cooperate in security arrangements have been judged by different standards built into the images through which each is viewed by American policy makers. From the U.S. perspective, Mexico, perceived as the colonial child, cannot be trusted and dealt with in the same manner as Canada, the ally and cousin of the family (Gibbins, 1997; Schmidt, 1997).[1]

Consequently, the policy predispositions are different regarding each border. Mexicans are perceived through an image that suggests inferiority and incompetence. Hence, there is a great deal of demand making and instruction by U.S. policy elites and very little give and take at the southern border. Mexicans need to be told what to do. Canadians, however, are perceived to be quite similar to Americans; they can be trusted to do their part, and differences can be resolved reasonably. In short, problems, threats, and solutions are not identified objectively but are influenced by the perception of the country and people on the other sides of the U.S. border as well as Americans' perceptions of themselves.

The influence of imagery also complicates the cooperation among law enforcement agencies required to properly balance freedom of legal movement with control of illegal activities. The impact of nationalistic sentiments and associated images and stereotypes of each other and underlying assessments of the nature, character, credibility, capability, and will of the self and others profoundly affect the possibilities of linkages and cooperation. Images develop independently of border threats but once formed will constrain and distort the capacity to create cooperative and cordial relations among the agencies joined in the mutual tasks of controlling a border. Throughout time, differences in police cooperation at the two internal borders may lessen, but given the contrasting histories of the borders and the perceptual imagery, competing nationalistic sentiments, policy differences, and distinct functional problems associated with those histories, such differences will not disappear soon. The coalescence of imagery and threats at the Canada-U.S. border will continue to lead to cooperative and cordial relations; at the Mexico-U.S. border, imagery and threats combine to frustrate efforts to cooperate, leading instead to tensions, recriminations, and failure. Yet as Papademetriou noted in Congressional hearings, NAFTA can only succeed as one economic system if the internal borders are treated similarly and partners are equally trusted to defend the external borders (U.S. Congress, 1999; Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], 1997). This will only happen if imagery changes, and that will be a long process.

Managing border security everywhere presents unique and complicated challenges to law enforcement agencies, for normal concerns about order maintenance and crime control are overlaid, distorted, and constrained by claims of sovereignty, the flux of foreign policy prior-

ities, the dynamics of threats and needs, and mutual perceptions of each others' intentions, capabilities, and credibility. Responding to problems of transnational crime, disorder, and security threats raises issues lacking in purely domestic law enforcement (M. Anderson, 1996; Davis, 1997; Hills, 2003; Marx, 1997; Snow, 1997). Although this article mentions a variety of law enforcement issues at both borders, the focus is on cooperation in the war on drugs. Drug trafficking is not the only border control issue, yet it allows us to examine more precisely the intersections of policy preferences, imagery, and functional threats, as these affect the capacity for police cooperation. We present our argument in three sections: a description of threats to the internal borders, mutual imagery, and patterns of police cooperation at both borders.

The Borders of NAFTA

Border Threats

The U.S. war on drugs has a long history, beginning in 1915 and accelerating in the 1970s. The DEA was created in 1973 on the foundation of precursor agencies as the principal agency for this war. For the United States, the war on drugs rose to the level of a national security problem in the mid-1980s, requiring the federalization and militarization of enforcement, interdiction, and source country efforts (Andersen, 1993; Dziedzic, 1995; Kraska, 1997; U.S. General Accounting Office [GAO], 1999a; Winer, 1997). The United States defines the domestic drug problem basically as an issue of supply involving numerous international state and nonstate actors, requiring the assistance and cooperation of foreign governments to help address the U.S. demand situation. In the process, the United States has shown great willingness to tolerate, for the common (i.e., U.S.) good, temporary deviations from accepted standards of domestic and international law and democratic norms (e.g., the abduction of Alvarez Machaín from Mexico to the United States by bounty hunters, banking regulation reforms [Mexico and Canada], and the Helms/Burton Act [Canada]). Although other organizations in the Americas (e.g., the Summit of the Americas and the Organization of American States [OAS]) deal with the drug problem (Gamarra, 1996; OAS, 1992, 1996),[2] their institutional weakness and the

> absence of effective multilateral mechanisms against illegal drug use has enabled the unilateral dimensions of U.S. anti-drug policies to prevail over the multilateral approaches that are more in tune with the spirit of the Summits. . . . [In consequence] U.S. coercive diplomacy has predominated over what should be concerted multilateral action. (Ulloa, 2000, p. 12)

In 2004, the U.S. budget for the war on drugs stood at about $18 billion. In NAFTA, the principal target drugs in the war on drugs are cocaine, marijuana, and heroin coming across the southern border into the United States, some of which is then trafficked to Canada, and methamphetamines, of which 70% is believed to be produced by Mexican cartels and 30% by mom and pop operations (personal communication, June 25, 2004).[3] Pseudoephedrine, a precursor chemical for methamphetamines, is not controlled in Canada and therefore is smuggled in massive amounts across the northern border for use in the making of methamphetamines in the United States. Finally, Canada's western province of British Columbia is the source of a powerful marijuana known as "BC bud."

The nature of the drug problem (precursor chemicals, production, trafficking, and distribution) has not been directly affected by the terrorist attacks on September 11. The same drugs continue to flow. However, there are more border patrol agents out there looking for people (drug couriers, illegal aliens, and terrorists) trying to cross the boarder without proper papers, and the FBI has become more focused on the possibility of terrorists crossing the northern border, in particular. More recent announcements by the FBI about terrorist threats from the southern border have been largely symbolic, designed more to show activity by law enforcement than to achieve interdictions.

As is noted below, the three NAFTA partners have very different philosophies regarding drug use. Canada and Mexico regard it as a public health issue, whereas the United States believes it is a matter of criminal behavior and hence subject to law enforcement strategies. The United States has a supply side and law enforcement approach to the problem: eradicate the crops, stop drugs at the border, and arrest the traffickers at all levels of trade and use. Mexico and Canada both prefer a demand side and treatment and prevention approach, addressing the causes and consequences of addiction and the health of drug abusers.

The internal NAFTA borders are quite similar. Both are long, largely indefensible, with miles and miles of unpopulated territory that, although often rugged and difficult, can be crossed to avoid checkpoints. Both borders are interspersed with heavily populated matching cities, such as El Paso and Ciudad Juarez and Detroit and Windsor. Millions of people cross these borders for various reasons, and in accordance with U.S. law, each must be subject to inspection by border agents. Clearly, that is impossible and as everyone who has crossed either border knows, inspection is usually a question or two about citizenship and purpose of visit.

The Mexico-U.S. border stretches for about 2,000 miles, has 50 official border crossing sites separated in some cases by miles of desolate terrain, many large twin cities on both sides, and a unique culture that blends Anglo-American, Hispanic American, and Native American values. It is the busiest border in the world. In 1996, “75 million cars, 3.5 million trucks and railroad boxcars, and 254 million people entered the United States from Mexico” (U.S. GAO, 1999e, p. 2). In 1998, the numbers rose to nearly 4 million trucks and 85 million passengers. An estimated “278 to 351 million persons legally crossed” the border (U.S. GAO, 1999e, p. 10). By 2002, the numbers were 252 million passengers, 86 million cars, 4.4 million trucks, and about 600,000 trains (U.S. Customs Service, 2002). Very few are seriously inspected, and *inspected* (as used in the official statistics) means looked at, possibly talked to, but not necessarily stopped and searched (or in the language used by Customs, inspected in primary and not secondary). As a whole, “at the 38 official border crossings, fewer than 5 percent of the cars and trucks were searched for contraband” (J. W. Anderson & Branigin, 1997, p. A1). This low rate of inspections has continued and cannot be solved by human labor at the border. Flynn (2002) notes one practical problem: “The pure cocaine to feed America’s annual coke habit could be transported in just 15 40-foot containers and it takes on average five agents three hours to thoroughly inspect a single 40 foot container.”[4]

Drugs are part of the traffic. It is estimated that about 70% of all illicit drugs smuggled in the country enter across the Mexico-U.S. border, including 60% of all cocaine, more than 85% of amphetamines, and a substantial proportion of marijuana and heroin (about 14% of which is grown in Mexico; DEA, 2000; U.S. GAO, 1999c). In 2002, 87% of all marijuana, 25% of all cocaine, and 7% of all heroin seized by Customs and Border Protection were interdicted at the southwest border.[5] In 2003, Mexico produced about 8,000 metric tons of mari-

juana, of which about 3,000 tons were seized, leaving 5,000 tons available for "distribution to the U.S. Market" (White House, 2004), as well as 10 metric tons of heroin, and traffickers moved about 300 metric tons of cocaine to the Mexico-U.S. border.

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), "Mexico has become the top priority for U.S. counternarcotics activities, ranking ahead of the source countries of Bolivia and Peru" (U.S. GAO, 2000b). The number of border patrol agents at the Mexico-U.S. border had increased from about 2,000 in 1993 to more than 7,300 in 1998. After September 11, 2001, the number increased to around 10,000. Nevertheless, a study commissioned by the ONDCP estimated that about 16,000 agents were needed to provide minimal deterrence at the border (U.S. GAO, 1999e, p. 26).[6] In 1999, more than 1.6 million illegal aliens were intercepted at U.S. borders (the vast majority was 1.5 million at the Mexico-U.S. border), about 14% of these were being smuggled (U.S. GAO, 1999e, p. 2; U.S. GAO, 2000a, p. 7).

The Canada-U.S. border is even longer (5,500 miles if the Alaska-Canada border is included) and has 130 official crossing points. More than 200 million border crossings occur each year. Ninety percent of Canada's population lives within 100 miles of the border. As in the case of Mexico, the border tends to have matching cities. The Great Lakes region contains heavy industry on both sides, yet elsewhere there are many miles of rugged terrain where crossings can occur undetected. NAFTA has had a huge impact on border business. Border traffic is projected to increase by 10% annually, and trade between the United States and Canada went from $174 billion in 1988 to $447 billion in 1999, the world's largest bilateral trading relationship (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2000). Border patrol operations by the United States are much less intense at the northern border. In 2000, the U.S.-Canada border was protected by a mere 300 agents, and that figure rose to about 1,200 after September 11, 2001.

Drug trafficking between the United States and Canada has increased substantially, as indicated by the increase in arrests of about 400% between October 1998 and April 1999 (U.S. Congress, 1999). The flow of drugs across the northern NAFTA border is quite extensive. Powerful marijuana grown in Canada, called BC bud (which has a much higher street value than Mexican marijuana); heroin from southeast Asia; and methamphetamine precursor chemicals are imported from Canada into the United States. The United States is a transit country for South American cocaine going to Canada. Liquid hashish and marijuana also travel from the United States to Canada. In 1998, the United States seized 4,413 pounds of drugs along its border with Canada: 614.77 pounds of cocaine, 3.84 pounds of heroin, and 3,794.63 pounds of marijuana. In contrast, in 1998, "Customs seized 31,769 pounds of cocaine, 830,891 pounds of marijuana, and 407 pounds of heroin" at the Mexico-U.S. border (U.S. GAO, 1999c, p. 23). The ONDCP, referencing a Canadian government study, estimates that about 15,000 marijuana-growing operations exist in Canada, which yields about 1,000 metric tons available for exportation to the United States (White House, 2004, pp. 43-44). A more recent development is the influx of pseudoephedrine, which is used to make methamphetamines in the United States, into the United States from Canada. Pseudoephedrine is a controlled substance in the United States but is not in Canada.

After September 11, 2001, and the preoccupation of the U.S. government with the war on terror, Canada has emerged as a more likely source of threats in the eyes of U.S. decision makers, whereas there has been very little public discussion of a terrorist threat coming through Mexico (Hristoulas, 2003; Serrano, 2003).[7]

Cooperation Needs at and Across the Borders

Border management and law enforcement is complicated by the fragmented authority domains among local, state and province, and national agencies in the three countries. Policing is done by an amalgam of agencies, each with diverse legal and political authorization and jurisdiction, institutional interests, conflicting policy goals and priorities, accountability linkages to political centers and constituencies, and loose coordination by organizational and political mechanisms that shift with political winds.[8]

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), created after the September 11 terrorist attacks, is an attempt (in part) to reorganize and simplify interagency cooperation for border control among U.S. agencies but has, being a young establishment, a number of characteristics that complicate this task: intra-institutional arrangements are still unsettled; there is no common organizational culture; the agency has widely divergent goals and responsibilities, ranging from intelligence assessments to responding to hurricane damage, all tied loosely to the overarching goal of combating international terrorism; and shifting relations to first responders and local and state law enforcement agencies. The two major existing counterterrorism and intelligence agencies, the FBI and the CIA, were excluded from the DHS. Yet resources, personnel, and attention have been shifted away from existing agencies (e.g., the DEA) and institutional arrangements as the war on terror supplanted the war on drugs as the primary threat to American safety and well-being (Marenin, 2002).[9] The U.S. Customs, Border, and Protection (CBP) unit within the DHS combines three former agencies—Customs, Immigration, and Agriculture (Animal and Health Inspection)—to present "'one face at the border' [the CBP officer] to travelers and the importing community." Creating one inspectional workforce will, the government hopes, enhance the efficiency of "preventing terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the U.S., while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel" (U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2003a). Current officers will be cross-trained in each other's traditional responsibilities and converted to the new position title in spring 2004 (Ridge, 2003).

The border patrol, now also in the DHS and part of the CBP, will continue its function of patrolling the borders between official crossing points. The National Border Patrol Strategy at the Mexico-U.S. border, the Southwest Border Strategy, and associated directed or targeted operations (e.g., Operation Hold the Line or Safeguard: Arizona), which were developed under President Clinton, continue to be the strategic framework for coordinating U.S. agencies and transborder interactions with Mexican agencies (U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2003b). More recently, the Border Coordination Initiative, which began in 1998, and Operation Cobija ("blanket" in Spanish), which began in 1990 by the Southwest Border DHS Executive Committee, are attempts to coordinate the activities of 14 federal agencies and task forces with "state and local law enforcement agencies along the entire Southwest border" to avoid overlaps and redundancies (U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 1998).

The new organizational overlay of DHS agencies and antiterrorism goals will not do away with the need to coordinate the multiplicity of agencies that already exist. Nor will it decrease the effects of imagery and nationalism on patterns of transborder cooperation. Rather, we argue that because DHS priorities are directed to stopping terror, a rather more serious and immediate threat to the security of the nation than are dugs and illegal immigrants, this will increase the power of imagery and nationalism, and the attendant difficulties for cooperation,

at the southern border while simultaneously having little impact on Canada-U.S. border cooperation.

Image Theory and Nationalism

Understanding the histories and patterns of interaction among the NAFTA partners requires an understanding of how they perceive themselves and each other. Much of that history is understandable if one examines the political psychology of the policy makers and citizens of each country using concepts, findings, and arguments drawn from image theory and the literature on nationalistic attitudes and behaviors. Both can help understand the perceptions of one another and the accompanying policy predispositions.

Briefly, image theory is a political psychological framework that draws from basic and commonly accepted findings in cognitive psychology and social identity theory. It begins with the following basic premises: (a) People must organize and simplify the world to manage the vast amount of information available to them; (b) the organization is done through the development of cognitive categories, or images, of people and things (examples of such categories in the political world include ethnic groups, racial groups, or types of states; see below); and (c) the categories must be cognitively efficient in that they enable people to process information quickly and with little cognitive effort. Information is filtered through the categories, and generally, information is accepted when it conforms to the category and is rejected as false or irrelevant when it does not (M. L. Cottam, 1986, 1994; M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001; R. W. Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1985).

With these basic assumptions, image theory goes on to argue that the international environment is organized by categories or images of types of states; this is the most efficient way of organizing the international environment. The images function very much like stereotypes. The image model also draws connections between a policy maker's image of other countries and his or her resulting behavioral predispositions. Each image contains information about a perceived target's (which may be a country; a political group, such as an ethnic group; or a nonstate group, such as a gang, militia, or terrorist organization) capabilities, culture, and intentions; the kinds of decision-making groups (whether many people are involved in decision making or only a few), and a perceived target's perceptions of threat or opportunity. Capabilities include economic characteristics, military strength, and domestic political stability and effective policy making and implementation. Cultural attributes consist of judgments of cultural sophistication. (One can dislike the culture of another country but still see it as sophisticated in terms of scientific and technological know how, arts, medicine, and its ability to solve complex problems, carry out plans, communicate, and so forth.)

When assessing a country, decision makers judge whether its capabilities and culture are equal, inferior, or superior to that in their own country. Another appraisal concerns intentions, which may be perceived as harmful, benign, or good. Finally, each image is associated with a general sense of threat or as presenting an opportunity to achieve an important goal. Lessons of history, or historical analogies, may be included in the expression of perceptions of threat or opportunity associated with a particular type of state image. In other words, leaders may use historical incidents to explain a conflict and make predictions about the outcome of a conflict. Policy makers draw on a variety of tactical and strategic options that they see as appropriate for dealing with another actor, given the characteristics ascribed to it based on its placement within a particular image. In addition, images of other countries tend to be shared

by political elites and the public as well. This becomes mutually reinforcing: Elites explain the need for a particular policy vis-à-vis another country, and the public accepts the explanation and expects the policy to achieve its anticipated results. Thus, changing a policy is often predicated on a need to persuade the public that a different image of the other country is appropriate, which is not an easy task, particularly when the image of another country is repeatedly replicated and re-enforced by cultural icons, such as movies, television, and comedic routines.

Mutual Imagery: United States, Canada, and Mexico

Below, we explore the mutual images that policy makers (as well as the public, although this is not the focus of our argument) in Canada, the United States, and Mexico hold of one another. We argue that American policy makers see Canada through the ally image and Mexico through the colonial image. Each is approached, in both policy development and implementation, as well as in negotiations, in a manner appropriate to those images. Mexicans, on the other hand, see Americans through the imperialist image, and their policy approach is reflective of that image. Finally, Canadians perceive the United States through the ally image, with some qualifications reflecting America's culture and power, both of which are seen in Canada as being somewhat overwhelming. In the discussion of the images, we present illustrative statements and public opinion data demonstrating the qualities of the images. Generally, the images are assessed through qualitative content analysis of policy maker and implementer statements and speeches, documents from legislative sessions, government reports, and newspaper articles, in addition to press briefings in accordance with a coding scheme available in M. L. Cottam (1994). These documents are readily available from official Web sites of all three governments. In addition, structured interviews (promising anonymity) were conducted with U.S. officials along both U.S. borders. Open-ended discussions were also held with citizens of Juarez, Mexico, and in various locations in Canada (see note 3).

The images of relevance in this article are the colonial, the ally, and the imperialist. The colonial image is that of an inferior people, of incompetence, and of needing direction from the superior perceiver, and the policy predisposition is to order rather than negotiate. After all, one does not negotiate with children. The ally image is that of a cultural and political equal, similar in values, a competent people, and capable of carrying out and fulfilling its promises. The imperialist image is that of a domineering, powerful country, capable of managing and directing events through a hidden hand, and a country that is willing to hurt and exploit the perceiver's country.

When other countries are perceived as fitting one of these images, particular policy patterns occur. The colonial client is essentially ordered about and told what to do. The ally is treated as an equal. The imperialist is resented, but given its power, it is difficult to resist. Indeed, opportunities to resist are difficult to identify at all, given the perception of overwhelming power of the imperialist country.

These patterns are only augmented when the perceiver is nationalistic (M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001). Studies of nationalism and nationalism-derived behavior in political psychology note that people need to belong to groups and that they see their group, the in-group, as better than other groups, the out-groups. Nations are groups and for nationalists a deeply important in-group. In-group members see themselves as similar and as sharing common attributes, and this group identification inspires group behavior. They tend to accentuate their

positive attributes when they compare their in-group to out-groups, which they do regularly. When engaging in social comparison, the self-esteem of group members is enhanced when that comparison is positive for the in-group. Sometimes, conflict is a result of engaging in social comparison. Nationalists are highly cohesive and very willing to sacrifice for the nation. They are also more likely to be sensitive to such things as insults, frustration, and aggressive behavior by out-groups (M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001; Keckmanovic, 1996; Searle-White, 2001). The nation as an identity group is highly salient for nationalists, and it is very sensitive to perceptions of threat and opportunity to the nation, even when dealing with a perceived ally. Nationalism can blind people to the flaws in their own policies, it can inspire a search for someone to blame for their problems, and it accentuates and polarizes stereotypes of others. Finally, nationalism makes people very sensitive to and protective of sovereignty. This can be problematic when confronting a transnational problem, such as drug trafficking, that may require compromising differences in legal systems and law enforcement rules and practices.

Americans, including policy makers, are nationalistic. They see the United States as rational, confident, disciplined, able to control its actions and its future, interested in the cooperative good and willing to compromise to achieve it, unwilling to be coercive unless absolutely necessary, and consistently supportive of fundamental human and democratic rights. The United States is perceived as a force for good in the world.

Mexico, on the other hand, is seen through a colonial image (M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001; M. L. Cottam & Marenin, 1999), as undisciplined, democratic in pretext (but slowly learning, particularly after the election of Vicente Fox), unwilling to confront its own problems, nonrational, corrupt, violent, dirty, unsuccessful, and immature (Schmidt, 1997), an image captured in the often-heard phrase *what are they so touchy about?* when the American parent suggests to the Mexican child, in a benign and reasonable manner, policies the United States believes to be sensible (Constantine, 1997).

It is surprising that little empirical research has been conducted on cases of the ally image. Although it would appear to be self-evident that Canada is perceived by Americans as an ally and vice versa, there is anecdotal evidence that Canadians believe Americans behave in a rudely imperialistic fashion on occasion. There are some data that indicate that Canada is perceived by Americans as an ally, however. A 1986 study found Canada, along with West Germany and Great Britain, as the perfect example of an ally (M. L. Cottam, 1986). Gallup Polls provide other pieces of evidence about the perception of both Canada and Mexico. In a February 2001 poll, Canada was the most favorably rated of a series of countries (including Great Britain), with a 90% overall favorable rating. Mexico, on the other hand, was rated favorably by only 67% of respondents, and of those, only 17% rated Mexico very favorably. Canada was rated very favorably by 51%, with another 39% giving it a mostly favorable mark (Chambers, 2001).

In verbal and written statements by Americans, the relationship between the United States and Canada is described in strong terms as one between equals. A U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (2000) report, for example, noted the differences in the sizes of the populations (31 million vs. 280 million) and economies but insisted that nevertheless, "citizens of the two countries regard their neighbors to the north/south very much as equals, and as being very similar to themselves" (p. 3). This is a common characteristic of the ally image. People presume that those they like are similar to themselves.

In fact, Canada and the United States are very different. Canada has a parliamentary political system with a bicameral legislature; Canada has multiple political parties compared to two in the United States; the Canadian Provincial governments are much more powerful than are U.S. state governments; the legal systems differ greatly; Canada remains part of the British Commonwealth, whereas the United States revolted against it; and the cultural similarities are fewer than the "we're just alike" attitude that many Americans have. Assuming similarities when they do not exist causes miscommunication between the United States and Canada when Americans expect Canada to act just as the United States does and get upset when it does not. For example, the fact that Canadians regard drug use as a health problem, not a crime problem, and therefore consider decriminalization of drugs, such as marijuana, a reasonable alternative causes shock in drug policy circles in the United States. Americans also have difficulty understanding that Canadians are very serious in their view that guns should be tightly controlled, and they are shocked when Americans suggest they should adopt lax American policies toward gun control (personal communication, October 30, 2002).

In addition, the United States and Canada have had a technical alliance in NATO and bilaterally through the North American Air Defense Command throughout the Cold War and in post–Cold War eras. U.S. officials and citizens identify strongly with the cultural, historical, and linguistic similarities (except for the Quebecois) with Canadians and have years of cooperation in security spheres to use as evidence that Canada can be relied on when needed. Nevertheless, conflicts between the United States and Canada do provide some indication that Canada's fit in the image in the minds of Americans is less than typical. The United States sometimes behaves as though Canada mistakenly thinks of itself as a country, when it is really part of the United States or the little brother in the family, the 51st state as it were.

Mexicans' self-image is strongly dominated by nationalism. Mexicans are intensely proud of their country, which they perceive to be a revolutionary, democratic country that is committed to social justice; is strong in traditions, culture, and achievements; and is willing to grapple with problems but is hampered by resources and international constraints. Mexicans are quite willing to be critical of their government yet strongly attached to the national community (M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001). The image of the United States is most commonly that of the imperialist. Mexicans anticipate exploitative intentions on the part of the United States and complain of unequal treatment as an inferior. America is accused of ordering, not negotiating, and demanding of Mexico things it would not demand of other countries, including Canada.

With the exception of the Quebecois, Canadians are also nationalistic (Jamieson, South, & Taylor, 1998a, pp. 252-254).[10] Similar to the United States (and Mexico), Canada's population is an immigrant population that has assimilated into a unique identity as Canadian. Studies of Canadian identity patterns have found that 80% of English Canadians identify themselves as Canadian, with another 6% identifying themselves as British Canadian, and 65% of other ethnics (excluding original French speakers) identify themselves as Canadian (Berry & Kalin, 2000). When the majority of people in a multiethnic country identify with the nation, that populace can be considered nationalistic (M. L. Cottam & Cottam, 2001). The Canadian self-image would include a (unfocused) sense of international benevolence exercised fairly and rationally toward one's self and all, a preference for multilateralism internationally, a willingness for tolerance, and a commitment to social justice. This is reflected in the 1994 defense white paper and post–Cold War statements on security conceptualization in the Cana-

dian government (Smith-Windsor, 2001). At the same time, Canadians reportedly have some self-doubts about what it means to be Canadian. According to a recent *The Washington Post* report (Brown, 2001), many Canadians believe they suffer from a national inferiority complex.

The Canadian image of the United States appears also to be that of an ally but with the caveat that the United States acts as a big brother on occasion and has to be put in its place. Official documents and statements regarding the border are strictly complimentary and describe a completely equal partnership. But popular culture, including such television shows as *Talking to Americans*, present a humorous critique of the United States and the American lack of knowledge about Canada. Americans are stereotyped as well meaning but rude, loud, and arrogant. The head of a Canadian think tank, Rudyard Griffiths, describes this perception as the belief "that Canadians are worldly, aware of international affairs, intelligent and informed and upwardly conscious of global issues and global concerns, and that Americans are, in contrast, isolationists, parochial, navel-gazing fatsos" (Brown, 2001). Or to quote the late former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau on relations with the United States, "living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt" (Brown, 2001). Neither depiction is one of American superiority.

Border Management

The drug war within NAFTA takes place in three different contexts, each of which presents specific challenges to cooperation. It is discussed at national levels, between Ottawa, Mexico City, and Washington, DC. Second, policies are implemented by organizations at the federal, state or provincial, and local agencies within each country. And third, the drug war is fought as a local border problem (Blase, 2000), requiring the interactions of all law enforcement agencies across the shared international borders.

We focus on the first and third patterns of policy and law enforcement interactions and mainly on transborder relations among federal agencies at the borders, referring to local-level law enforcement interactions contexts only as necessary. We explain the different law enforcement histories across and at the two borders as products of functional needs as these are defined and filtered through mutual imagery and nationalistic sentiments, and discuss likely developments. Much of the factual information of police cooperation across the NAFTA borders is episodic because many of the issues raised have not been studied extensively or systematically. The framework presented and the arguments made are meant to suggest further avenues for research and theorizing.

The drug war is not of one piece; it has different actors, dynamics, goals, and rhetoric within each of the following three contexts: among federal governments, between federal and local governments, and along the border itself, in borderland. At the national level, the insistence on sovereign rights leads to conflicts, negotiations, and resolution through legal agreements and declared understandings. At the local level, habits of working together, a pragmatic neglect of sovereignty, and resolution of conflicts through practical actions are dominant characteristics.[11] Having said this, however, the discussion of the two borders below illustrates the dramatic differences in levels of cooperation, trust, and information sharing on the two borders. In the case of the northern border, cooperation is deep and institutionalized. The perception of equality on both sides produces easy and confident cooperation, and law enforcement agents see their Canadian and American counterparts as unques-

tionably reliable, regardless of whose feet fill the shoes. Personal bonds are formed as well, and nationalism does not get in the way of local border management and cooperation. In the south, the opposite occurs. There is little trust and much stereotyping of one another as typical gringo imperialists or typical corrupt, inefficient, and untrustworthy Mexicans, and confidence in law enforcement officers from foreign agencies is largely dependent on evidence (e.g., lie detector tests) and the development of personal relationships. There is no institutional bond that produces routine cooperation, and nationalism frequently inflames antagonisms among law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border.

Mexico and the United States

Mexico City and Washington, D.C. In the war on drugs, the Mexico-U.S. border has received top priority from the United States, particularly because Mexico became the primary transit country for cocaine and other drugs entering the United States. The other border policing issue of particular importance to the United States is illegal immigration from Mexico. The disparity in the number of border patrol agents on the southern and northern borders, approximately 10,000 and 1,200, respectively, in 2003, shows the extent to which the United States is more concerned with its southern rather than northern border. It is interesting that despite concerns about terrorist access to the United States through its borders, the working emphasis of border law enforcement agencies on the southern border remains immigration and drug trafficking interdiction. In interviews with officials from the DEA, border patrol, and FBI, the DEA stated that its mission had not changed because of September 11. The border patrol emphasized that its mission also had not changed but that it added antiterrorism to its mission. But the FBI reported that its primary focus had shifted from drug trafficking to terrorism (personal communication, June 2003). Moreover, no terrorist suspects have been apprehended trying to enter the United States through Mexico (whereas 2,500 other illegal entrants are apprehended daily), and "most agents believe would-be terrorists have the savvy and resources to choose other routes" (Jacoby, 2004, p. 19).

The efforts by Mexico in fighting drugs are perceived completely differently from the two sides of the border. Mexican officials see themselves as struggling valiantly with the problems of corruption, violence, and organized groups involved in drug trafficking (which they see as caused by the unwillingness of the United States to seriously address its domestic drug problem) only to be threatened yearly by the United States with possible decertification.[12]

The president has the authority to not decertify a country if he believes that U.S. national security concerns would be negatively affected by decertification (Perl, Sanford, & Storrs, 1997; Storrs, 1997)—itself an insult to their sovereignty—and by having their efforts belittled by many U.S. politicians and police officials, especially those in the DEA (Dillon, 2000). They are never doing enough to satisfy the United States.

Mexico's drug policy favors treatment and prevention (Government of Mexico, 1992, 1994; Ruiz-Cabañas, 1992; Toro, 1995) and links the drug problems that exist in Mexico more to the gateway substances alcohol and nicotine rather than marijuana, as is done in the U.S. drug policy bureaucracy.[13] Mexicans see much of the drug problem and its consequences for the integrity and effectiveness of the political and policing systems (corruption and violence) as caused by consumption demands in the United States, the final destination of practically all illegal drugs produced or transshipped through Mexico. Most of the corruption and violence, the need to militarize police forces (Andersen, 1995), political instability, financial

dislocations (Fabre, 2003), the illegal influx of weapons from the United States into Mexico, and a decline of legitimacy associated with ineffectiveness and corruption would not happen were it not for the insatiable demand for drugs in the United States (Chabat, 1994).

Yet the United States does not recognize the problem it causes Mexico with its domestic drug consumption, nor is the United States able to reciprocate in policy discussions. One of the ongoing issues has been the question of guns. Mexican officials "believe that guns from the Unites States account for 80 percent of the weapons in the country" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001b, p. A3) and for much of the violence at the borders and among trafficking groups and wants the United States to do something about it, including greater efforts to suppress the trade as well as tighter domestic regulation of the traffic of guns in the United States. The basic U.S. response has been twofold: First, this is really a Mexican demand problem that should be dealt with by Mexican authorities rather than a supply problem (from the Mexican side, this argument is completely hypocritical and reverses the drug problem perception). Second, guns are legal in the United States, and changing laws to require tighter control would be politically difficult (again, this strikes Mexicans as hypocritical; Mexico is asked to change its laws and approach to drugs, but that requirement does not apply to the United States). The issue has not been resolved, even though a number of meetings and agreements have started to address the problem (OAS, 2001).

The United States' track record in interacting with Mexico in the realm of border law enforcement in general and drug trafficking in particular has reflected the colonial image of Mexico (M. L. Cottam & Marenin, 1999). Beginning with Operation Intercept I and II (1969 and 1985, respectively), the United States has attempted to shape and direct Mexico's internal and international approach to drug production and trafficking. Programs along the U.S.-Mexico border would seemingly require cooperation, but little consultation took place until the late 1990s. Operation Alliance, for example, which began in 1986,

> was *the* primary coordinating body for collaborative drug enforcement efforts in the border region. Its joint-command structure included senior officers from the Customs Service, Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, and INS-border patrol as well as representatives from various law enforcement agencies in each of the four border states. (Dunn, 1996, p. 113)

Nevertheless, it had no representative from Mexico. The parallel operation at the U.S.-Canada border (see below), Project Northern Star, did have Canadian law enforcement participation (Mendel, 1995). Even Operations Cooperation and Condor, long hailed as a highlight in the history of U.S.-Mexico cooperation in the drug war in the 1970s, consisted of the United States furnishing "aircraft, technology and instruction. Mexicans would furnish money, men and a desire to master the arts of crop destruction and trafficker interdiction" as taught by the Americans (Craig, 1989, p. 77).[14]

Perceptions of Mexico began to become more complex in the 1990s, at least at the national executive level, and this is reflected in improved cooperation through the creation of new mechanisms for Mexico-U.S. narcotics policy coordination. The principal group now responsible for drug cooperation between Mexico and the United States is the High Level Contact Group (HLCG, 1997) on drug control, which was formed in March 1996. It organizes periodic meetings of senior officials at the cabinet level and working groups in specific issues, such as demand reduction, chemical control, and money laundering. The HLCG has developed a broad-based strategy, including strengthening border security, limiting escapes,

improved information sharing, reduction of drug use in both countries, anti-money-laundering initiatives, cooperation to interrupt the trafficking of drugs, and concentration of law enforcement efforts on trafficking organizations that operate in both countries. The Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group, from Mexican and U.S. justice ministries, meets "on counternarcotics and crime issues throughout the year" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1997, p. 148).

HLCG meetings concluded that a review of the "existing counterdrug intelligence architecture" was needed (ONDCP, 1997, p. 58).

> In May [1996], DEA, FBI and the U.S. Customs Service signed an agreement with the PGR [procuratoria general de la republica] on cooperation with, and support for, counter-drug task forces located in northern Mexico. These units are complemented by similar interagency task forces on the U.S. side of the border set up under the U.S. Department of Justice's Southwest Border Initiative. (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1997, pp. 148-149)

And in September 1997, Mexico and the United States signed an "agreement allowing the U.S. Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section to provide direct support for law enforcement and eradication operations and money laundering investigations" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1997, pp. 148-149).

A binational drug strategy document was released by the two governments (HLCG, 1997), leading to the creation of a number of joint working groups and efforts to develop common performance measurements and milestones (U.S. GAO, 1999e, p. 22), which were released in February 1999 during President Clinton's visit to Mexico (U.S. GAO, 1999d, p. 5).

The Mexican approach to the United States in the drug war also reflects an increasing demand for equality, particularly with the advent of the Fox administration. The Vicente Fox administration began a campaign to change U.S. policies, and perceptions, about the border and sought to change some of Mexico's policies related to the drug war. Major traffickers and a governor have been arrested, the Mexican Supreme Court has found the extradition of Mexican citizens to the United States for trial to be constitutional, and corrupt officials continue to be purged from the military, police, and justice agencies. Yet the Fox administration also insisted that the United States rethink its policies on open border and illegal immigration, do more to protect immigrants from dying while crossing (the result of increased border patrol, which has forced illegal immigrants away from populous areas into the desert as they seek a way across; about 400 die each year by drowning or heat exhaustion), and seriously address the problem of guns smuggled into Mexico.

The Fox administration insisted early on a greater partnership and more equality. It asked the United States and the Bush administration to help develop a "master plan for the fight against organized crime, drug trafficking and violence" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001a, p. A8); to share information; to "arrest and prosecut[e] American weapons dealers who are arming Mexican crime syndicates" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001a, p. A8); and to have genuine cooperation among Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies. As noted by a Mexican academic, U.S. agencies have "typically treated the Mexican agencies as servants. Servants are not allowed to ask questions. They are only supposed to follow orders. That attitude has to change" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001a, p. A8). The national security advisor for the Fox administration, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, made the same point. It is time for U.S. agencies "to

trust" Mexico and not "expect us to be the recipient of unilateral demands" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001a, p. A8). As the journalists note, that "will require a small revolution in the way American law enforcement and intelligence services regard Mexico" (Weiner & Thompson, 2001a, p. A8).

President Fox himself has argued that "we need to stop the blame game. The drug trade is driven by both supply and demand and can only be dealt with through international cooperation. As a first step, we should eliminate the sources of gratuitous tension," first among these the annual certification exercise by the United States, which should be "replaced by an international mechanism to evaluate the efforts of all countries in the drug war" (Fox, 2000, p. A25). Mexico much prefers the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) developed and administered by Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission to assess the antidrug performance of all members of the OAS, including the United States, by a committee of international experts (White House, 2002a). The MEM mechanism treats all members of the OAS as being equal and equally accountable for its drug policies, as judged by a common set of criteria.

Improvements in relations between Mexico and the United States and between Fox and Bush were on the fast track until Mexico's opposition to the preemptive war in Iraq by the United Kingdom–United States coalition soured relations dramatically and moved concerns about Mexico-U.S. border problems to the back burner among Bush administration policy groups. Mexico, although it disagreed with the United States' decision to invade Iraq, has supported antiterrorist policies that reflect international standards and priorities; has agreed to greater cooperation with the United States in antiterror intelligence collection, investigations, and detentions and arrests of suspects; and has agreed to the extradition of major drug lords from Mexico to the United States.

At the Border. Although cooperation at the nation-to-nation level appears to have improved as the colonial image of Mexico weakened at the executive level in Washington, D.C., the image remains strong at the borders, and cooperation remains problematic. Many U.S. law enforcement agencies are involved in the war on drugs, and they report varying levels of cooperation with their Mexican counterparts. The DEA (U.S. GAO, 1999b) is the federal lead agency (domestically and internationally) but operates under the general policy umbrella of the ONDCP. Drug-related policing in the United States is conducted by more than 50 federal law enforcement agencies, by military units, and by state and local police departments and agencies, linked by a bewildering array of organizational mechanisms. One consequence is that there is little agreement or common effort on what needs to be done, who has authority, who makes decisions, who controls tactics and policy in the field, how to share the material (e.g., forfeiture proceeds) and political (who gets their picture taken) rewards of success, and who gets the blame when things go wrong.

Individual federal U.S. law enforcement agencies have formal cooperative arrangements with Mexican authorities as well. Bilateral Border Task Forces, including the DEA and representatives from the Mexican prosecutor general's office, have cooperated and shared information in pursuit of Mexican drug cartels. Other examples include FBI training programs for Mexican law enforcement, ongoing since the late 1980s, and the willingness by the local FBI to provide training in forensic and evidentiary techniques for the Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, police to assist them in investigating the murders of women. Border patrol has programs such as training with Grupo Beta, the Mexican police unit developed to protect illegal immigrants from criminal attacks; border safety agreements; and a full-time Mexican liaison unit. The

U.S. Department of State has taken the lead in organizing border liaison mechanisms in some of the twin cities along the border. BLMs comprise U.S. and Mexican consuls, civic leaders, and Customs and law enforcement officials, all of whom meet to share information and discuss common problems, such as the civil rights of citizens, cooperation in auto theft cases and other transborder crimes, child abductions, or emergency situations (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1998). Largely in response to public outcry and media attention to the number of illegal immigrants who die while attempting to cross in desert areas, Operation BORSTAR (Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue) created highly specialized units whose mission it is to "respond to incidents involving distressed agents and migrants along the border" (U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2003c). Training in rescuing migrants who are abandoned or lost without food or water in the desert has been offered to about 400 Mexican officers in 2000 and 2001 (U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2003c).

However, when one talks to agents from federal U.S. agencies participating in the drug war, the assessment of the degree of cooperation is that it is anywhere from terrible to limited (personal communication, June 2003). Information is shared but guardedly and sensitive information is not shared at all. Rotella's (1998, p. 115) description of relations between border patrol and Grupo Beta in the San Diego–Tijuana border area illustrates the limits of cooperation as well as the impact of images on the cooperation that does exist. Cooperation produced a reduction in crimes against migrants (rapes and murders) and assaults on border patrol agents. Yet border patrol was angered by Grupo Beta's accusations of occasional misconduct by border patrol and "command-level relations were cordial, but tense" (Rotella, 1998, p. 115). Rotella also describes the role played by preexisting images on relationships, leading to mistrust in cooperative efforts:

> They [border patrol] saw Beta's help in the delicate area of drug interdiction as noticeably limited and noted that a commander of Beta had been found murdered execution-style, raising questions about whether he was connected to drug mafias. Moreover, Valenzuela [head of Grupo Beta] and his Mexico City bosses struck the Border Patrol chiefs as sneaky bureaucrats and anti-American leftists. The Mexicans, meanwhile, tended to see the Border Patrol chiefs as two-fisted cowboys in the Yankee imperialist mold. (p. 116)

Even this level of cooperation is missing in DEA perspectives of Mexico. It is important to note that the sole mission of the DEA is drug control. There is a single-minded focus on the job, an occupational culture that values effectiveness over process, and there is considerable distrust of other U.S. agencies, which consider good bilateral U.S.-Mexico relations as more important than the war on drugs (personal communication, June 2003; Bowden, 2002). In an interview, for example, one DEA agent referred to the CIA and state department as the "spooks" and "pukes," respectively. In the view of the DEA, cooperation is minimal, with both Mexican law enforcement and other U.S. agencies, such as the CIA and Department of State. Yet there are DEA offices in Mexico that liaise with the Mexican Federal Police, based on personal assessments of integrity and trust, and there is some confidence in the Mexican Beta (antidrug) units because the DEA vets their agents. (Beta units are not the same as Grupo Beta.)

The issue of vetting agents brings up a central operational problem for cooperation in border policing, as seen from the U.S. side: finding trustworthy counterparts in Mexico. Dealing

with the suspicion and reality of corruption affects the way policy is implemented. Mexican officers, who are equally suspicious of American police (maintaining that all the drugs coming into the United States could not enter or be distributed unless border controls and American law enforcement were corrupted to some degree), face a similar problem. Whom do you trust with intelligence and operational information? When stereotypes and experiences of corruption clash with policy requirements, stereotypes win out, contact will not be established, information will not be shared, and cooperation becomes almost random and based on personal relations rather than guidelines (González-Ruiz, Buscaglia, & Garcia-González, 2003). In the 1990s, the United States and the DEA insisted on vetting Mexican police officials with whom they had to work, a proposition that was rejected initially by the Mexican government but ultimately accepted for specialized drug-fighting units. “The DEA believes that the vetting process is our best chance at ensuring integrity with our counterparts” (DEA, 2000, pp. 5-6) ,yet also considers much of the implementation of vetting ineffective. It has not stopped corruption or the leakage of information shared with Mexican police.

Such suspicions result in many adjustments to organizational and legal rules (Nadelmann, 1993, pp. 286-310). The connections must be kept quiet, if not secret, to avoid Mexican officers from being persecuted for their collaboration with Americans or killed by fellow officers who work with drug traffickers; DEA agents must and do accept some forms of corruption by their contacts, as long as it is not related to their specific relationship; perceived political realities limit the targets after which one can go; and the relationship can be exploited to yield results. Mexican law and practices on interrogation are less restrictive than U.S. laws. Letting Mexican officers conduct interrogations in Mexico rather than bringing a suspect back to the United States (legally) may be more effective.[15]

Perhaps most important is the variance within U.S. agencies in perceptions of the levels of corruption in Mexican law enforcement and society as a whole. The FBI and border patrol acknowledge that corruption is a difficulty in bilateral law enforcement but also acknowledge that there are Mexican law enforcement units that are trustworthy. Nevertheless, they share information only on a need-to-know basis and are careful. Indeed, in an interview, one border patrol agent (personal communication, June 2003) indicated that they are not affected by corruption in Mexico simply because they do not give sensitive information to Mexican authorities. The same agent reported that Mexican law enforcement provides them with information and cooperates to catch criminals.

The issue of corruption is one of the most perplexing elements in cooperation or lack thereof. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the American fear of Mexican corruption is based on mythology and stereotypes versus hard data. No one knows exactly how pervasive corruption is in Mexico. The U.S. government is alleged to keep the true facts under wraps to have leverage with the Mexican government (personal communication, June 2003; Ramos, 2002). Moreover, from the Mexican perspective, the United States is either naive or disingenuous in its unwillingness to examine corruption and the impact of drug money within the United States. Bowden (2002) quotes one Mexican journalist with extensive experience covering the narcotics industry as follows:

> The Latin mafias are not really on the streets in the U.S. But the money from this illegal activity is in the U.S. banks. Mexico has bad guys, Colombia has bad guys, but the U.S. banks are not bad guys? That’s beautiful. The men from U.S. law enforcement think the bad guys are across the

> border. This is a big mistake. The drug question now has a simple answer: this is a crime. It is dangerous to the international community. The big business is in the U.S. It goes: I have coke, you have dollars, let's trade. The level of understanding of this question in the U.S. is like that of a child. It is a problem of penetration of the drug money into U.S. politics and the economy. In Mexico the corruption is in the streets and we fight it. In the U.S. everyone is like a child. . . . The drug business is being protected by a kind of narco-nationalism.[16] (p. 285)

Nationalism can also blow up in the face of cooperative efforts, as in the Anapra case along the Ciudad Juarez–El Paso border in 1992. This involved an FBI-sponsored sting of train robbers that resulted in a fiasco, including allegations that the FBI entered Mexican territory to rescue two agents who had been attacked, beaten, and dragged into Mexico when the sting went wrong. In the ensuing scandal, many Mexican agents who were involved in the sting were accused of treason for permitting American agents to engage in law enforcement in Mexico. This was not the first time Mexican nationalism has been inflamed by the presence of U.S. law enforcement personnel on Mexican soil. In 1999, 65 FBI agents helped Mexican Federal Judicial Police in the investigation of four ranches in Mexico believed to be the burial sites of up to 100 victims of drug-related murders. The presence of the FBI in Mexico was regarded by many citizens as a violation of Mexican sovereignty (Ramos, 2002).

In short, cooperation in the war on drugs along the U.S.-Mexico border is unsystematic, murky, and dependent on personal relationships rather than strong institutional bonds. There is considerable mistrust on each side at every level. Moreover, federal law enforcement agencies within each country are suspicious of each other. Cooperation is a necessity, but it does not take place in a mutually beneficial and trusting relationship.[17] It is consistently limited not only by the corrupting nature of the drug trade but also by mutual images and nationalism.

Canada and the United States

Ottawa and Washington, D.C. The policing situation in Canada is straightforward. The principal policing organization is the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP has specific national responsibilities and acts as the provincial police in eight of Canada's provinces. Ontario and Quebec provinces have their own provincial police forces. Nevertheless, cooperation and coordination with the United States is necessarily complicated in terms of the number of agencies involved because of the complexity and decentralization on the U.S. side.

The track record of cooperation at the nation-to-nation level in the northern border is the polar opposite of that along the southern border. Most Canadians visitors are not required to have visas to enter the United States; Mexican nationals are. There are programs to facilitate travel by frequent border crossers by preclearing them. It is a crime in Canada to conspire to violate U.S. laws. The central criminal activities are the same as those along the Mexico-U.S. border (drug trafficking, gun running, and illegal immigration). In addition, there are issues such as telemarketing and cyber crime across this border, criminal activities not involving actual physical border crossings. A recent issue of great concern to the United States is the entrance of anti–United States terrorists to the United States via Canada, a consequence in part of Canada's liberal immigration policy and the fact that it does not require visas for 29 countries from which the United States does require visas. This also makes it easy for Mexicans to come into the United States illegally. It is often cheaper to buy a ticket to Canada,

which requires no visa from Mexicans, and enter the United States through Canada than it is to hire a coyote to take one across the southern border.

Collaboration and cooperation between the United States and Canada is so intense and has such a long history that we cannot possibly list all the agreements here. Among the more important nation-to-nation efforts at cooperation in the 1990s, for example, is the Canada–United States Accord on Our Shared Border in 1995. The accord suggests initiatives regarding promotion of international trade; facilitation of border crossing by individuals; preventing drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal immigration; and reducing costs to the governments and the public. There is a coordinating committee with members from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (USINS), Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), U.S. Customs Service, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, the U.S. Department of State, and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (CIC, 2000). Also, in 1990, the United States and Canada signed a mutual legal assistance treaty that allows the exchange of information to be used in legal proceedings against suspected criminals. In 1994, the two countries signed an asset-sharing agreement so that assets seized from criminals during joint investigations can be divided.

The Shared Border Accord was enhanced by the Canada–U.S. Cross Border Crime Forum that has met annually since 1997. The forum is cochaired by the solicitor general of Canada and the attorney general of the United States and brings together officials from both countries to discuss transnational crime. In 1999, Prime Minister Chretien and President Clinton introduced the Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum (CUSP) to "promote high-level dialogue among governments, border communities, and stakeholders on border management" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2000, p. 1). This is an effort to "streamline, harmonize, and collaborate on border policies and management; expand co-operation to increase efficiencies in Customs, immigration, law enforcement, and environmental protection at and beyond the border; and collaborate on threats outside Canada and the United States" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2000, p. 1). Additional agreements designed to accomplish goals set forth in these agreements are USINS-CIC Border Vision and Cross Border Crime Forum. Clearly, the border and its management receive top-level executive attention and multilevel and multiagency cooperation.

In terms of the drug problem in particular, in the case of Canada and the United States, despite different philosophies regarding drug abuse and the drug war, cooperation and collaboration takes place as if among equals. The United States spends about $18 billion a year on the war on drugs, about 70% of that on law enforcement. Canada's basic approach (Fisher, 1998), in rhetoric if not always in policy, is that drugs, especially marijuana, are a social problem. Policy needs to seek to reduce the harm done to individuals and society, and that means a focus on treatment and prevention, with law enforcement the last preference, and then a focus mainly on hard drugs and trafficking, not consumption. About 70% of Canada's drug effort is targeted to treatment and prevention. As is the case in Mexico, alcohol and nicotine are seen as the major gateway substances for further involvement in consumption.

Canadians have some of the complaints Mexicans have about U.S. behavior: The drug problem is created and sustained in the United States, yet the United States wants concessions, legal changes, and different policy priorities but offers little in return except threats and does not recognize the need for Canada to protect its own system of laws and norms of justice. A policy of harm reduction

> would mean a significant erosion of traditional prohibition ideology on the North American continent [and] would have to be launched against enormous American pressure and sanctions that might far exceed the area of drug control, a rather grim prospect for Canada, a country so unilaterally dependent on the United States in socio-economic terms. (Fisher, 1998, p. 174)

Canada has not yet changed completely to a harm-reduction policy because of real or predicted pressures.

Another example is the U.S. 1999 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, which explicitly presents as one of its goals to "work to strengthen [Canadian] legislation and regulatory practice in an effort to bring them more in line with U.S. practice" (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 1999, p. 5). Demands for banking regulation reform to assist the United States in controlling money laundering or changes in border control mechanisms (e.g., visa requirements) to help in U.S. immigration at the Canada-U.S. border have a long history.

Although, as noted earlier, drug trafficking across the Canada-U.S. border has increased substantially in recent years, unlike the attitude toward Mexico's role in the drug trafficking area, Americans see the drug trafficking across the northern border as a two-way street (they acknowledge that drugs cross from the United States into Canada) and, most significantly, that the culprits are criminals rather than the citizens of Canada (or parenthetically, the United States). For example, the deputy chief of the U.S. border patrol in Blaine, Washington, explains the problem, as follows:

> The U.S./Canada Border is significantly different than our border with Mexico in that most of the smuggling on our Southern Border is northbound, whereas smuggling along the Border in Blaine Sector is both north and south. In fact, it is common to have the same smugglers moving illegal contraband in both directions. Their bottom line is profit. (U.S. Congress, 1999, p. 17)

This analysis stands in stark contrast to the statement by then DEA Director Tom Constantine to the effect that "there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with whom DEA has a trusting relationship" (U.S. Congress, 1997, p. H961). The implication is that Mexicans themselves are to blame rather than criminal organizations. This difference in perception exists despite the fact that corruption occurs in the United States (a former FBI official stated that law enforcement in the United States is thoroughly corrupted 30 miles deep from the Mexican border) and in Canada (in August 2000, for example, U.S. Customs and DEA officers seized 240 pounds of BC bud from a Canadian military vehicle crossing into the United States). Moreover, the deputy chief's statement discounts the extent to which the drug industry does thrive as a two-way business at the southern border, particularly in the weapons smuggling from the United States to Mexico.

The language of government statements regarding the realm of drug trafficking is glowing. Differences between the United States and Canada in laws and perspectives on the drug war are not interpreted by Americans as indications that the Canadians are corrupt, unreliable, or not doing their share to protect American consumers from illegal substances. For example, in a press interview announcing the successful arrest of more than 100 people in Operation Mountain Express III in January 2002, U.S. officials praised their Canadian counterparts for their contribution to the operation, calling it a "great example of law enforcement agencies working together" (DEA, 2002, p. 3). When questioned about Canadian law, the following exchange took place:

> Interviewer: You thank the Canadian law enforcement agencies for their role in assisting you in this. But do you not think that the Canadian government has been negligent in not clamping down on the use of pseudoephedrine in Canada sooner?
>
> Hutchinson (DEA administrator): Let me just say from a very positive standpoint, we want them to move expeditiously. This is very important to what we are trying to accomplish in the United States, and we urge the Canadian government to move as quickly as possible to enact regulatory legislation.
>
> Mr. Bonner: Could I just add one thing to that? And that is I want to echo Administrator Hutchinson's comment, and that is that we had incredibly good cooperation from Canadian law enforcement. . . . In fact, they were extremely helpful. (DEA, 2002, p. 5)

There has been some debate at the national level regarding Canada's movement toward decriminalization of the personal use of marijuana, such as statements by American authorities to the effect that this action would produce a virtual shutdown of the border. Nationalism was evident in the Canadian response, as exemplified by the response of a Vancouver member of Parliament: "We can't be subservient to the ridiculous rhetoric coming out of the United States" (Anderssen, 2002, p. A5). But even this rhetoric was limited and was not transformed into an allegation that all Canadians are potheads. The same is the case for policies on pseudoephedrine, a major import from Canada into the United States that has been blamed on "an inadequate chemical control regime" in Canada, which now has been replaced by a new regulatory system (White House, 2004, p. 46). Things were worked out through negotiations and friendly persuasion.[18]

Officials in the United States repeatedly express frustration with Canada's immigration and visa policies, which, as mentioned above, are far more liberal than those in the United States. This, U.S. officials believe, facilitates illegal immigration from other countries through Canada to the United States and, more important, makes it easier for terrorists to attack the United States. However, this frustration is expressed in, for Americans, very polite and respectful terms. For example, the sheriff of Whatcom County in Washington said that "our friends to the north, the Canadians, are good neighbors but I must tell you that I too am troubled by their liberal immigration policies" (U.S. Congress, 1999, p. 37). A report from the U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2000) report on CUSP makes an equally equitable comment, noting that Canada and the United States have visa waivers for countries for which the other does not and that "legal changes in one or both countries can be useful in some cases, such as the amendment before the U.S. Congress in 2000 that would allow U.S. consular officers overseas to share visa application information with Canadian consular offices." Both countries share responsibility, both could and conceivably should change their laws, and the example refers to change by the United States. This is an expression of perceived equality.

Project Northern Star, which started in 1990, perhaps best illustrates the differences in cooperation at the nation-to-nation level when the two borders are examined. In contrast to Operation Alliance at the Mexico-U.S. border, Operation North Star was developed with the participation of Canadian law enforcement and military personnel. It was designed to improve and systematize cooperation in drug trafficking as well as the smuggling of tobacco, liquor, and weapons into Canada from the United States (Knorr, 1995). This reflects both an understanding that Canadian officials had to be involved in the development of the plan and that smuggling is a two-way street. The organization and decision-making practices also reflect equality. Law enforcement efforts are integrated through three joint coordination

groups comprising four law enforcement members from each U.S. border state (reflecting the law enforcement levels in the United States: state, county, municipal, and national guard) and an RCMP officer from each province, plus provincial police representatives from Quebec and Ontario. The Northern Star strategy developed by these groups was done on the basis of consensus.

At the Border. Cooperation at the local level at the northern border is repeatedly reported to be very good. Information, technology, and databases are shared; agencies engage in joint U.S.-Canada operations; and complaints at the local level on both sides of the border revolve primarily around frustration with limited resources. The cooperation described by the deputy chief of the U.S. border patrol in Blaine, Washington, is typical:

> By far the best strategy that has been developed along the Border is the operational liaison and intelligence that the Sector has been able to establish with other law enforcement agencies. This includes working closely with U.S. Customs, the DEA, local law enforcement agencies and with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Canada. Each of our individual agencies has limited manpower along the border, so we have developed a unique Border Management posture. We have treated the border as a common entity and made great strides in not only sharing intelligence, but in actually working joint operations. We share common radio frequency and are in constant contact as we work along both sides of the border. (U.S. Congress, 1999, p. 17)

Cooperation between federal law enforcement agencies on the border is close. There is the Bilateral Consultative Group on Counterterrorism that works on preventive measures. Integrated border enforcement teams (IBETs) are being established along the entire border. These involve a number of agencies on both sides of the border, including border patrol, the FBI, the DEA, the RCMP, and Customs Canada, among others. The IBETs share information relevant to border management, from smuggling drugs and other contraband to illegal immigration to information regarding terrorist threats. They are, as border patrol agents will tell you, merely the formalization of what is going on anyway (personal communication, June 2003). Most significantly, in terms of indicators of the degree of cooperation between U.S. and Canadian law enforcement, the IBET plan was a grassroots scheme created by border patrol and the RCMP. Border patrol and DEA agents report strong trust in the RCMP and see it as very similar to its U.S. counterpart. They respect each other's national sovereignty as well. In one interview, a border patrol agent noted that although decriminalization of marijuana in Canada may make border patrol's job harder, it is a sovereign nation and can do as it pleases.

In fact, nationalism tends to be more of a problem for cooperation at the nation-to-nation level, in the case of Canada-U.S. relations, than at the border. American agents at the Canada border indicate that cooperation and trust is so extensive that they would freely come to the aid of their Canadian counterparts even if it meant crossing the border with a weapon. Complaints about U.S. efforts to violate Canadian sovereignty tend to occur more often at the national level.[19]

Differences in national policies have slowed progress at the local level regarding CUSP goals, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, temporarily pushed back cooperation regarding rapid border crossings. But the rapid border crossing program, which requires Canadian background checks of Canadian applicants and U.S. background checks of U.S. applicants, has been restored quickly through the NEXUS and Fastlane programs. It reflects

the degree of trust between the two countries as well. In contrast, rapid border crossing background checks on the U.S.-Mexico border are done entirely by American authorities. In addition, U.S. inspectors carry firearms and Canadians do not. Inspectors in the United States are not permitted to carry arms when on duty in Canada. But this is accepted and understood as a legitimate product of two different systems, whereas it is the basis for a chronic complaint in U.S.-Mexican relations.[20]

Reflections

Much of the information provided here and the interpretations argued should not be surprising. Of course, the borders are different. Even though crime and security problems fit the same categories—drug trafficking, normal crime, terrorists, and illegal border crossing—they differ in degree. The borders also reflect unequal levels of economic development and political power among Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The Mexico-U.S. border is the largest line of direct contact between the developed and the developing world, whereas Canada and the United States have achieved similar levels of economic development. But there is more to the obvious. NAFTA seems to have encouraged the promotion of a seamless border with Canada and the development of a virtual war to prevent the same thing from occurring on the southern U.S. border. The smart border agreement negotiated and signed between Canada and the United States in December 2001 (White House, 2002c) reflects and reinforces the creation of a seamless border zone between the two countries, whereas a similar agreement with Mexico, announced by President Bush in March 2002 (White House, 2002b), seems not to have made much progress. Cooperation is much greater in the north than it is in the south, and we have argued that this difference in treatment and policies is the product of the image of Mexico compared to Canada held by the U.S. policy makers and the public alike, and the role of nationalism, as much as functional needs.[21] The related issue, whether and how defense of the external border can be entrusted to the countries adjacent to it (i.e., Germany has to depend for its internal security on the border control efforts by Spain and Poland), has a different answer for the European Union (EU) than it will have for NAFTA. In the EU, that trust (with variations) exists. But it is extremely unlikely that the NAFTA area will see a disappearance of internal borders, a la the EU, given the power of imagery. It is difficult to even imagine that any U.S. politician or law enforcement official will advocate that the United States trust Canada or Mexico to protect the United States.

Much of the border control problem is driven by the insatiable demand for drugs in the United States. The political psychology of nationalism leads to the expectation that proud, nationalistic people cannot blame themselves for their problem.[22] And in the case of drug trafficking across these two borders, Americans manage to blame someone else for America's drug problem: Mexicans along the southern border (perceived as inferior and incapable of resisting temptation and corruption) and Canadian and other criminals along the northern border (Canadians are equals and therefore much like Americans, so personal and cultural weaknesses cannot explain the flow of drugs). Moreover, the perception of relative equality enables Americans to admit that drugs (and other illegal goods) flow both ways, and it also enables them to accept without complaining the fact that American law enforcement personnel are prohibited from carrying weapons in Canada. In Mexico, however, the DEA (as well as other policing agencies) complain loudly and often about the same prohibition.

Of course, cooperation between Canada and the United States is not without its problems. The Canadians do complain about the Americans' high-handedness. But the interaction and the complaints are nowhere near the extreme that they are in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. This raises the question why, if the United States perceives Canadians as equals, it still is accused of imperial-like behavior. There are three possible explanations. First, American arrogance may be a result of American nationalism and the assumption that if Americans' identity is threatened, someone has to do something and quickly. This is illustrated in the terrorist border crossing issue (but still, American official policy statements reflect the normal diplomatic courtesies expected among equals). Second, it may reflect the fact that Canada is perceived as an ally, but being weaker in capability, its fit into the image is less than perfect. And third, it may be a consequence of Canadian nationalistic sensitivities, which are alert to being bossed around by a more powerful neighbor.

The main point we have argued is that needs and policy are not the only forces that drive cross- border law enforcement cooperation and conflicts. Rather, the capacity to work together results from multiple factors, including mutual imagery and nationalism. These patterns of influences on cooperation will not change because of the NAFTA overlay or the emergence of terror as the dominant U.S. security concern. Nor does the creation of NAFTA affect the power of policing agencies and personnel to exercise discretion, especially at the local levels, on how to implement policy directives. Discretionary decisions to cooperate or not, in what manner, and for what purposes are channeled by imagery as much as by objective assessments of each other's capacity and will. The likelihood that NAFTA will evolve into a seamless economic unit with a common set of policies on enforcing border control and transit is quite low, for that will only happen when images, stereotypes, and the force of nationalistic sentiments decrease in salience and intensity among all partners, but most so in the United States, the dominant economic and political partner of the region. The prospects for that small revolution happening are dim.

Notes

1. Although Andreas (2003), discussing possible reactions by the United States to future terrorist attacks, notes that "U.S. images and perceptions of its NAFTA partners will be crucial" (p. 16), his analysis of border problems and police preferences stays resolutely within the economic interests versus threats to security and within the functional needs framework.

2. The drug war in the Americas has been the subject of numerous studies (Bagley, 1989; Bagley & Walker, 1994; Council on Foreign Relations, 1997; Friman, 1995; Johns, 1992; Mawbry, 1988; Reuter & Ronfeldt, 1992; Ryan, 1998; Sheptycki, 1996).

3. Interviews (i.e., personal communication) were conducted by M. Cottam with law enforcement officials at the Washington-Canada border and the Texas-Mexico border and with academics, journalists, and citizens in El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, in 2002 and 2003. This was a small convenience sample. The interviews were designed as explorations of sentiments and attitudes held by people involved in or familiar with border control issues and policies.

4. The projected solution to this dilemma emphasizes, as is to be expected, enhanced technological capacities to screen and analyze border traffic (e.g., giant x-ray machines that can scan a truck in one pass, license plate readers linked to a national database, and software programs to develop risk scores for vehicles and containers); better coordinated and more extensive intelligence, often collected overseas, available on time at the borders; prescreening and preclearing arrangements for traffic at ports of departure as a way of extending "the zone of security outward, so that borders become [the] last line of defense rather than [the] first line of defense" (Ridge, 2003, p. 4; see also Koslowski, 2003; U.S. Customs Service, 2002); and the mandated or voluntary cooperation of private individuals and businesses in sharing information with government agencies.

5. These percentages were calculated from statistics provided by the U.S. DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (2004). Interestingly enough, there are no separate statistics in these summary data for the Canada-U.S. border.

6. This estimate seems rather low. "'It would take a million people, I suppose—maybe more' said Paul. H. O'Neill, the secretary of the treasury, which oversees Customs" (Weiner, 2002, p. A14). A Customs agent who patrols a 100-mile stretch of the border is quoted as stating that "this border is open. Policing it cannot be done" (Weiner, 2002, p. A14).

7. One of the truly odd silences in the analysis and policy discussion of how to stop terrorists from crossing into the United States is that there is little discussion in the public rhetoric of terrorists coming across the unguarded border (i.e., in the spaces between official crossing points). Two points merit mention here. To start with, the border is truly unguarded, especially the northern border. Discussions of how many border control agents work at the borders, typically stated as so many border miles for each agent, are completely misleading. Merely dividing the length of the border by the number of agents employed takes no account of shifts, vacations, absences, concentration of agents at official crossing points, or those engaged in office work. Yet despite the fact that the agents know the border is effectively unguarded by human work, discussions of how terrorists might come into the United States always focus on official crossings and what might be done there by technological, intelligence, animal, and human initiatives to detect likely incursions. Even the 9/11 report released in July 2004, when discussing terrorists, talks only about official crossings (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004).

Second, until quite recently, U.S. agencies have focused on terrorists crossing from Canada, with little mention of the southern border. The reasons for this are not clear. We would argue two explanations. Terrorists trying to cross from Canada have been caught but none so far from Mexico. Experience points to the northern border; historical myopia has set in. Second, there seems to be the implicit assumption that (Arab) terrorists would have greater trouble mingling or being undetected in Mexico or finding guides to help smuggle them across, whereas they can submerge more easily in the more culturally diverse and more Westernized milieu of Canada. The reason why U.S. agencies assume terrorists will cross at official borders is hard to fathom. Terrorists have routinely walked across borders elsewhere, outside the NAFTA area, such as from training camps in Afghanistan or Lebanon into Pakistan, Iran, or Syria. It could be that U.S. border officials assume that terrorists could not carry what they need to commit their acts in backpacks, which is hardly a reasonable assumption, though.

This may be changing. The above two paragraphs were written in 2003, initially. Now, in August 2004, some awareness of the possibility or likelihood that terrorists might actually walk across the borders, as drug runners and illegal immigrants do, seems to have crept into the thinking of policy circles and border controllers. The U.S. DHS, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs announced on August 9, 2004, that border patrol agents would be given "sweeping new powers to deport illegal aliens from the frontiers with Mexico and Canada" on their own discretion, without giving the persons caught a chance to appeal their deportation before overworked immigrant court judges. In announcing this new policy, Asa Hutchinson, undersecretary for border security, also noted that "there is a concern that as we tighten the security of our ports of entry through biometric checks that there will be more opportunity or more efforts made by terrorists to enter our country through our vast land border" and that border patrol agents would concentrate on illegal immigrants who were not from Mexico (Swarns, 2004, pp. A1, A11).

One reason for this increase in attention and shift in policy, in addition to the large number of illegal crossers, may have been the detention by border patrol officers of a potential terrorist suspect at the McAllen-Miller airport in Texas after she had swum across the Rio Grande. Her still-wet jeans in her luggage was the clue (Blumenthal, 2004, p. A13). At the Canadian border, Customs and immigration officials recently announced the establishment of five bases from which fixed wing aircrafts and helicopters would patrol the border. As one pilot noted, "if they can get drugs through, they can get terrorists through" (Johnson, 2004, p. 5A).

8. The fragmentation, overlap, and infighting among policing agencies in the United States is well known (and depicted routinely in movies and television) and has existed at the borders for a long time. Nadelmann (1993, p. 63) lists more than 20 agencies, including some vigilante groups, doing border control in the 1860s at the Mexican border.

9. The official rhetoric acknowledges this reality but also attempts to assuage the feelings of agencies losing clout: "While counterterrorism has become the number one priority of Customs, the fight against drugs smuggling is still of paramount importance" (*CBP Statistics and Accomplishments*, 2004).

10. Jamieson, south, & Taylot (1998a) argue that the "dismissal of the idea of Canadian identity is one of the most problematic aspects of the advance of free trade during the 1908s and 1990s" (p. 252), the lead-up years to NAFTA negotiations, and they note the continued "stubborn play of Canadianicity at the border" (Jamieson, South, & Taylor, 1998b, p. 310).

11. As expressed by Jamieson et al. (1998b),

> the understandings which agents bring to this work will be informed by the different kinds of common-sense interpretation which are brought to the practical understanding of particular cross-border threats, their origins and source, their relevance in terms of border-crossing, and the most likely ways in which such cross-border threats are to be encountered. (p. 299)

National policies and priorities do not control the discretionary understandings and actions of local border police.

12. Congress mandated in 1986 that the Department of State prepare an annual report, the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, on the extent to which drug producing and transiting countries that have received INL (the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs office in the Department of State) support have met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The annual reports assess the production of illegal drugs and drug control efforts undertaken by each country.

The president, on the basis of this report, must report to Congress and certify that the countries in question have done a satisfactory job in the war on drugs. Countries that fail to be certified may be denied all U.S. aid not related to the antinarcotics efforts, and the United States may vote against their requests in six international financial institutions. If a country does not pass certification, specific sanctions are applied by law.

13. Personal notes taken by the authors on a presentation by Mora (2002).

14. Serrano (2003) argues that the

> expansion of the military's role in drug and border control, the development of mobile forces, interagency operational teams, as well as the creation of a bilateral high level contact group, are all good examples of how the process of defining [common] security policies has taken place under duress rather than through convergence. (p. 54)

15. Alejandro Enrique Hoyodan, a suspected member of the Tijuana drug scene and an American citizen, was abducted and detained illegally for 80 days by Mexican military authorities; interrogated and tortured (by his account); and visited by an American embassy official who observed him handcuffed and blindfolded to a bed in an unused barracks near Guadalajara. The consular official decided to take no action. A Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent also interviewed Hoyodan at that time. After deciding to give information, Hoyodan was transferred to drug headquarters in Mexico City and flown out of the country by DEA agents. A DEA spokesman stated that there was no indication that Hoyodan had been mistreated while in custody. "Every time the D.E.A. saw this guy, he was walking around having a good time. When we see him, he's not bruised, no beaten, no chile peppers up his nose, no signs of duress" (Dillon, 1997, p. A4). Yet American officials involved in the case "now acknowledge that they were too willing to turn a blind eye to the methods used by the Mexican military to secure Mr. Hoyodan's cooperation" (Dillon, 1997, p. A4).

16. Controlling money laundering, which is one strategy in the U.S. war on drugs, does not routinely enter the discussion of stopping the drug traffic itself. Money laundering investigations are conducted by a different set of national and local agencies. Annual International Narcotics Strategy Reports issued by the State Department typically name the United States as the largest money-laundering country, which is not surprising given the size of the U.S. economy, but this is not an issue that affects border management in any significant way.

17. The dynamics and patterns cooperation among local law enforcement agencies on both sides of the border may be quite different, as suggested by journalistic accounts. Local police know each other fairly well professionally and socially; they deal with normal crimes that happen to cross international borders rather than internal jurisdictional borders (hence, they tend to treat the international border as if it where just another jurisdictional line); and they are equally distrustful of the national government coming into their areas and telling them what to do. But such interactions are little studied so far, as is, of course, the impacts of imagery and nationalistic sentiments on the capacity and willingness for cooperation. That is true of both the Mexico-U.S. and Canada-U.S. borders.

18. Pseudoephedrine is a precursor chemical for the production of amphetamines.

19. This practice has existed among local law enforcement as well. One of our graduate students, who used to be a sheriff's deputy in Wyoming, told us that he routinely was asked by Canadian officers to come and work on

their side when they had received information that a dangerous person was likely to cross. They wanted his gun on their side, and he obliged.

20. In addition, there is considerable interaction between official agencies on both sides of the border and private stakeholders who do business across or along the border. The Cascadia Project is an example. It is a “coalition of government, business and non-governmental organizations in British Colombia, Washington and Oregon dedicated to developing transborder strategies that focus on sustainable communities, cross-border mobility and improved regional transportation, trade and tourism linkages” (U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2000, p. 9).

21. Developments within the EU provide an instructive example and analogy. As the defense of security for the EU has shifted to its enlarging external borders, cooperative agreements and arrangements in the border zones along the former and now internal to the EU national borders (similar to the Canada-U.S. border) have emerged. Borders have become regions instead of lines, as people see the need to have functional arrangements that straddle former borders (Bort, 2003; Ceyhan, 2001; Hobbing, 2003; Nogala, 2001).

22. Controlling the flow of drugs was too sensitive a topic for inclusion in the NAFTA talks.

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